Doe v. Champaign Cmty. Unit 4 Sch. Dist.

JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, asParents and Next Friends of D.M., a Minor, Plaintiffs,

v.CHAMPAIGN COMMUNITY UNIT 4 SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 11-CV-3355

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

ENTERED: July 12, 2013

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Motion to Dismiss) (d/e 29). For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 20, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a 12-count Complaint (d/e 1) against the Champaign Community Unit 4 School District (District);Rhonda Howard, the principal of Academic Academy, in her individual and official capacities; Arthur Culver, the Superintendent of the District, in his individual and official capacities; and members of the District's Board of Education Sue Grey, Stig Lanesskog, Tom Lockman, Greg Novak, Jamar Brown, Kristine Chalifoux, and David Tomlinson in their official capacities. Novack has died during the pendency of this case. The Court dismissed several of Plaintiffs' claims but gave Plaintiffs leave to replead.

Plaintiffs have filed a First Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint) that names the same Defendants. The allegations of the Amended Complaint are similar to those in the original Complaint and state as follows.

At the time of the incident in question, D.M. was a 15-year old male enrolled at Academic Academy in Champaign, Illinois. On January 21, 2011, Principal Howard entered D.M.'s classroom prior to D.M. arriving at school. Principal Howard detected the odor of cannabis and then left the classroom. Later, D.M. arrived at school and took his seatin the classroom. About 30 students were present at the time. D.M. was one of only two African-American students in the classroom.

After D.M. had taken his seat, Principal Howard entered the classroom, removed D.M. from the classroom, and took D.M. to her office. There, Principal Howard searched D.M.'s coat and backpack. Principal Howard then required D.M. to remove his shirt, unbutton his pants, remove his belt, remove his shoes, and partially disrobe. The Amended Complaint refers to this as a "strip search." Principal Howard did not find any contraband on D.M. during the search. Principal Howard did not contact D.M.'s parents prior to conducting the search.

D.M. then returned to his classroom. Principal Howard did not conduct a search of any other student in the classroom or of any other student's belongings.

According to the Amended Complaint, Principal Howard did not have reasonable cause to conduct this "strip search" of D.M. Principal Howard's actions were taken in her official capacity as Principal, pursuant to the policies and direction and under the supervision ofSuperintendent Culver and the School Board.

The Amended Complaint further alleges that the School Board and Superintendent Culver have a policy, procedure, or practice and custom of failing to adequately train personnel on the appropriate and correct procedures for the apprehension of students, contacting parents of minors, conducting searches, avoiding the profiling of students on the basis of race, and preventing violations of students' rights. The Amended Complaint further alleges that the School Board and Superintendent Culver have a custom of tolerating or acquiescing in the failure to adequately supervise and discipline its principals. The Amended Complaint further alleges that the School Board and Superintendent Culver failed to train its personnel on the appropriate procedures for the apprehension of students, contacting parents of minors, the conducting of searches, avoiding the profiling of students on the basis of race, and preventing violations of the rights of its students. Finally, the Amended Complaint alleges that the aforesaid actions of Defendants were reckless, done with deliberate indifference, disregard, and substantial risk ofviolations of D.M's rights.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants have filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Defendants' Memorandum in Support). In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants contended that the official capacity claims against Principal Howard in Counts I and II, the individual and official capacity claims against Superintendent Culver in Counts III and IV, and the Failure to Train claims against Superintendent Culver and the School Board in Counts V and XI should be dismissed.

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statementmust be sufficient to provide the defendant with "fair notice" of the claim and its basis. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, 940 (2007). This means that (1) "the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant 'fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" and (2) its allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a "speculative level." EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). While detailed factual allegations are not needed, a "formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 940. Conclusory allegations are "not entitled to be assumed true." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 885 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). "In ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party." In re marchFIRST Inc.,589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081). A. Official Capacity Claims Against Principal Howard in Counts I and II

Counts I and II allege claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981, respectively, against Principal Howard in both her individual and official capacities. Count I alleges that the School Board, Superintendent Culver, or Unit 4 had a policy, practice or custom of conducting unreasonable searches. Count II alleges that Unit 4 had a policy, practice, or custom of conducting racially discriminatory illegal searches. Counts I and II both allege that Principal Howard exercised final policymaking authority for Unit 4 with respect to student searches. Defendants seek dismissal of the official capacity claims in Counts I and II.

A suit against a governmental official in her official capacity is a suit against the governmental entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Here, the governmental entity is the District. To establish municipal liability, Plaintiffs "must show the existence of an 'official policy' or other governmental custom that not only causes but isthe 'moving force' behind the deprivation of constitutional rights." Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). "Our case law establishes that unconstitutional policies or customs take three forms: (1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice, that, although unauthorized, is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a "custom or usage" with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that a person with final policymaking authority caused the injury." Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Rasche v. Vill. of Beecher, 336 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003). This same standard applies to official capacity claims brought under § 1981. See Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989); see also Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 2007).

Here, Plaintiffs have not identified an express policy of the School Board or Unit 4 that could have caused D.M.'s constitutionaldeprivation. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged an official capacity claim based on an express policy in Counts I or II.

Likewise, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that permit an inference there was a widespread practice or custom of conducting unreasonable or racially discriminatory searches of students. "The usual way in which an unconstitutional policy is inferred, in the absence of direct evidence, is by showing a series of bad acts and inviting the court to infer from them that the policymaking level of government was bound to have noticed what was going on and by failing to do anything must have encouraged or at least condoned, in either event adopting, the misconduct of subordinate officers." Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995). When using this method of proof, "a single act of misconduct will not suffice; for it is the series that lays the premise of the system of inference." Id. (citing Cornfield by Lewis v. Consolidated High School District No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1326-27 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Levin v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 470 F.Supp. 2d 835, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (dismissing § 1983 claimbecause two instances of unconstitutional conduct does not suggest a widespread, enduring practice that violates constitutional rights in a systemic manner.) (internal quotation omitted); Hale v. Pace, 2011 WL 1303369, at *8 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 2011) ("to allege an official policy, plaintiffs must plead 'specific facts that demonstrate the actual existence of an illegal municipal policy that goes beyond a single alleged incident of wrongdoing.'") (...