Doe v. Brown Univ.

253 A.3d 389

Jane DOE

v.BROWN UNIVERSITY et al.

No. 2019-167-Appeal.

PC 17-4635

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 28, 2021

Patrick T. Jones, Esq., Ralph R. Liguori, Esq., Audrey R. Poore, Esq., for Plaintiff

Steven M. Richard, Esq. Michael D. Grabo, Esq., for Defendants

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court.

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, appeals from a Superior Court judgment dismissing her complaint against the defendants, Brown University, Jonah Allen Ward, and Yolanda Castillo-Appollonio (collectively defendants).¹ Although the complaint existed only briefly in Superior Court, the facts at issue also have lent themselves to claims in federal district court, as well as an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See Doe v. Brown University , 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 558-59 (D.R.I. 2017) ( Doe I ); Doe v. Brown University , 896 F.3d 127, 128-29 (1st Cir. 2018) ( Doe II ). In Superior Court, the plaintiff asserted claims under both the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, chapter 112 of title 42 of the general laws (RICRA), and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution. The matter now before us concerns the plaintiff's appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss and the dismissal of all claims. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.²

Facts and Travel³

In the fall of 2013, plaintiff was a freshman at Providence College. On November 21, 2013, she was socializing at a bar in the Providence area when she was drugged, unbeknownst to her. The plaintiff was then transported by taxi to a Brown University dormitory, where she was sexually assaulted by three Brown University football players (individually Student A, Student B, and Student C). On November 30, 2013, plaintiff received treatment at Lawrence General Hospital, in Lawrence, Massachusetts, related to the sexual assault.

On February 3, 2014, plaintiff reported the sexual assault to the Providence Police Department. A Brown University Police detective was present when plaintiff made her statement. On February 26, 2014, a search warrant was executed on Student A's dorm room and cell phone. On March 27, 2014, a search warrant was executed on Student B's dorm room and cell phone. On May 8, 2014, a search warrant was issued for the seizure of Student C's cellular device. A forensic analysis of the cell-phone data revealed communications between Student A and Student B from November 22, 2013, stating, "YO LIKE CLASSIC [Student C] THO ... NO INVITE JUST WALKS IN AND STARTS RAPING HER." Another text from that day stated, "LMAO I died in her face, too real[.]"⁴

On June 19, 2014, defendants notified plaintiff that she had the right to file a complaint pursuant to the University's Code of Student Conduct (the Code of Conduct). On September 5, 2014, Dean Castillo-Appollonio notified plaintiff that Brown University would conduct an inquiry as to whether any of the students involved had violated the Code of Conduct. Dean Castillo-Appollonio also requested that plaintiff submit a statement in writing. On September 15, 2014, plaintiff gave defendants a three-page statement, as well as copies of documents from the Providence police investigation. The plaintiff also requested response and redress pursuant to Title IX.⁵ On October 7, 2014, defendants notified plaintiff that Brown University would proceed with its inquiry only under the student disciplinary code, which process, plaintiff alleged, did not comply with Title IX standards.

On October 11, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint against Brown University with the Office for Civil Rights at the United States Department of Education, alleging that Brown University had unlawfully refused to redress her complaint under Title IX and that Brown University had failed to provide a prompt, equitable, and effective response to plaintiff's sexual assault. At the time plaintiff's complaint was filed in Superior Court, that complaint with the Department of Education had been accepted for investigation and was still pending.

On October 26, 2014, plaintiff informed defendants that she had submitted samples of her hair for testing to determine the presence of drugs at the time of the assault. The results of this test were positive for two over-the-counter drugs that are commonly used to induce incapacitation and memory loss. On October 27, 2014, Castillo-Appollonio informed plaintiff that Brown University "planned on issuing ‘charge letters soon’ in connection with the University's inquiry into her sexual assault."

On April 20, 2016, plaintiff requested an update from Brown University as to information related to the investigation of her sexual assault. On June 21, 2016, Brown University informed plaintiff that it never completed any investigation and had abandoned all disciplinary action against the three Brown University students who were allegedly involved.

On November 14, 2016, plaintiff filed an action against defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiff sought damages and equitable relief pursuant to Title IX and RICRA, arising out of defendants’ response to plaintiff's sexual-assault allegations. In that action, defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Doe I , 270 F. Supp. 3d at 559. The federal district court determined that plaintiff, as a nonstudent at Brown University, did not fall within "Title IX's private-cause-of-action umbrella of protection" and dismissed plaintiff's claim under Title IX. Id. at 563. The federal district court further concluded that, because it dismissed plaintiff's sole claim under federal law, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id. at 563-64. Thus, those claims were dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 564. The plaintiff appealed the District Court judgment, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Doe II , 896 F.3d at 133.

On September 28, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants in the Superior Court seeking damages and equitable relief under RICRA and the Rhode Island Constitution. In response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

In support of that motion, defendants argued that they had no control over the "hostile education environment" plaintiff claimed she experienced at Providence College, and, therefore, they could not interfere with her educational contract with Providence College. The defendants further argued that collateral estoppel prevents plaintiff from bringing a claim under the "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons" clause of RICRA because in doing so plaintiff relies on her Title IX claim, which was dismissed by the federal district court, and which dismissal was upheld by the First Circuit. Lastly, defendants contended that plaintiff could not bring the state constitutional claim for damages against defendants because defendants were not state actors and the constitutional provision at issue does not create a private cause of action for damages.

In response, plaintiff argued that defendants’ deliberate refusal to address the sexual assault violated plaintiff's rights under both RICRA and the Rhode Island Constitution. Further, plaintiff claimed that collateral estoppel did not apply here because the issues are distinct from those raised in federal court. Finally, plaintiff argued that Brown University is an institution doing substantial business with the State of Rhode Island and, therefore, falls within the purview of section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution.

A hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss was held in Superior Court on January 23, 2019. The parties returned for an additional hearing on February 6, 2019, at which the hearing justice issued a bench decision. The hearing justice determined that issue preclusion foreclosed the claims under RICRA based on the decision of the federal courts. She also found that section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not grant plaintiff a private right of action. Accordingly, judgment entered in favor of defendants as to all counts of plaintiff's complaint on February 22, 2019. On February 25, 2019, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

Standard of Review

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure "has a narrow and specific purpose:

‘to test the sufficiency of the complaint.’ " Mokwenyei v. Rhode Island Hospital , 198 A.3d 17, 21 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Properties, LLC , 61 A.3d 414, 416 (R.I. 2013) ). The motion to dismiss can be granted only "[i]f ‘it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff's claim[.]’ " Id. (quoting Rein v. ESS Group, Inc. , 184 A.3d 695, 699 (R.I. 2018) ). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the hearing justice "is to ‘look no further than the complaint, assume that all allegations in the complaint are true, and resolve any doubt in a plaintiff's favor.’ " Id. (quoting Multi-State Restoration, Inc. , 61 A.3d at 416 ).

However, this Court has recognized a "narrow exception for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs’ claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Mokwenyei , 198 A.3d at 22 (quoting Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company , 160 A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017) ). "To be more precise, if ‘a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to—and admittedly dependent upon—a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), then that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in...