Dixon v. LGX Servs.

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JOHN C. DIXON, Plaintiff, v. LGX SERVICES, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL No. 1:23-cv-00703-JMC

United States District Court, D. Maryland

July 19, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

J Mark Coulson, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff John C. Dixon (“Dixon”) filed suit against Defendant LGX Services, LLC (“LGX”) on March 15 2023 for employer race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C.§ 1981, and Title 20 of Maryland's State Government Article. (ECF No. 1). Dixon asserts two counts: (1) Race Discrimination in Violation of Title VII, Section 1981 and Title 20, and (2) Retaliation in Violation of Title VII, Section 1981, and Title 20. (ECF No 1 at p. 67).^[1]Currently, before the Court is LGX's Motion to Dismiss and/or Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 19). In addition to LGX's Motion, the Court has reviewed Dixon's Opposition (ECF No. 28) and LGX's Reply (ECF No. 30). The Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons explained below, LGX's Motion, which is treated as a motion for summary judgment, is granted to the extent that it seeks to compel arbitration and stay proceedings pending arbitration.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 29, 2020, LGX, a trucking and logistics company incorporated in Virginia with its principal place of business in Maryland, hired Dixon, an African American citizen residing in Maryland, as a Class A CDL driver. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3, ¶¶ 2-3, 9). On October 20, 2020, Dixon was promoted to Operations Manager. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 10. In March of 2021, Dixon had the opportunity to be promoted again to Director of Operations, but the position was instead given to “Ray Naimaster, a white LGX driver who was a subordinate of Mr. Dixon, and who Mr. Dixon had trained.” Id. at p. 4, ¶ 11. In July of 2021, Dixon encouraged another LGX driver to report a racially offensive remark made by Mr. Naimaster. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 13. On July 26, 2021, Dixon was told that LGX eliminated the position of Operations Manager, and Dixon was subsequently fired. Id. at p. 5, ¶ 16.

Two contracts are relevant to LGX's Motion. The First is Dixon's Employment Agreement (“Employment Agreement”) (ECF No. 21),^[2]signed in July 2020 when LGX hired Dixon as a Class A CDL driver. (ECF No. 30 at p. 1). The Employment Agreement contains an arbitration provision, which the Court will provide in full within the Court's analysis in Section III of this Opinion. (ECF No. 21 at p. 5, ¶ 21). The second relevant contract is Dixon's Offer Letter (“Offer Letter”) (ECF No. 28-3), signed in October 2020 when LGX promoted Dixon to Operations Manager. (ECF No. 30 at p. 2). The Offer Letter contains a provision entitled “Entire Agreement,” which provides in part that “[the] letter constitutes the entire agreement between you and the Company regarding the matters described in this letter ....” (ECF No. 28-3 at p. 1, ¶ 6). LGX argues that, pursuant to the Employment Agreement's arbitration provision, Dixon is compelled to arbitrate his claims, notwithstanding the absence of such a provision in Dixon's later Offer Letter. (ECF No. 19 at p. 1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

LGX moves for dismissal, or in the alternative, to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings under § 3 and § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Under the FAA, all written contracts containing an arbitration provision and “evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . .” are considered “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract ....” See 9 U.S.C. § 2. “The Supreme Court [of the United States] has made it plain that judicial protection of arbitral agreements extends to agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims.” Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 937 (4th Cir. 1999); Ratliff v. CoStar Realty Info., Inc., No. 11-0813, 2011 WL 2680585, at *2 (D. Md. July 7, 2011) (recognizing in a case involving Title VII and Title 20 that “[E]ven claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute serves its functions.”) (other citation omitted). “In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court noted that by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d at 937 (other citations and internal quotation marks omitted).^[3]“The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the FAA to reflect a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.'” Dome Tech., LLC v. Golden Sands Gen. Contractors, Inc., 257 F.Supp.3d 735, 741 (W.D. Va. 2017) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). In “the Fourth Circuit, a litigant can compel arbitration under the FAA if he can demonstrate ‘(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce,^[4] and (4) the failure, neglect or refusal of the defendant to arbitrate the dispute.'” Adkins v. Lab. Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Whiteside v. Teltech Corp., 940 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1991)); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. Regarding a party's demand for a jury trial under Section 4 of the FAA, “the party seeking a jury trial must make an unequivocal denial that an arbitration agreement exists-and must also show sufficient facts in support.” Chorley Enters., Inc. v. Dickey Barbecue Rests., Inc., 807 F.3d 553, 564 (4th Cir. 2015) (other citations omitted). “The FAA requires a court to stay ‘any suit or proceeding' pending arbitration of ‘any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.'” Dome Tech., LLC, 257 F.Supp.3d at 741 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3).

“[M]otions to compel arbitration exist in the netherworld between a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment.” PC Const. Co. v. City of Salisbury, 871 F.Supp.2d 475, 47778 (D. Md. 2012) (quoting Shaffer v. ACS Gov't Servs., Inc., 321 F.Supp.2d 682, 683-84 (D. Md. 2004)). “When a party moves to compel arbitration and the validity of the purported arbitration agreement between the parties is disputed, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment.” Guanyu Li v. StockX.com, 349 F.Supp.3d 517, 521 (D. Md. 2018). Here, Dixon challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement, so the Court will treat LGX's Motion as a motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) requires the Court to “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute as to a material fact “is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v. S.R.P. Dev. Ltd. P'ship, 115 F.Supp.3d 593, 600 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A nonmoving party “opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The Court is “required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to” the nonmoving party. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). However, the Court must also “abide by the ‘affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.'” Heckman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 962 F.Supp.2d 792, 799-800 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993)). Consequently, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences. See Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1998). The party resisting arbitration must make the showing that the claims should be settled by litigation rather than arbitration. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000).

III. ANALYSIS

The parties do not dispute the relevance of the FAA in the Court's determination of LGX's Motion. As such, they agree that if the four Adkins elements enumerated above are satisfied, then the case sub judice should proceed through arbitration rather than through judicial proceedings before this Court. However, Dixon argues that the second and fourth^[5]Adkins elements are not satisfied. Specifically, regarding the second element, Dixon makes two arguments: (1) the original, written Employment Agreement containing the arbitration provision is superseded by the Offer Letter, and alternatively, (2) if the Employment Agreement is valid, the scope of the arbitration provision does not cover the basis of Dixon's claim, i.e., the alleged employment discrimination against and unlawful termination of Dixon. Thus, whether this Court can grant LGX's Motion depends on whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of Dixon regarding the validity and scope of the arbitration provision. See J.E. Dunn Const. Co., 115 F.Supp.3d at 600; see also Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d at 938 (quoting ...