Dixon v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist.

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VERONICA DIXON v. PLANO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

CIVIL No. 4:22-CV-148-SDJ

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division

August 23, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SEAN D. JORDAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Plano Independent School District's (“PISD”) Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt #8). Plaintiff Veronica Dixon did not respond to this motion. Also before the Court is Defendant Plano Independent School District's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. #14). Dixon also did not respond to this motion. The Court then requested that Dixon file a brief addressing the Court's concerns with her 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim. (Dkt. #18). Dixon failed to respond to this order, and PISD filed its own response brief. (Dkt. #20). The Court, having considered the motions and the applicable legal authorities, will grant PISD's motion for summary judgment, sua sponte dismiss Dixon's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, and deny as moot PISD's motion to dismiss.

I. Background

Plano Independent School District formerly employed Dixon as a special education teacher. Dixon alleges that she did not receive the training that she requested for the role. Further, she alleges that she was not given a planning period or allotted time to complete paperwork even though all of the other non-black special education teachers were. Dixon also suffered a herniated disk in her back while at work that required physical therapy and medical treatment. She claims that PISD retaliated against her for the injury by harassing her when she had physical therapy and assigning her to recess duty when she returned to work. Finally, Dixon alleges that she was constructively discharged by PISD as a result of the disparate and discriminatory treatment that she faced.

Based on these allegations, Dixon filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 9, 2021. Dixon alleges that she received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on December 1, 2021, which was followed by the filing of the instant case on February 28, 2022, within the requisite ninety-day filing period. Dixon's suit against PISD includes claims for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C § 1981, retaliation and disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) under Texas state law. Dixon seeks actual damages, punitive damages, and an award of attorney's fees and costs.

PISD moved to dismiss Dixon's ADA claim, IIED claim, and request for punitive damages pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) Dixon failed timely to exhaust her administrative remedies because she did not timely file a charge of disability discrimination; and (2) governmental immunity bars Dixon's IIED and punitive damage claims. Dixon did not respond to the motion to dismiss. Because Dixon did not respond, the Court presumes that she “does not controvert the facts set out by [PISD] and has no evidence to offer in opposition to the motion.” Local Rule CV-7(d).

PISD has also moved for summary judgment on all of Dixon's claims, arguing that as Dixon failed (and continues to fail) to comply with the initial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and this Court's scheduling order, she is barred from presenting any evidence to support her claims. In addition, PISD's summary-judgment motion reurges its motion to dismiss arguments concerning Dixon's ADA and IIED claims.

Finally, the Court, having reviewed Dixon's complaint, sua sponte questioned the legal viability of Dixon's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim against PISD. The Court therefore ordered Dixon to respond to the Court's concern that under Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Dixon's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim cannot be maintained against PISD, as PISD is a governmental entity, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against governmental entities. 246 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not provide “a remedial cause of action against local government entities”). The Court further noted that it may sua sponte dismiss a plaintiff's claim under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) so long as the plaintiff has notice and an opportunity to be heard. Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 642 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing, among others, Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 2006) and Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991)). Dixon failed to respond to the Court's order, and PISD filed its own supplemental brief regarding the Court's concern.

While the Court notes that Dixon has failed to respond to either of PISD's motions and to this Court's order, the Court will not dismiss Dixon's claims solely due to her failure to respond. Instead, the Court will consider the merits of Dixon's complaint, PISD's arguments, as well as the merits of the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 issue the Court raised sua sponte. See Morgan v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 114 F.Supp.3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“It is well established in the Fifth Circuit that a federal court may not grant a default summary judgment where no response has been filed.” (simplified)). However, where a defendant argues that a plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence in support of an essential element of her claim, the plaintiff “must produce evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact of that essential element of her case.” Rhodes v. U.S. Off. of Special Couns., No. 3:05-CV-2402-K, 2008 WL 4791380, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2008).

II. Legal Standard

“Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 282-83 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). If the moving party presents a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by evidence, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show with ‘significant probative evidence' that there exists a genuine issue of material fact.” Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)).

The nonmoving party “must respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must present “significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.” In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Thus, “mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden.” Pickett v. IceCold2, LLC, No. 4:17-CV-666, 2019 WL 1063369, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2019).

Further, as noted in the Court's local rules, in ruling on motions for summary judgment, the Court “will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are controverted in the responsive brief filed in opposition to the motion, as supported by proper summary judgment evidence.” Local Rule CV-56(c).

III. Discussion

A. Dixon's ADA Claim

PISD first moves for summary judgment on Dixon's disability discrimination claim, incorporating by reference the arguments it made in its dismissal motion. PISD argues that Dixon failed timely to exhaust her administrative remedies under the ADA, and towards that end, PISD attached a copy of Dixon's EEOC change to its dismissal motion.^[1]

Having considered Dixon's charge and complaint, the Court finds that Dixon has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the ADA because she did not timely file a charge of disability discrimination with the EEOC. An employee “must comply with the ADA's administrative prerequisites prior to commencing an action in federal court against her employer for violation of the ADA.” Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5(e)(1)). To comply with the statutory prerequisites, an employee must “file a timely charge with the EEOC” before commencing a civil action. Id. (citing the procedural requirements of Title VII-42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)-which the ADA has incorporated by reference). Once the charge is filed and a “right-to-sue” letter is received from the EEOC, the plaintiff must commence a civil action within ninety days. Id.

Here, it is uncontested that Dixon filed an EEOC charge and commenced the present action within ninety days after receiving her right-to-sue letter. However, PISD argues that Dixon has not exhausted her administrative remedies under the ADA because her EEOC charge included allegations of racial discrimination only, and not also allegations of disability discrimination. The Court agrees.

When considering exhaustion, “[c]ourts interpret the scope of an EEOC complaint broadly, looking at the administrative EEOC investigation that can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Huff v. DRE Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-0414, 2012 WL 3072389, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2012) (simplified) (quoting McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008)). This fact-intensive analysis “looks beyond the four corners of the document to its...