Dixon v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.

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SALLY DIXON, Plaintiff, v. DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC., Defendant.

No. 22-CV-131S

United States District Court, W.D. New York

March 7, 2023

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

In this employment discrimination action, Plaintiff Sally Dixon (“Dixon”) alleges sex and age discrimination against Defendant Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Dollar Tree”) in violation of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). Dixon claims being a victim of sexual harassment and retaliatory termination.

Before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration or to Dismiss (Docket No. 3^[1]). Dollar Tree Stores invokes its Arbitration Agreement with Dixon (and its other employees) (Docket No. 3, Steven Pearson Decl. Ex. B, Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims (For Associates Hired Before October 6 2014) (or “Arbitration Agreement”)) and seeks dismissal of this case in favor of arbitration of her claims.

For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration (Docket No. 3) of Dixon's present claims is granted as is its Motion to Dismiss (id.), and this case is dismissed.

II. Background

A. Factual Allegations

This Court assumes the truth of the following factual allegations contained in the Complaint. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740, 98 S.Ct. 1848, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976).

Defendant hired Dixon in February 2013 as an Associate at its Geneseo, New York, store, promoting her in 2014 to store manager (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8; see Docket No. 3, Pearson Decl. ¶ 8; Docket No. 3, Def. Memo. at 1).

From 2017, Dixon complained to Defendant's management about inappropriate contacts she had with installation contractors hired by Defendant which she deemed to be instances of sexual harassment. Defendant's managers, however, dismissed her complaints. (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 9-15, 17-18, 28-36, 61, 62, 65.)

Dixon then claims that Defendant's management engaged in a campaign of retaliation against her. Dollar Tree's management allegedly cited Dixon for work infractions (criticizing Dixon's mode of dress, making suggestive comments about her attire, and falsely placing negative statements in her annual performance review) while not citing male or younger female employees for their infractions. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38, 40-43, 45, 46-50, 51-56, 57, 58, 59-60.) In May 2020 Defendant issued a performance evaluation and Dixon completing some cited performance items, on June 26, 2020, Defendant abruptly terminated her, purportedly in violation of Defendant's own disciplinary procedures (id. ¶¶ 70, 76-82, 84-86, 90).

The Complaint alleges six counts:

• Count I, sexual harassment and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.

• Count II, sexual harassment, age discrimination, and sex discrimination each in violation of the NYSHRL.

• Count III, age discrimination under the ADEA.

• Count IV, retaliation under Title VII.

• Count V, retaliation under the NYSHRL; and

• Count VI, retaliation under the ADEA.

(Id. ¶¶ 101-08, 109-17, 18-26, 127-34, 135-41, 142-48.)

B. Dollar Tree Employment Arbitration Agreement

Meanwhile in 2015, Defendant instituted an arbitration program wherein it and its Associates (hired before October 6, 2014, like Dixon) arbitrated claims arising “under applicable federal, state, or local law, arising out of or related to [Plaintiff's] employment (or its termination)” that either party may have with the other (Arbitration Agreement at 1; Docket No. 3, Def. Memo. at 2). The Arbitration Agreement did not require the employee's agreement but provided for an Associate opt out if she took affirmative steps to decline being bound by the agreement. To opt out, the employee needed to complete either an online opt out form or mail a paper opt out form to Defendant's office. (Arbitration Agreement at 4; see Docket No. 11, Def. Reply Memo. at 1.) The employee's decision not to opt out by May 31, 2015, constituted her assent to the Arbitration Agreement (Arbitration Agreement at 5).

On February 23, 2015, Defendant emailed Dixon instructions regarding the Arbitration Agreement, including a copy of the Agreement and frequently asked questions fact sheet about the Agreement (Docket No. 3, Pearson Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10, Ex. A). Dixon acknowledged receipt of the Agreement on May 4, 2015 (id. ¶ 14, Ex. E), but Dixon never opted out of that Agreement (id. ¶ 15).

Dixon explains that she was not aware that Defendant's arbitration program included her (Docket No. 7, Pl. Memo. Ex., Pl. Decl. (or “Pl. Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4). After receiving a reminder email to acknowledge receipt of the Agreement, Dixon contacted her supervisor, Michelle Cavalli, to refuse signing the Agreement (Pl. Decl. ¶¶ 6-7). Ms. Cavalli later insisted Dixon sign the acknowledgement form for the Agreement (id. ¶¶ 8, 10-11). Dixon believes that Ms. Cavalli “seemingly refused to allow [Dixon] to leave the store until” Dixon signed the acknowledgement (id. ¶ 13). Dixon repeated her refusal to sign the Agreement but eventually did (under “Cavalli's pressure”) signed the acknowledgement (id. ¶¶ 14, 15). Dixon further claims she also never received a copy of the rules of Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (or “JAMS”), the arbitral body designated under the Agreement (id. ¶¶ 21,22).

III. Discussion

A. Applicable Standards

1. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant has moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted based upon the Arbitration Agreement (Docket No. 3). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court cannot dismiss a Complaint unless it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570 (rejecting longstanding precedent of Conley, supra, 355 U.S. at 45-46).

To survive a Motion to Dismiss, the factual allegations in the Complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 555; Hicks, supra, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39163, at *5. A Rule 12(b)(6) Motion is addressed to the face of the pleading. The pleading is deemed to include any document attached to it as an exhibit, Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), or any document incorporated in it by reference. Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).

In considering such a Motion, the Court must accept as true all the well pleaded facts alleged in the Complaint. Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). However, conclusory allegations that merely state the general legal conclusions necessary to prevail on the merits and are unsupported by factual averments will not be accepted as true. New York State Teamsters Council Health and Hosp. Fund v. Centrus Pharmacy Solutions, 235 F.Supp.2d 123 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).

2. Federal Arbitration Act

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq., favors arbitration agreements, 9 U.S.C. § 2; CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98, 132 S.Ct. 665, 181 L.Ed.2d 586 (2012); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24,103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (Docket No. 3, Def. Memo. at 3). As Defendant Dollar Tree has done a litigant can petition this Court for an Order directing arbitration pursuant to the parties' agreement, 9 U.S.C. § 4; see Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016).

In deciding a Motion to Compel Arbitration, this Court must determine (1) the existence of a valid arbitration agreement; (2) whether the claims sought to be arbitrated fall within the scope of that arbitration agreement; (3) whether Congress intended federal statutory claims to be non-arbitrable; and (4) if some, but not all, of the claims are arbitrable, whether to stay the balance of the proceeding pending arbitration, Abdullayeva v. Attending Homecare Servs. LLC, 928 F.3d 218, 221-22 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing JLM Indus. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004)) (Docket No. 3, Def. Memo. at 3). “A standard similar to the summary judgment standard applies to motions to compel arbitration,” Pool Deals, LLC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 454 F.Supp.3d 208, 213 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (Sinatra, J.), with all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the opponent to compelled arbitration, Nicosia, supra, 834 F.3d at 229 (Docket No. 7, Pl. Memo. at 3 & n.1).

Any doubts of the arbitrability of a claim are resolved in favor of arbitration, DDK Hotels, LLC v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 6 F.4th 308, 317 (2d Cir. 2021), quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (Docket No. 3, Def. Memo. at 3); see Moses H. Cone, supra, 460 U.S. at 24-25. Courts thus “will compel arbitration unless ‘the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute,'” Pool Deals, LLC, supra, 454 F.Supp.3d at 213, quoting Daly v. Citigroup, Inc., 939 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2019).

The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of demonstrating that an agreement to arbitrate was made, Hines v Overstock.com, Inc., 380 Fed.Appx. 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary Order); Barrows v. Brinker Rest. Corp., 36 F.4th 45, 50 (2d Cir. 2022), by merely by showing the agreement's existence, Barrows, supra, 36 F.4th at 50. Whether the parties entered into an arbitration agreement is substantive issue resolved...