Dobrski v. Int'l Union

VINCENT DOBRSKI, Plaintiff,

v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACEAND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT, WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:13 CV 1439

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Dated: July 9, 2013

Judge Dan Aaron Polster

MEMORANDUM OF OPINIONAND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Vincent Dobrski filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 2000e against the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW") and UAW employees Jimmie D. Williams, Jimmy Settles, Wendy Fields-Jacob, and Bahati Jaha. In his Complaint (Doc. # 1), plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully terminated from his employment with Ford Motor Company, and that defendants thereafter wrongfully delayed or refused to process the grievance he filed on the basis of his race. He seeks $600,000 in monetary damages for lost wages, bonuses and benefits, as well as an order compelling an investigation of defendants' filings with the Office of Labor Management Standards. For the reasons that follow, this action is DISMISSED.¹

I. BACKGROUND

The Complaint is rambling and at times incoherent, however, it appears to make the following factual allegations. On March 20, 2007, while he was out on approved vacation and during the midst of his campaign to be elected Vice President of UAW Local 420, Dobrski was terminated from his position at Ford Motor Company in Walton Hills, Ohio. Thereafter, a "five day quit" grievance was "fabricated with a false date stamp" and was filed on behalf of Dobrski. (Doc. # 1 at 2.) Dobrski contends Williams delayed in processing the grievance and that he "has held on to it to this day." (Id.) He claims he complained to Williams about his treatment of the grievance, but Williams disregarded his complaints and instead contacted Ford's human resources department, stating Dobrski should be psychologically evaluated.

Throughout 2008, Dobrski contacted several of the other defendants to complain aboutWilliams' handling of his grievance. Specifically, he claims that in or around May through July 2008, he contacted Settles, the Vice-President of the UAW Ford division, but Settles never spoke to him or returned his phone calls. Further, sometime in June of 2008, Dobrski contacted Fields-Jacob and she purportedly told him she "would look in to it," but she also did not return his call. Finally, in December 2008, Dobrski received a letter from Jaha indicating his grievance was "in the 3rd and a ½ stage." (Doc. #1 at 3.) Dobrski states no such stage exists in the "Union book." (Id.)

In December 2008, Dobrski asserts he had "a controlled conversation" with Williams, during which Williams allegedly made false promises to Dobrski about his employment with Ford and back pay owing to him. (Id.) He also contends that Williams refused to meet him at the UAW "Region 2B" in Independence, Ohio to handle the grievance.

Based on the foregoing factual allegations, Dobrski alleges three claims as follows. In Count One, he claims reverse discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, and § 1983, stemming from defendants' purported unification "against Plaintiff to aid an African-American employee in the Local 420 UAW Vice-Presidential election" and their alleged preferential treatment of grievances filed by African-American employees. Plaintiff does not identify his own race, except to imply that he is not African-American. In Count Two, he alleges a state law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Finally, in Count Three, plaintiff asserts a claim for libel/slander, indicating defendants have produced both written and oral false publications about him.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a "district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit or no longer open to discussion." Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the proposition that patently frivolous claims divest the district court of jurisdiction); In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 300 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that federal question jurisdiction is divested by obviously frivolous and unsubstantial claims).

Legal conclusions alone are not sufficient to present a valid claim. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). This Court is not required to accept unwarranted factual inferences. Id.; see also Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1971) ("A pleading will not be sufficient to state cause of action under Civil Rights Act if its allegations are but conclusions."). To set forth a valid claim, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) ("dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim.") Even liberally construed, the Complaint in this case does not set forth a colorable claim for relief.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

In the Complaint, plaintiff invokes § 1983 as a basis for this Court's jurisdiction and hisreverse discrimination claim. To establish a prima facie case under § 1983, plaintiff must assert that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Section 1983 is only applicable to private parties where the actions taken "can fairly be seen as state action." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). A plaintiff does not have a cause of action under § 1983 against a private party no matter how discriminatory or wrongful the party's conduct. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). Each of the defendants in this case are private parties and there is no allegation that they exercised any powers which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state. Therefore, plaintiff has no cause of action against defendants under § 1983. Accordingly, Dobrski's § 1983 claims are dismissed.

B. Title VII

In Count One of the Complaint, plaintiff alleges a reverse discrimination claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e against the UAW and four of its employees. Plaintiff alleges defendants discriminated against him by giving preferential treatment to African-American union members.

As a preliminary matter, the individual defendants are not subject to suit under Title VII. Title VII liability attaches to unlawful employment practices of employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, or the joint actions of these entities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Individual supervisors or coworkers are not personally liable under Title VII. Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) ("We now hold that an individual employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an 'employer,' may not be heldpersonally liable under Title VII."); see also Mathis v. CWA Local Union 4320, No. 2:10-CV-1093, 2011 WL 3497189 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2011) (holding a union official is not liable in his individual capacity for discrimination under a Title VII claim); Burrell v. Henderson, 483 F. Supp. 2d 595, 600-01 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (president of labor union not liable in her individual capacity under ADEA or Title VII). Therefore, plaintiff's Title VII claims against defendants Williams, Settles, Fields-Jacob, and Jaha are hereby dismissed.

Further, there is no indication in the Complaint that plaintiff filed a charge and obtained a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), a necessary prerequisite for pursuit of a Title VII action for discrimination. See Aaron v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F. App'x 670, 672 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Fritz v. FinancialEdge Cmty. Credit Union, 835 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381 (E.D. Mich. 2011) ("An individual may not file suit under Title VII if she does not possess a 'right to sue' letter from the EEOC.") (citing Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1998)).

Moreover, even if plaintiff could pursue his reverse discrimination claim, he has not stated a plausible claim for relief. Title VII makes it unlawful for a labor organization "to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c). To allege a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination in a typical case, a plaintiff must assert that he: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the job; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) was replaced by a person outside the protected class or was treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees. Newman v. Fed. ExpressCorp., 266 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 2001). In a reverse discrimination case, where a member of a racial majority alleges racial discrimination, the first and fourth prongs of the test are different. Sutherland v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2003). Under the first prong, the plaintiff "must demonstrate background circumstances [to] support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." Id. at 614 (citing Zambetti v. Cuyahoga...