Doe v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist.

1

JANE DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ANDERSON UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

C093099

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Shasta

March 10, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Super. Ct. No. 192696)

ON TRANSFER

MAURO ACTING P. J.

Daniel Schafer, a teacher at a high school in the Anderson Union High School District (District), had a sexual relationship with one of his students, plaintiff Jane Doe, which included sexual activities in his classroom. Doe sued the District principal Carol Germano, and superintendent Tim Azevedo for negligent hiring and negligent supervision. We refer to the defendants collectively as the District, except when being more specific is necessary to the discussion. The trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the District, finding there was no evidence the District knew or should have known that Schafer posed a risk of harm to students.

Doe now contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the District had a duty to take reasonable measures to protect Doe, and whether the District breached its duty to Doe is a question for a trier of fact.

We conclude the District had a duty to take reasonable measures to protect Doe from sexual abuse by Schafer. This is so because the District had a special relationship with Doe, and the factors articulated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland) do not weigh in favor of limiting the District's duty. We further conclude that whether the District breached its duty to Doe is a question for a trier of fact. Because the trial court should not have granted the District's motion for summary judgment, we will reverse the judgment.

BACKGROUND

When Doe was 17 years old and a student at a high school in the District, she engaged in sexual activity with Daniel Schafer a teacher at the high school, over a period of about three months. Doe told her best friend about the activity, and in September 2018, the District learned of the sexual relationship from the mother of Doe's best friend. The District immediately investigated, obtained Schafer's resignation, and notified Doe's parents and law enforcement.

Schafer had been a teacher in the District since 2012, and the District vetted him through education and law enforcement agencies and trained him on prevention of sexual harassment and child abuse. His relationship with Doe began with hand-holding and texting in Schafer's classroom. Eventually, Doe began visiting Schafer's classroom in the evening. On the first day of summer break 2018, Doe again visited Schafer in his classroom, and they engaged in sexual activities. Through the summer, they engaged in additional sexual activities in the classroom and at Schafer's home. Schafer pleaded guilty to crimes associated with this sexual relationship.

When the District hired Schafer in 2012, there were no facts, reports, or rumors that Schafer had ever engaged in any improper relationship. The revelation of his relationship with Doe was a surprise to the District.

A janitor once saw Doe alone with Schafer in his classroom after school but did not see any inappropriate conduct. The janitor told the school receptionist what she had seen, but because she did not think anything was wrong at the time, she did not tell principal Germano until after the District learned of the relationship and obtained Schafer's resignation.

The District maintained outdoor security cameras at the high school, including a camera that recorded video of the doors to Schafer's classroom. Footage from the cameras was saved for only 14 days before automatic erasure. The District's policy was to review the footage only if the District learned of an incident that may have been caught on video. The District also maintained an alarm system that covered the main building and Schafer's classroom. Each employee, including Schafer, had a code to deactivate the alarm. The District had not requested data from the alarm company on when alarms were deactivated or by whom.

Teachers had unrestricted access to the high school campus, but prior to the report of the relationship between Schafer and Doe, there had been no problems with teacher access. Principal Germano was the only administrator supervising the daily activities of the teachers at the high school. She was aware that teachers were on campus after hours, but she did not review video footage or alarm logs because such access had not been a problem.

In opposition to the District's motion for summary judgment, Doe submitted the declaration of David Jackson, a retired principal and school administrator. He had made it a practice at schools where he had worked to obtain and review alarm logs. If he found that a teacher was spending too much time on campus late at night, Jackson would interview the teacher and, possibly, review the video footage. According to Jackson, this review was inexpensive and cost-effective. But Jackson opined that "budgetary issues are never a concern when dealing with the safety of students."

In response to the motion for summary judgment, Doe conceded she did not have evidence to support the negligent hiring cause of action, so the trial court focused on the negligent supervision cause of action, concluding that to prove negligent supervision, Doe had to show not only that Schafer posed a risk of harm, but also that the risk was foreseeable, i.e., that the District knew or should have known of the risk that Schafer posed. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against Doe.

On review, this court affirmed. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 (Brown).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

" 'A trial court properly grants summary judgment when there are no triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." '" (Delgadillo v. Television Center, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1085.) The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion. (Ibid.) We review de novo the trial court's judgment following the granting of a motion for summary judgment. (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

Doe contends the District had a duty to take reasonable measures to protect her, and whether the District breached its duty to her is a question for a trier of fact.

A

Our first task is to determine whether the District had a duty to take reasonable measures to protect Doe from sexual abuse by Schafer. This determination is made by the court as a matter of law. (Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 831-832 (KFC).)

The formulation of a duty of care does not depend on the specific facts of the case. "An approach that [focuses] the duty inquiry on case-specific facts would tend to 'eliminate the role of the [trier of fact] in negligence cases transforming the question of whether a defendant breached the duty of care under the facts of a particular case into a legal issue to be decided by the court ....' [Citation.]" (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 773.) Citing Cabral and other authorities, Justice Cuellar, in a concurring opinion in Brown, emphasized that duty must be expressed at a high level of generality because what constitutes reasonable care in a specific case usually involves whether the defendant breached a duty. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 228-229 (conc. opn. of Cuellar, J.), citing Cabral, at p. 773.)

On the question of duty, we apply a two-step process. "First the court must determine whether there exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty." (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209; see also Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108.)

"A special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one that 'gives the victim a right to expect' protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that 'entails an ability to control [the third party's] conduct.' [Citation.] Relationships between parents and children, colleges and students, employers and employees, common carriers and passengers, and innkeepers and guests, are all examples of special relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty to protect. [Citations.] The existence of such a special relationship puts the defendant in a unique position to protect the plaintiff from injury. The law requires the defendant to use this position accordingly. [Citation.]" (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 216.)

"[A] school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district's pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, 'analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.' [Citations.] Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714, the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands...