Divine v. Volunteers of Am. of Ill.

319 F.Supp.3d 994

Taylor DIVINE, Plaintiff,

v.VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA OF ILLINOIS, Defendant.

No. 17 C 8127

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed August 8, 2018

Justin Harold Lessner, Michael J. Modl, Axley Brynelson, LLP, Paul A. Kinne, Gingras, Cates & Wachs, Madison, WI, Kevin Robert O'Neill, Thomas G. Griffin, Walker Wilcox Matousek LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff

Bryan David LeMoine, Brian Murphy O'Neal, Rex P. Fennessey, McMahon Berger PC, St. Louis, MO, Terrence Buehler, The Law Office of Terrence Buehler, Chicago, IL, for Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Chief Judge Rubén Castillo

Taylor Divine ("Plaintiff") brings this putative class action against her former employer, Volunteers of America of Illinois ("Defendant"), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C § 216(b), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/1. (R. 39, Am. Compl.) Defendant brings a counterclaim alleging that Plaintiff violated the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2701, by accessing Defendant's email system without proper authorization. (R. 44, Def.'s Answer & Countercl. ¶¶ 16-23.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, to strike Plaintiff's prayer for declaratory relief. (R. 41, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Defendant separately moves to strike Plaintiff's affirmative defenses to Defendant's SCA counterclaim. (R. 48, Def.'s Mot. to Strike.) For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss or to strike Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief, and grants Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's affirmative defenses.

BACKGROUND

On or about September 19, 2016, Plaintiff was hired as a "case aide" by Defendant.

(R. 39, Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff contends that while working as a case aide, she was classified as exempt from overtime requirements, allegedly based upon the "learned professional" exemption. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff claims that the duties she performed as a case aide did not satisfy the learned professional exemption. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff asserts that she was not paid overtime while employed by Defendant as a case aide despite working a "substantial" number of overtime hours. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)

On or about November 1, 2016, Plaintiff was promoted and began training for a new position as a "case manager." (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff started working in this position on or about December 1, 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) She claims that during this period, she again worked a "substantial" number of overtime hours without any additional pay. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant classified the case manager position as exempt from overtime requirements under the learned professional exemption, even though the duties of a case manager did not satisfy the test for the exemption. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brought this action on November 9, 2017, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated case aides and case managers. (R. 1, Compl.) On February 14, 2018, she filed an amended complaint asserting claims under the FLSA and IMWL. (R. 39, Am. Compl.) On February 26, 2018, Defendant answered Plaintiff's amended complaint and filed its counterclaim (R 44, Def.'s Answer & Countercl.) On February 28, 2018, Plaintiff answered Defendant's counterclaim and asserted various affirmative defenses. (R. 45, Pl.'s Answer & Affirm. Defenses.)

Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint or, alternatively, to strike her prayer for declaratory relief. (R. 42, Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either the FLSA or the IMWL because her amended complaint contains only conclusory allegations regarding the number of hours she worked and other matters. (Id. at 1.) Defendant further contends that even if Plaintiff states a claim, she cannot seek declaratory relief because there is no suggestion that she is in "immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury." (Id. ) In response, Plaintiff argues that she adequately asserted claims under both the FLSA and the IMWL, and that her request for declaratory relief is proper. (R. 52, Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 2.)

Defendant separately moves to strike Plaintiff's affirmative defenses. (R. 48, Def.'s Mot. to Strike.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff's affirmative defenses are either legally invalid or not adequately pleaded. (Id. at 1-2.) In response, Plaintiff contends that her affirmative defenses are legally viable and properly pleaded. (R. 57, Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. to Strike at 6.) Both motions are now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). Motions to strike are "generally disfavored" because they may unnecessarily delay the proceedings. Siegel v. HSBC Holdings, plc. , 283 F.Supp.3d 722, 730 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (citation omitted). However, a motion to strike is proper "when it serves to remove unnecessary clutter" and thereby expedites the case. Id. (citation omitted). Affirmative defenses subject to a motion to strike are examined using a three-part test: (1) the defense must be a proper affirmative defense, (2) it must be adequately pleaded under Rules 8 and 9; and (3) it must be able to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. Hughes v. Napleton's Holdings, LLC , No. 15 C 50137, 2016 WL 6624224, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2016).

ANALYSIS

I. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

A. Plaintiff's Overtime Claims

Defendant first contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief because the amended complaint contains no "facts" that would make her claims for unpaid overtime plausible. (R. 42, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) The Court disagrees. "Ever since their adoption in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have required plaintiffs to plead claims rather than facts corresponding to the elements of a legal theory." Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop. , 875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017). Thus, "it is manifestly inappropriate for a district court to demand that complaints contain all legal elements (or factors) plus facts corresponding to each." Id. Rather, "[a] full description of the facts that will prove the plaintiff's claim comes later, at the summary-judgment stage or in the pretrial order." Id. All that is required at the pleading stage is enough detail to allow the Court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Plaintiff meets that standard.

The FLSA and IMWL both require employers to pay employees one and one-half times their regular hourly wage for hours worked beyond forty hours a week, unless an exemption applies.¹ See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) ; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/4a(1). Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendant as a case aide between September 2016 and November 2016, and during this period worked a substantial number of overtime hours without any overtime pay. (R. 39, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-11.) She further alleges that between December 2016 and March 2017, she worked for Defendant as a case manager, and again worked a substantial number of overtime hours without any additional pay. (Id. ¶¶ 12-20.) She claims that during the entirety of her employment, Defendant applied a blanket overtime exclusion for case aides and case managers, based on Defendant's view that these positions qualified as "learned professionals." (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff asserts that these positions do not meet the test for the learned professional exemption. (Id. ¶ 18.) The Court finds that these allegations, taken together, are sufficient to assert a plausible claim for overtime pay. See, e.g., Hancox v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc. , No. 17-CV-01821, 2018 WL 3496086, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2018) (finding that plaintiff adequately stated a claim for overtime pay where she alleged that for a two-year period "she worked more than 40 hours in a workweek during 30 to 35 pay periods" and "was never paid proper overtime wages" because there is "no requirement ... that a FLSA plaintiff identify, by date, the specific weeks in which she was undercompensated"); Brown v. Club Assist Rd. Serv. U.S., Inc. , No. 12 CV 5710, 2013 WL 5304100, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2013) ("FLSA claims generally and in this instance are fairly straightforward and do not require plaintiffs to plead infinitesimal details to render them plausible or provide defendants with fair notice of the claims against them."); Victoria v. Alex Car Inc. , 2012 WL 1068759, at *5 (N.D Ill. 2012) (finding "no rule of law that requires Plaintiffs to allege their hourly wage, the dates on which the alleged violations took place, or the specific tasks they performed off the clock" to survive dismissal of claim for overtime pay).

Defendant relies heavily on Hughes v. Scarlett's G.P., Inc. , No. 15-cv-5546, 2016 WL 4179153 (N.D. Ill. 20...