Doe v. Bishop of Charleston

John Doe 2 and Jane Doe 4, John Doe 10, Jane Doe 11,John Doe 193, Father Doe 194, John Doe 194,John Doe 245 and Father Doe 245, and John Doe 297, Appellants, v. The Bishop of Charleston, A Corporation Sole;Robert Gugliemone, The Bishop of Charleston, in his official Capacity;Rev. Monsignor Martin Laughlin,former Administrator of the Diocese of Charleston, in his official Capacity;Robert J. Baker, former Bishop of Charleston, in his official capacity;Lawrence E. Richter, Jr.; David K. Haller;and Richter and Haller, LLC, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001996

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-060

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Heard September 15, 2020

March 3, 2021

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Appeal From Charleston County

J. C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

AFFIRMED

Gregg E. Meyers, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellants.

Richard S. Dukes, Jr., of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Charleston, for Respondents The Bishop of Charleston, a Corporation Sole, Robert Gugliemone, The Bishop of Charleston, in his official capacity, Rev. Monsignor Martin Laughlin, former Administrator of the Diocese of Charleston, in his official Capacity, and Robert J. Baker, former Bishop of Charleston, in his official capacity.

Benjamin C. Bruner and Chelsea Jaqueline Clark, both of Bruner Powell Wall & Mullins, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents Lawrence E. Richter, Jr., and Richter and Haller, LLC.

Susan Taylor Wall and Henry Wilkins Frampton, IV, both of Gordon & Rees LLP, of Charleston, for Respondent David K. Haller.

PER CURIAM: In this civil matter, Appellants (Victims) argue the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Respondents the Bishop of Charleston, a corporation sole, Robert Gugliemone, the Bishop of Charleston, in his official capacity, Reverend Monsignor Martin Laughlin, former administrator of the Diocese of Charleston, in his official capacity, and Robert J. Baker, former Bishop of Charleston, in his official capacity (collectively, the Diocese) and to Respondents Lawrence E. Richter, Jr., David K. Haller, and Richter and Haller, LLC (collectively, Counsel). We affirm.

1. We find the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Counsel on Victims' claims for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. See Loflin v. BMP Dev., LP, 427 S.C. 580, 588, 832 S.E.2d 294, 298 (Ct. App. 2019) (providing that this court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the circuit court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP), aff'd as modified on other grounds 432 S.C. 246, 246, 851 S.E.2d 713, 714 (2020); Rule 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"). Victims' complaints clearly express in multiple places that their claims against Counsel are alternative claims in the event they are precluded from bringing claims against the Diocese. As established by the circuit court's collateral review order, Victims are not precluded by the settlement from bringing claims against the Diocese. Therefore, Victims are bound by theirpleadings, and their claims against Counsel must fail as a matter of law. See Postal v. Mann, 308 S.C. 385, 387, 418 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct. App. 1992) ("It is well settled that parties are judicially bound by their pleadings unless withdrawn, altered or stricken by amendment or otherwise. The allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader and a party cannot subsequently take a position contradictory of, or inconsistent with, his pleadings . . . ." (emphasis added)); Gary v. Lowcountry Med. Transp., Inc., 424 S.C. 18, 23, 817 S.E.2d 291, 294 (Ct. App. 2018) ("[T]he doctrine of binding a party to its pleadings exists to protect the integrity of the court process."); see also Prince v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 390 S.C. 166, 169, 700 S.E.2d 280, 281 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."). Moreover, we find summary judgment was proper because Victims failed to establish damages proximately caused by Counsel's alleged breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. See Gauld v. O'Shaugnessy Realty Co., 380 S.C. 548, 559, 671...