Dodson v. Beijing Capital Tire Co.

VINCENT DODSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BEIJING CAPITAL TIRE COMPANY, LTD, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-01358

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 27, 2017

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court are six motions in limine; four filed by the Plaintiffs, Vincent Dodson and Rosalin Davis-Dodson, and two by Defendant, World Wide Distribution, Inc. Three motions seek to preclude testimony from expert witnesses. The remainder seek to bar the introduction of evidence on contributory negligence by Vincent Dodson or his employer, and evidence on a lack of prior similar incidents to the one that caused Dodson's injuries. For the reasons articulated below, all six motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As the Court writes primarily for the parties, the background and history are limited to the immediately relevant circumstances of the pending motions.

This case stems from injuries suffered by Plaintiff Vincent Dodson, when a Beijing Capital Tire Company ("BCT") tire ruptured while Dodson mounted and inflated the tire during his employment as a tire technician at Kost Tire and Auto Service. (Doc. 1). On July 15, 2014, Dodson filed suit against Defendants BCT and World Wide Distribution, Inc. (Doc. 1). A separate action against Defendant Reemo Resources International, LTD was consolidated with this action on January 6, 2016. (Doc. 16). To date, only World Wide Distribution has appeared, and default judgment was entered against Reemo Resources on February 9, 2016. (Doc. 19).

Two causes of action remain for adjudication: one for strict products liability predicated on a defective design and negligence on the part of World Wide Distribution, Inc. for failing to adhere to NHTSA guidelines on inquiry into the safety of the product and in allowing an unsafe product to enter the market. Dodson asserts that an outdated "weftless" bead design caused the tire to rupture during the mounting process, causing multiple injuries, numerous surgeries, and essentially the loss of the use of his dominant arm. A weftless bead design relies on a cluster of thinner metal wires wrapped around the tire to maintain structural integrity. Dodson asserts that modern tires have long since abandoned such a design, with manufacturers instead relying upon a single, thicker wire.

The parties have each filed motions in limine in anticipation of trial. In addition to briefing, the Court held oral argument on each motion during the September 25, 2017 pretrial conference. Defendant World Wide Distribution, Inc. seeks to bar the testimony of Plaintiff's experts Allan J. Kam and William J. Woehrle pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It argues that Kam's testimony does not speak to causation and will only confuse the jury. (Doc. 38; Doc. 39). It further submits that Plaintiff's causation expert, William Woehrle, is not qualified to render the expert opinion anticipated. (Doc. 40; Doc. 41).

Plaintiffs seek to preclude testimony from Defendant's expert, Alfred Cipriani, on the grounds that Cipriani's opinion lacks a proper foundation and engages in improper speculation. (Doc. 47; Doc. 48). Further, Plaintiffs ask the Court to restrict any testimony relating to contributory negligence on the part of Dodson (Doc. 43; Doc. 44), Kost Tire and Auto Service (Doc. 45; Doc. 46), and on a lack of prior, similar incidents. (Doc. 49; Doc. 50).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which carries with it the discretion to rule on motions in limine prior to trial. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (noting that the court exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues "in appropriate cases"). Courts may exercise this discretion in order to ensure that juries are not exposed to unfairly prejudicial, confusing or irrelevant evidence. United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so in order to "narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions." Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). In considering motions in limine, which call upon the court to engage in preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court begins by recognizing that these "evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine] are subject to the trial judge's discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of discretion . . . . Additionally, application of the balancing test under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is 'arbitrary and irrational.'" Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-CV-2284, 2016 WL 454817, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2016) (citing Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)); see Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing in limine rulings for abuse of discretion).

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that relevant evidence is generally admissible.¹ FED. R. EVID. 402. Evidence is "relevant" if its existence simply has "any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action." FED. R. EVID. 401(a)-(b). However, relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. EVID. 403. The balancing test under Rule 403 provides as follows:

[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

FED. R. EVID. 403.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and requires an expert witness to have "specialized knowledge" regarding the area of testimony. Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702.

"Rule 702 has three major requirements: (1) the proffered witness must be an expert, i.e., must be qualified; (2) the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical or specialized knowledge [, i.e., reliability]; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact [, i.e., fit]." United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2008)).

In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence embody a strong preference for admitting any evidence that may assist the trier of fact. FED. R. EVID. 402. Moreover, Rule 702 in particular "has a liberal policy of admissibility." Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir. 1997).

First, an expert is qualified if "the witness possess[es] specialized expertise." Schneider ex rel. Estate of Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interprets the qualifications requirement liberally, and notes that "a broad range of knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert as such." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994); Betterbox Commc'ns Ltd. v. BB Techs., Inc., 300 F.3d 325, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[T]his specialized knowledge can be practical experience as well as academic training and credentials . . . ."). Thus, "it is an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the bestqualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization that the court considers most appropriate." Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996); see Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 & n.11 (collecting cases that illustrate the permissive nature of qualifications requirement). "However, at a minimum, a proffered expert witness must possess skill or knowledge greater than the average layman." Betterbox, 300 F.3d at 328 (quotation omitted).

The second requirement under Rule 702 is that "the process or technique the expert used in formulating the opinion is reliable." Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742. Therefore, "the expert's opinion must be based on the 'methods and procedures of science' rather than on 'subjective belief or unsupported speculation'; the expert must have 'good grounds' for his or her belief." Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)). The Daubert court noted that the assessment of whether testimony is based on a reliable foundation is "flexible." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.

The third and last requirement under Rule 702 is "that the expert testimony must fit the issues in the case." Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404. This requirement is satisfied where the "expert testimony proffered . . . is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242; "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92. Although the applicable standard for determining "fit" is "not that high," it is nonetheless "higher than bare relevance." Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745.

As a...