Doe v. Bd. of Educ.

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MOTHER DOE #1, et al., v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SOMERSET COUNTY, et al.

CIVIL No. RDB-22-1491

United States District Court, D. Maryland

January 24, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge

Three students and their parents filed this suit against the Board of Education of Somerset County, and school district employee Samantha Williams Marsh, for Marsh's alleged grooming of and eventual sexual misconduct with, the three children who are plaintiffs in this case. The original complaint, filed in the Circuit Court for Somerset County, alleged nineteen distinct causes of action against the defendants under state and federal law. The defendants removed the case to this Court based on the federal claims, and the plaintiffs ultimately filed an amended complaint in July 2022 containing eighteen of the original nineteen counts.^[1]The Board now moves to dismiss each of the claims against it, Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 30, and Marsh asks the court to dismiss or grant summary judgment on most, but not all, of the claims against her, Partial Mot. to Dismiss or for Partial Summ. J., ECF 33. The motions are fully briefed and no oral argument is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6.

For the reasons explained below, the court will grant each motion in part and deny each motion in part. Specifically, the court will permit the plaintiffs to continue pursuing their claims of negligence, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, as well as their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Article VIII of the Maryland Constitution, against both parties. The plaintiffs' Title VI and Title IX claims against the Board, and their battery, invasion of privacy, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Marsh, may also advance. The court will, however, dismiss the respondeat superior, § 20-901, § 1981, and § 1986 claims against both parties, dismiss the Title VI and Title IX claims against Marsh, and dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim against the Board.

BACKGROUND

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Consistent with that standard, the court begins with an overview of the factual allegations as set out in the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs, three black males who were seventeen at the time of the alleged misconduct, and their parents, claim that Marsh abused her position as a school nurse at Crisfield Academy and High School (“Crisfield”) to groom the student-plaintiffs and ultimately engage in sexual relationships with them. The Board, they assert, was aware of Marsh's conduct but failed to intervene.

Marsh joined Crisfield as a school nurse in 2017. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-23, 53, ECF 27. The job was her first in a school setting. Id. ¶ 24. According to the plaintiffs, when Marsh took the job, she aspired “to have a ‘black baby.'” Id. ¶ 42. So she set out to “have sexual relations” with “as many male African American students as possible.” Id.

To that end, the plaintiffs say, Marsh engaged “in a process known as ‘grooming'” to manipulate students, “gain access to them, coerce them into sexual activity, and reduce the risk of being caught.” Id. ¶¶ 27-28. She leveraged her role as school nurse to implement the plan, enticing black students to the nurse's station-even “when they had no health care needs” and even “when they were assigned to be in different areas of the school”-with “candy, snacks, and other drinks” that were stored in her office. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. The tactic was so successful that the nurse's station began overflowing with student invitees to the extent that “students requiring actual medical attention or assistance had difficulty receiving that attention or did not receive that attention at all.” Id. ¶ 31. The goal: Not only developing relationships with students, but also normalizing for them the idea of “breaking the rules” with Marsh. Id. ¶ 32.

From there, Marsh escalated the relationships. She began interacting with specific black students, including the plaintiffs, excessively, talking with them “in person, on social media, and via text messages during school hours and while on school property.” Id. ¶ 35. She also gave them “small gifts,” “special attention,” and rides home. Id. ¶¶ 39, 41, 47. All this was designed to increase the amount of time she spent with the students, gain their trust, and develop their relationships in an apparently natural way without raising their suspicions. Id. ¶¶ 38, 47.

Ultimately, after “over a year” of targeting and grooming the plaintiffs “because they were male and African American,” the relationships became explicitly sexual. Id. ¶ 47. At first, Marsh exchanged “sexually explicit text messages, conversations, and photographs” with the students. Id. ¶ 37. Then, “between March 2018 and October 2018,” Marsh “engaged in sexual relations with Student Doe #1, Student Doe #2, and Student Doe #3.” Id. ¶ 53. At the time, each student was under eighteen. Id.

As a result of Marsh's sexual relationship with students at Crisfield, “a report of potential child sex abuse” was filed against her. Id. at 54. The Somerset County Sheriff's Office investigated, and “Marsh eventually pled guilty to three counts of fourth degree sex charges in the Circuit Court for Somerset County, Criminal Case No.: C-19-CR-19-000045.” Id. ¶ 52. “These counts were directly related to” Marsh's sexual encounters with the student-plaintiffs. Id.

The plaintiffs allege that as all this was going on, the Board knew of Marsh's misconduct but did nothing. As “early as October 2017,” Board agents and employees witnessed and appreciated Marsh's “red flag grooming behaviors,” but “did nothing to increase Defendant Marsh's training or supervision to eliminate these behaviors and the risks associated with them.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 51. The Board also “received complaints” about Marsh's behavior “from personnel at the school and concerned parents,” but still did nothing. Id. ¶ 44. Then, in Spring 2018, the Board received a report demonstrating the product of Marsh's grooming activity: “Marsh had engaged in sexual activity with a student” (who is not a plaintiff here). Id. ¶ 46. Still, the Board “failed to take any action regarding that incident,” and did not report it to “authorities for an independent investigation.” Id. ¶ 46. Instead, Marsh remained employed at Crisfield-where she received no additional training, supervision, or scrutiny-and “engaged in sexual relations with” the student plaintiffs “between March 2018 and October 2018.” Id. ¶¶ 43-46, 53.

The parents of the student-plaintiffs became aware of Marsh's relationships with their children in 2019 as a product of the criminal investigation into Marsh's behavior. Id. ¶ 54. They later filed this suit, together with their children, in state court in 2022. See Notice of Removal, ECF 1. The defendants removed the case to federal court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331, where the plaintiffs ultimately filed an amended complaint on July 26, 2022. The Board now moves to dismiss the claims against it in full. Marsh moves to dismiss, or for summary judgment on, all but the claims of negligence and gross negligence.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Board moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Marsh also moves to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons discussed below, the court will treat both defendants' motions as motions to dismiss and thus Rule 12(b)(6) will govern the court's analysis.

I. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not ‘forecast' evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the claim. However, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish those elements.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “Thus, while a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate in a complaint that the right to relief is ‘probable,' the complaint must advance the plaintiff's claim ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

As an alternative to her motion to dismiss, Marsh moves for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The court considers only the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. But where, as here, the parties present matters outside of the pleadings, the court may consider those matters if it treats the motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); Gadsby by Gadsby v Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 949 (4th Cir. 1997); Paukstis v. Kenwood Golf & Country Club, Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 551, 556 (D. Md. 2003). “There are two requirements for a proper Rule 12(d) conversion.” Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013). First, all parties must “be given some indication by the court that it is treating the 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment,” which can be satisfied when a party is “aware that material outside the pleadings is before the court.” Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Laughlin...