DiTanna v. Edwards

323 So.3d 194

Michael DITANNA, Appellant,

v.Blake EDWARDS, Appellee.

No. 4D20-1619

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[June 30, 2021]

Christopher B. Hopkins and Craig S. Distel of McDonald Hopkins LLC, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Dave K. Roy of Roy & Associates, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Warner, J.

In this appeal from a final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic violence, appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that he had engaged in stalking or cyberstalking, because he had a legitimate purpose in reporting appellee's actions to authorities and persons affected by appellee's conduct. He also contends that the resulting injunction infringes on his First Amendment rights. Additionally, appellant argues no proof existed that his actions caused substantial emotional distress.

Because appellant's communications provided information about appellee to law enforcement, to appellee's hospital employer, and to a gym about appellee's behavior, those communications did serve, at least in part, a legitimate purpose. Thus, those actions cannot support the final judgment of injunction or its restrictions on communications to law enforcement authorities or the hospital employer of appellee. As to appellant's remaining actions, we conclude that no legitimate purpose was shown, and those actions support the final judgment, as collectively, they would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress. To the extent that the final judgment constitutes a prior restraint in preventing appellant from speaking with appellee's employer, we conclude that the court erred.

We thus reverse that portion of the final judgment restricting communications with third parties about appellee but otherwise affirm as to all other issues raised.

Prior to the events that led to appellee filing a verified petition for protection against domestic violence, he and appellant had been in a relationship for a little over two years, and they had lived together during some of that time period. Appellee was a doctor at a hospital at the time their relationship ended on May 14, 2020, and that is when the events occurred that led appellee to seek the injunction.

On June 6, 2020, appellee filed a petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence alleging that appellant was stalking appellee. Attached to the petition, but not introduced into evidence at the hearing, were text messages purportedly between appellee and appellant. Generally, the texts from appellant expressed concern that appellee was cheating on appellant, but the messages also stated that appellee was lying to people, and appellant was going to share with others information that he found on the laptop that appellee was using.

The trial court entered an ex parte temporary injunction and set a hearing to determine if a final judgment should be entered. At the hearing, appellee did not have a lawyer present, but appellant was represented.

Appellee stated that he was on leave from the hospital because of allegations made by appellant to the hospital. He testified that on May 14th, he woke up to find appellant saying that he had gone through appellee's phone, and he was leaving. Appellee asked appellant not to leave. Appellant pushed appellee to the floor and took a photo of appellee. Appellant also took some of his belongings when he left. After he left, appellant began questioning appellee about cheating, and his threats escalated. "[H]e contacted my work. He's - - he's threatened to contact the gym I go to. He's threatened to contact the bank where I have my mortgage. He has contacted many of my neighbors with false allegations telling them that they need to protect their children from me. He has contacted my family. He has threatened my mother and stepfather. He has told me that he was going to make one of my best friends lose their job, as well."

Sometime before the May incident, appellee testified that appellant had grabbed him and twisted his arm. A year earlier, appellant had cracked his laptop.

Since the temporary injunction was granted, appellee testified that he had been contacted from "numerous, anonymous accounts with ... information ... sensitive to my work that no one else has known." Appellant has sent out "highly detailed sexual information" to random people that appellee stated that neither he nor appellant have ever contacted before now.

On cross-examination, appellee admitted that he had never filed a police report against appellant for physical violence. He was aware that appellant lives in New York but stated that appellant visited Florida frequently. Appellee agreed that appellant never asked in any of the text messages exchanged between them for anything in exchange for not sharing that information. Despite appellee telling appellant to stop contacting him, he admitted that he later texted appellant because of the threatening nature of appellant's texts.

Appellant then testified, initially in response to court questions. He confirmed that he had known appellee since September 2017. The court asked if he sent the text and "all of this" and appellant answered yes. (Although the texts attached to the petition were not admitted into evidence, we assume "all of this" refers to those texts.)

Appellant testified that during their breakup he made "some really disturbing discoveries" on his laptop which appellee had been using. He was in the process of reporting them to the authorities. At that point, the court asked appellant if he believed appellee was cheating on him, and he responded that he did. He said that he reported information not in regard to cheating but to "health risks to myself and criminal activity that I've discovered." The court then asked if appellant believed that appellee was sleeping around, and he replied that he did not. The court asked why he simply did not go back to New York and break off the relationship. Appellant replied that he did remove himself, but he discovered things "so egregious, I felt a moral and ethical obligation to report them to the authorities. And that's what I did."

The court asked if appellant texted appellee's neighbors and work and he responded that he submitted formal complaints through "the correct channels at the hospital." He told the judge that friends were telling him that appellee was having contact with "many, many people in the middle of quarantine."

When the court finished its questions, appellant's attorney commenced his examination of appellant. Appellant testified that he spent ninety-five percent of his time in Manhattan. He comes to Florida occasionally, staying mostly in the northern part of the state but comes to Miami about twice a year.

Appellant showed the court a video he took of the night he left appellee, but the video is not part of the record. Appellant testified that he did not push appellee to the floor, but appellee tried to prevent him from leaving.

The attorney then showed appellant a document on an iPad which he identified as a conversation between appellee and appellee's personal friend which he had seen on the laptop appellee had been using. This document was not offered into evidence. Appellant testified that he submitted it to the CEO at the hospital where appellee worked, because the conversation within the document included a sexual comment made by appellee regarding an underage patient. Another conversation involved sexual relationships at the hospital. With COVID-19, "I think it was a significant risk to - - a risk to myself, and the community, and the patients at the hospital, quite frankly." Based upon the information he saw on the laptop, he also turned it over to the police, who still had the laptop as of the hearing date.

After appellant's counsel completed his direct of appellant, appellee questioned appellant. Appellee asked if appellant had threatened to contact the gym he frequented to report that appellee was taking inappropriate photos of people. Appellant responded that he was not threatening, because he actually did report to the gym that he witnessed photos taken of other members with sexual comments attached, which was a violation of the gym's express policies. Appellant admitted that he joined the same national gym chain in order to report what he found.

Appellee asked whether appellant had contacted neighbors telling them to protect their children from him. Appellant replied that he had only contacted one neighbor whose phone number he obtained from a text message to appellee. He admitted to contacting a friend of appellee who worked at the same hospital, whom he reached out to for "general advice." Appellant also contacted another friend with whom appellee had a sexual relationship when he was not with appellant. Appellant contacted this friend, because he was concerned about appellee cheating on exams and asked the friend if that was true. There is no testimony as to why appellant would think that this friend had any information or relevance to cheating by appellee. Appellant added that he reached out to all of these people, because he also discovered that appellee had hidden recording devices in his apartment, and he wanted to warn them of "potentially a risk."

Appellant admitted contacting appellee's work, emailing appellee's boss at the hospital three times, and having five to ten different conversations with the hospital telling them about anything that he thought was "criminal activity." The most recent contact that appellant had with the hospital was in the end of June with "the director of risk at the hospital who is leading the investigation."

After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that appellee proved his case of stalking. The court stated, "if the Court believed that [appellant's] intentions were pure, that's one thing. The Court does not. The Court finds his testimony to be not credible." The court entered an injunction for two years. The injunction provided that appellant shall have...