Doe v. Cnty. of L. A.

1

JANE DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

B320315

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division

August 19, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 21STCV44757 Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed.

Jane Doe, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Collins + Collins, Erin R. Dunkerly and David C. Moore, for Defendants and Respondents County of Los Angeles, Alex Villanueva, George Gascon, and John Adams.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anthony R. Hakl, Supervising

Deputy Attorney General, and Jeffrey A. Rich, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent Rob Bonta.

SEGAL J.

INTRODUCTION

Jane Doe brought this action against the County of Los Angeles Sheriff Alex Villanueva, Lieutenant John Adams, Los Angeles County District Attorney George Gascon, and California Attorney General Rob Bonta. Doe alleged that, after she reported a sexual assault to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, a deputy sheriff forged Doe's name on a search waiver form and that the Department downloaded the entire contents of Doe's phone without her permission. Doe alleged she reported the forgery to the Department, but instead of commencing a criminal investigation, the Department conducted an administrative review to shield the deputy from criminal liability. Doe asserted causes of action for violation of her right to equal protection; municipal liability for constitutional violations; negligent supervision, training, discipline, and retention; and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend and entered judgment against Doe. The trial court also denied Doe's request to proceed pseudonymously. We affirm the judgment and the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Doe Accuses a Sheriff's Deputy of Forgery

According to the allegations in the operative first amended complaint, which we accept as true (see Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 786), in July 2019 Doe met with Liliana Jara, a detective in the Department's Special Victims Bureau, who was investigating Doe's report she had been sexually assaulted. Doe showed Detective Jara "incriminating" messages on her cell phone, and the detective said she needed to download the messages. Doe agreed, and at the end of the interview, Detective Jara took Doe's phone. Although Detective Jara told Doe it would take two weeks to download the information, Doe did not get her phone back for three months. When Doe retrieved her phone, she discovered one of her messages had been translated into English.

In October 2020 Doe discovered a search waiver form with her forged signature authorizing the Department to search her phone "for information related to the case, including 'text messages, photographs, videos, messages, and emails.'" The forged search waiver form allowed the Department to seize Doe's "call logs, device locations, passwords, searched items, web history, texts, databases, documents, user accounts, calendar, emails, photographs, bank information, videos, and audio etc. that were totally unrelated to the offense" Doe had reported. Doe demanded the original search waiver form for "forensic examination," but Detective Jara said the Department no longer had it.

In February 2021 Doe went to a sheriff's station and "announced her need to report a criminal conduct of a deputy."

A sergeant took Doe's statement and created "a service comment report which resulted in 'service review.'" The Department sent Doe's complaint to the Special Victims Bureau. Lieutenant John Adams, who was Detective Jara's supervisor, took Doe's statement by telephone. "Despite obvious allegation of criminal conduct," however, Lieutenant Adams "did not categorize the complaint as a criminal complaint or further investigate the allegation." For several months Doe asked about the investigation. In August 2021 Lieutenant Adams told Doe the Department had conducted an "administrative investigation," not a "criminal investigation." Because Lieutenant Adams and Detective Jara were assigned to the same unit, Lieutenant Adams's "'administrative investigation' was in fact a service review which would never result in discipline or sanction."

Doe contacted the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office and the California Attorney General "regarding Jara's criminal conduct but no action was taken." Doe also presented her claim to the County, which rejected it.

B. Doe Files This Action

In December 2021 Doe filed this action against the County, Sheriff Villanueva, Lieutenant Adams, Gascon, and Bonta. She asserted six causes of action. First, she alleged all defendants violated title 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983) by violating her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution "to have government services administered in a non-discriminatory manner" and to "be treated equally as a crime victim of police misconduct compared to crime victims of non-police misconduct." Second, she asserted a cause of action under section 1983 against the County, Sheriff Villanueva, and Lieutenant Adams for municipal liability for unconstitutional custom, practice, and policy. Third, she asserted a cause of action under section 1983 against the County, Sheriff Villanueva, and Lieutenant Adams for failure to train, supervise, and discipline employees. Fourth, she asserted a cause of action against all defendants for violation of her right to equal protection under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. Fifth, she asserted a cause of action against the County, Sheriff Villanueva, and Lieutenant Adams, alleging they negligently supervised, trained, disciplined, and retained employees. And sixth, she asserted a cause of action against the County, Sheriff Villanueva, and Lieutenant Adams for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

C. The Trial Court Denies Doe's Request To Proceed Pseudonymously

Before she served the defendants with the complaint, Doe filed requests to proceed under a pseudonym and for a protective order preventing the defendants from disclosing her identity, "to protect her privacy and prevent further harm from the stigma that can attach to victims of sexual assault." The trial court treated the request as a motion and allowed the parties to submit briefs and evidence. In April 2022 the trial court denied the motion. Doe timely appealed from the order denying her motion.

D. The Trial Court Sustains Demurrers to the First Amended Complaint

Meanwhile, the County, Sheriff Villanueva, Lieutenant Adams, and Gascon filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint, and Bonta demurred separately. In sustaining the demurrers, the trial court ruled that all of Doe's causes of action were based on the County's failure to investigate, prosecute, or discipline Detective Jara; that the executive branch had sole authority to decide whether to prosecute someone; that Doe, as a private citizen, did not have standing to compel the County to prosecute Detective Jara; and that the County defendants did not owe Doe a duty to investigate, prosecute, or discipline Detective Jara. Because Doe did not show she could cure this "fundamental problem" with her complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. Doe timely appealed from the ensuing judgment. We consolidated the two appeals.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the Demurrers to the Causes of Action for Violation of Section 1983

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

We independently review the trial court's ruling sustaining the demurrers to Doe's section 1983 causes of action. (Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1470.) "'To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.' [Citation.] '"State courts look to federal law to determine what conduct will support an action under section 1983. [Citation.]"' [Citation.] 'The threshold inquiry [in analyzing a section 1983 claim] is whether the evidence establishes that appellants have been deprived of a constitutional right.'" (Id. at pp. 1472-1473.)

We apply federal law to determine whether Doe alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action under section 1983. (Martinez v. City of Clovis (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193, 254; Rubin v. Padilla (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1144; Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471.) We "accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." (Resnick v. Hayes (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 443, 447.) "A plaintiff seeking recovery under section 1983 must plead more than constitutional 'buzzwords' to survive demurrer. [Citation.] The plaintiff must allege specific and nonconclusory facts showing the defendant's acts deprived him [or her] of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws." (Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 166, 180; see Golden Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 249, 267.)

Under federal law, where a plaintiff is self-represented, we will "'construe the pleadings liberally,'" but we will not "supply essential elements of a claim that are absent from the complaint." (Boquist v Courtney (9th Cir. 2022) 32 F.4th 764, 774.) "'Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights...