Doe v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps.

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JOHN DOE #1, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-1558 (JDB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

April 20, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN D. BATES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court are two motions to strike plaintiff Jocelynn Johnson's fifth amended complaint and dismiss her sole-surviving § 1981 wrongful termination claim without prejudice- one filed by defendant American Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE”) and one filed by defendant Jeffrey Cox. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motions.

Background

Given the myriad opinions that lay out the factual landscape of this case in detail, see, e.g., Doe #1 v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 554 F.Supp.3d 75 (D.D.C. 2021); Doe #1 v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Civ. A. No. 20-1558 (JDB), 2022 WL 4182223 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022); Doe #1 v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Civ. A. No. 20-1558 (JDB), 2023 WL 22059 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2023), the Court will only briefly reiterate the facts necessary to resolve the instant motions.

Johnson brought this lawsuit against AFGE and Cox^[1] in June 2020 alleging, among other claims that have since been dismissed that defendants wrongfully terminated her employment due to her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 520; Fifth Amended Compl. [ECF No. 150] (“5AC”) ¶ 109. Specifically, Johnson alleges that defendants “terminat[ed] [her] for allegedly violating the AFGE No Politics rule but [did] not terminat[e] [two] similarly situated Caucasian-American AFGE staff members . . . who were charged with violating the same AFGE No Politics Rule.” Id. ¶ 81.

Since her initial complaint, Johnson has filed five amended complaints, some with multiple versions. See Compl. [ECF No. 1]; Am. Compl. [ECF No. 11]; Pls.' Second Am Compl. [ECF No. 32] (“SAC”); Am. Compl. [ECF No 62] (“First Proposed Third Amended Complaint (‘TAC')”); Third Am. Compl. [ECF No. 72] (“Second Proposed TAC”); Corrected Third Am. Compl. [ECF No. 73-1] (“Third Proposed TAC”); Third Am. Compl. [ECF No. 74] (“Fourth Proposed TAC”); Fourth Amended Compl. [ECF No. 118] (“FAC”); 5AC.

Most relevant here, the Court dismissed all of Johnson's claims in her SAC except her § 1981 wrongful termination claim against defendants. Aug. 11, 2021 Order [ECF No. 59] at 2; see also Doe #1, 554 F.Supp.3d at 125. The Court allowed Johnson the opportunity to file a third amended complaint “limited to the claims that have not been dismissed from this lawsuit and the factual allegations supporting those claims.” Aug. 11, 2021 Order at 2. Johnson then filed five versions of a third amended complaint, which spurred a year of litigation, culminating in the Court striking the Fourth Proposed TAC because it violated the Court's previous order “in several . . . ways, such as . . . by alleging new claims not previously raised in the second amended complaint.” Doe #1, 2022 WL 4182223, at *14. The Court also imposed monetary sanctions against Johnson's counsel for including claims and underlying allegations that had already been dismissed by the Court and which the Court explicitly ordered should not be included in the third amended complaint. See id. at *15-17. But the Court stopped short of dismissing Johnson's sole- surviving claim at that time because she had “not yet received any warnings from this Court about the possible consequences of [her] actions.” Id. at *18 (footnote omitted).

The Court again allowed Johnson to file a fourth amended complaint “limited to the claims that have not been dismissed from this lawsuit and the factual allegations supporting those claims,” namely, her § 1981 wrongful termination claim. Sept. 13, 2022 Order [ECF No. 101] at 1-2. After Johnson filed her FAC, defendants again moved to strike it because it included factual allegations and requests for relief outside the scope of the § 1981 claim. See AFGE's Corrected Mot. to Strike & to Dismiss § 1981 Wrongful Termination Claim Against AFGE with Prejudice [ECF No. 123] (“AFGE Mot. to Strike FAC”); Cox's Mot. to Strike FAC & to Dismiss Claims with Prejudice [ECF No. 130] (“Cox Mot. to Strike FAC”). Defendants also moved to dismiss Johnson's § 1981 claim with prejudice due to her repeated noncompliance with court orders. See AFGE Mot. to Strike FAC ¶¶ 8-9; Cox Mot. to Strike FAC ¶¶ 7-8. The Court granted defendants' motions to strike because the FAC contained allegations outside the scope permitted by the Court in its previous order but again declined to dismiss Johnson's § 1981 claim. Doe #1, 2023 WL 22059, at *6. The Court noted that it “is loath to resolve a claim on procedural grounds rather than on the merits” and accordingly “grant[ed] Johnson one final chance to file a complaint that complies with this Court's Orders.” Id. The Court instructed Johnson as to what allegations her fifth amended complaint may include:

[t]o erase any doubt, and to ensure this litigation moves forward on the merits, the fifth amended complaint shall include only the allegations in the second amended complaint directly related to Johnson's wrongful termination claim, see SAC ¶¶ 656-84, or some close iteration thereof, and shall not include any other allegations nor prayers for relief that are not properly awardable on an individual racial discrimination claim, which would exclude, for example, the broad-based injunctive relief for “mandatory and extensive anti-racial discrimination training for all AFGE staff” requested in her FAC.

Id. But the Court warned that “[a]ny further violation of this Court's Orders will result in dismissal of Johnson's sole-surviving complaint with prejudice.” Id.

That long wind-up brings us to the present. Johnson filed her 5AC on February 24, 2023. See 5AC. Shortly thereafter, AFGE filed another motion to strike the 5AC and to dismiss Johnson's § 1981 claim with prejudice because the 5AC again included allegations outside the scope of those permitted by the court and those relevant to her § 1981 claim, see Def. AFGE's Mot. to Strike Johnson's 5AC & to Dismiss Her Section 1981 Claim Against AFGE [ECF No. 162] (“AFGE Mot.”), and Cox followed suit, see Def. Cox's Mot. to Strike 5AC with Prejudice & to Dismiss her Claims with Prejudice [ECF No. 164] (“Cox Mot.”). Johnson responded in opposition, see Opp'n to AFGE's Mot. [ECF No. 166] (“Johnson Opp'n”), and AFGE replied in support of its motion, see AFGE's Reply in Supp. of AFGE Mot. [ECF No. 168] (“AFGE Reply”). The motions are now ripe for decision.

Analysis

I. Motions to Strike

Both AFGE and Cox move to dismiss Johnson's 5AC because they claim “Johnson's counsel has once again violated this Court's Orders by making wholly new allegations that are nowhere in the Second Amended Complaint[,] . . . including allegations from sections of the SAC about claims other than Johnson's individual wrongful termination claim against AFGE and Cox . . . and making allegations that, because they are legally irrelevant to the wrongful termination claim, are not ‘directly related to' that claim.” AFGE Mot. at 2.^[2] “[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority . . . to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016). This broad power includes the authority to strike material from its docket for noncompliance with court orders or rules. See Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] District Court ha[s] jurisdiction to grant . . . motion[s] to strike pursuant to its inherent powers.”); HLFIP Holding, Inc. v. Rutherford Cnty., No. 3:19-cv-00714, 2020 WL 6484254, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 2020) (“The Court may strike improvident filings based on its inherent authority to manage its own docket. This includes the inherent authority to strike any filed paper which it determines to be abusive or otherwise improper under the circumstances.” (citation omitted)); cf. Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he inherent power enables courts to protect their institutional integrity and to guard against abuses of the judicial process with contempt citations, fines, awards of attorneys' fees, and such other orders and sanctions as they find necessary . . . .” (emphasis added)); Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1472). “It necessarily follows that, as part of its power to ‘manage [its] own affairs,' a district court can use less drastic measures such as striking documents from the docket to address litigation conduct that does not warrant outright dismissal.” Ready Transp., 627 F.3d at 404 (citation omitted) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991)).

Defendants argue the 5AC should be stricken because it contains three types of non-compliant allegations: (1) “entirely new allegations,” (2) “allegations not in SAC ¶¶ 656-84,” and (3) “allegations irrelevant to Johnson's individual wrongful termination claim.” See AFGE Mot. at 5-9.

A. Entirely New Allegations

AFGE points out that Johnson included new allegations related to misconduct by AFGE Defense Conference Emeritus Chair Don Hale in paragraphs 86, 88-89, and 91-97 of the 5AC. Id. at 5. Johnson's new allegations mainly pertain to Hale's act of “email[ing] a sexually explicit photo of himself to a female AFGE official . . . in violation of the AFGE Use of Resources Rule” and AFGE's subsequent decision not to discipline him. See 5AC ¶¶ 86-97. These allegations presumably serve as an example of a similarly situated white employee who was not fired. See Johnson Opp'n at 5.

AFGE contends that the inclusion of these allegations for the first time contravenes ...