Dodson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist.

44 F.Supp.3d 240

Dana R. DODSON, Plaintiff

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VALLEY STREAM UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT and the Valley Stream Central High School District, Defendants.

No. 14–CV–0116 JSAKT.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed Aug. 25, 2014.

Laura M. Dilimetin, Esq., The Law Office of Steven A. Morelli, Garden City, NY, for Plaintiff.

Caroline Beth Lineen, Esq., Rutherford & Christie LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Dana R. Dodson (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against defendants the Board of Education of the Valley Stream Union Free School District (the “Valley Stream School Board”) and the Valley Stream Central High School District (the “Valley Stream School District” and together with the Board, “Defendants”) following his resignation as a gym teacher for the Valley Stream School District. Plaintiff principally contends that Defendants deprived him of his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because his resignation was coerced and a disciplinary hearing did not precede the resignation. The Complaint also asserts New York state law claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, defamation, and prima facie tort.

Defendants move to dismiss the entire Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for improper service of process pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5). Defendants also move to dismiss the state law claims on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to serve a timely notice of claim as required by New York Education Law § 3813(1) and that certain claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion for leave to file a late notice of claim. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's cross-motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND¹

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff worked as teacher for the District from 2001 until his resignation on September 21, 2012. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 33.) On June 13, 2012, the District issued thirty-three disciplinary charges against Plaintiff pursuant to New York Education Law § 3020–a² for his alleged improper conduct towards a female high school student. (Compl. ¶ 19.) The District contended that Plaintiff acted improperly by hiring the student as his family's babysitter and by sending her inappropriate text messages. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff denied all wrongdoing and claimed that the student only complained to the District about his text messages because he refused to sign a permission slip that would have excused the student from cutting another teacher's class. (Compl. ¶ 20.)

On September 21, 2012, Plaintiff entered into a “Stipulation of Settlement and General Release” resolving the disciplinary charges against him (the “Agreement”). (Compl. ¶ 33.) Under the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiff resigned from his position and waived his right to a disciplinary hearing guaranteed to tenured teachers under New York Education Law § 3020–a(2)(c).³ (Compl. ¶¶ 23–24.) Among other things, the Agreement contains a general release clause and a general agreement not to sue Defendants.⁴ (See Sealed Silverman Decl., Docket Entry 25, Ex D ¶¶ 5, 7.⁵ )

Plaintiff claims that the Agreement is invalid because it is the product of fraudulent inducement and coercion. Plaintiff specifically alleges that “Defendants misled [him] into believing that: (1) he would be terminated if he did not sign the waiver; (2) he could go to jail if he did not sign the waiver; (3) he would be subject to additional disciplinary charges if he did not sign the waiver or if he revoked the waiver; and (4) that if he signed the waiver, he would retain his teaching license.” (Compl. ¶ 34.) The Complaint does not explain how any of these alleged misrepresentations were false, nor does it identify the speaker or speakers, but it does allege that “Plaintiff has since been served with license revocation charges and now has a hearing Ordered [sic] for license revocation.” (Compl. ¶ 36.)

The Complaint also contains allegations suggesting that Plaintiff signed the Agreement under duress and that he did not fully understand the terms of the Agreement. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made the misrepresentations listed above “all the while knowing that [Plaintiff] was suffering from [Diverticulitis ] and was taking medication which impaired his judgment.” (Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants intentionally spread false rumors about him to school officials in other Districts to put further pressure on him, and to ensure that he could not obtain other employment.” (Compl. ¶ 34.) Additionally, the Superintendent of the Valley Stream School District “told [Plaintiff] that he ‘needed’ to sign the waiver and that he did not want this to ‘go public.’ ” (Compl. ¶ 25.) The Superintendent further “made false statements about Plaintiff” to teachers, staff, and others in and outside of the Valley Stream School District “in efforts [sic] to put pressure on Plaintiff to sign the waiver.” (Compl. ¶ 27.) Defendants also “expressed to Plaintiff that if he did not sign the waiver, the District would proffer new, additional charges” against him. (Compl. ¶ 29.)

Finally, Plaintiff claims that “an attorney from the Union advised [him] that he should walk away” and that his teaching license “would not be affected” if he signed the Release. (Compl. ¶ 22.) He alleges that the attorney “did not go over all of the terms of the agreement” and that he “works with the District on a continual basis.” (Compl. ¶¶ 22–23.)

II. Procedural Background

On June 18, 2013, Plaintiff served Defendants with a notice of claim pursuant to New York Education Law § 3813(1). (Silverman Decl. Ex. B.) On December 9, 2013, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Summons and Complaint in New York State Supreme Court, Nassau County. Defendants subsequently removed the action to this Court. On February 14, 2014, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. (Docket Entry 10.) On March 20, 2014, Plaintiff cross-moved for leave to file a late notice of claim. (Docket Entry 22.) These motions are currently pending before the Court.

DISCUSSION

The Court will first address the applicable legal standards before turning to the merits of the parties' motions.

I. Legal Standard

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court applies a “plausibility standard,” which is guided by “[t]wo working principles.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; accord Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71–72 (2d Cir.2009) ). First, although the Court must accept all allegations as true, this “tenet” is “inapplicable to legal conclusions;” thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72. Second, only complaints that state a “plausible claim for relief” can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Determining whether a complaint does so is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.

The Court is confined to “the allegations contained within the four corners of [the] complaint.” Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir.1998). However, this has been interpreted broadly to include any document attached to the complaint, any statements or documents incorporated in the complaint by reference, any document on which the complaint heavily relies, and anything of which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir.2002) (citations omitted); Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir.1991).

II. Service of Process

As an initial matter, Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety for insufficient service of process. Defendants specifically claim that Plaintiff failed to properly serve them because he only forwarded a copy of the Summons and Complaint to the Valley Stream School District's general counsel, who was not authorized to accept service. (Defs.' Br., Docket Entry 12, at 18–19.) Plaintiff counters that he properly served Defendants by leaving the Summons and Complaint with Thomas Troisi and Mary Colgan, who, according to affidavits of service, were “willing to accept service for all parties.” (Pl.'s Br., Docket Entry 21, at 25; Dilimentin Decl., Docket Entry 21–1, Exs. E & F.) Defendants do not address these affidavits on reply and they appear to withdraw the improper service defense because it is no longer as one of the grounds for dismissal in their reply papers. (See Silverman Supp. Decl., Docket Entry 24, ¶ 3.) Accordingly, the Court finds, based on the affidavits of service produced by Plaintiff and Defendants' apparent withdrawal of the defense, that Plaintiff properly served Defendants with the Summons and Complaint. Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint based on improper service is therefore DENIED.

III. Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process when they coerced his resignation and waiver of a disciplinary hearing under New York Education Law § 3020–a(2)(c). (Compl. ¶ 46.) Defendants argue that dismissal of these constitutional claims is appropriate because: (1) the waiver and release clauses in the Agreement bar Plaintiff from suing Defendants for all claims based on conduct predating the Agreement; and (2) Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege municipal liability under § 1983 against the Valley Stream School District. As explained...