Doe v. Finke

86 Cal.App.5th 913

302 Cal.Rptr.3d 608

John DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Chad FINKE, as Executive Director and Clerk, etc., et al., Defendants;

Rob Bonta, as Attorney General, etc. Intervener and Respondent.

A163026

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Filed December 21, 2022

Law Office of Janice M. Bellucci, Janice M. Bellucci for Plaintiff and Appellant

Reed Smith LLP, Raymond A. Cardozo, San Francisco, for Defendants

Rob Bonta, Attorney General; Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General; Paul Stein, S. Clinton Woods, Deputy Attorneys General, for Intervener and Respondent

Miller, J.

For over 170 years, the California Constitution has directed that "[l]aws shall be made" to exclude "persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes" from serving on juries. ¹

Until recently, the Legislature followed this directive by excluding from jury service persons convicted of any felony , unless their civil rights had been restored; former Code of Civil Procedure section 203, subdivision (a) (former section 203(a) ), provided in relevant part, "All persons are eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except" "(5) Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony , and whose civil rights have not been restored." (Former § 203(a)(5), as amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 924, § 1, italics added.)²

In 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 310 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 310), which eliminated former section 203(a)(5) ’s exclusion of persons convicted of felonies from serving on juries³ and added new, narrower categories of persons ineligible for jury service. (Stats. 2019, ch. 591, § 1.) Code of Civil Procedure section 203, subdivision (a) ( section 203(a) ), now excepts from eligibility to serve as jurors "(9) Persons while they are incarcerated in any prison or jail. [¶] (10) Persons who have been convicted of a felony and are currently on parole, postrelease community supervision, felony probation, or mandated supervision for the conviction of a felony. [¶] [and] (11) Persons who are currently required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 290 of the Penal Code based on a felony conviction." It is the last exclusion that is at issue in this appeal.

Plaintiffs Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offense Laws, Inc. (Alliance), and John Doe filed this action against the clerk of the Alameda County Superior Court alleging S.B. 310's categorical exclusion of current sex offender registrants from jury service denies registrants equal protection under the California Constitution. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal.

Plaintiff John Doe appeals. We have granted the Attorney General's unopposed motion to intervene as a respondent. Keeping in mind the " ‘exceedingly deferential’ " nature of our inquiry ( In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 ), we conclude the statutory disparity at issue withstands rational basis scrutiny and there is no denial of equal protection. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We begin with a brief description of a prior lawsuit brought by Alliance in Los Angeles County Superior Court, relevant because the trial court in the present case adopted the analysis and conclusion of the court's order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend in the prior lawsuit.

Los Angeles County Lawsuit

In November 2019, Alliance and individuals John and Jane Doe filed an action in Los Angeles County Superior Court challenging section 203(a)(11) ’s exclusion of sex offender registrants from jury service on equal protection grounds. The operative complaint named as defendants the Executive Director/Clerk of the Los Angeles County Superior Court and the Attorney General.

The Attorney General demurred. He argued the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action because section 203(a)(11) is rationally related to a legitimate state objective and, thus, does not violate equal protection. The Attorney General noted that S.B. 310 excludes from jury service not just current sex offender registrants ( § 203(a)(11) ), but also persons who are currently in prison or jail ( § 203(a)(9) ) and persons on parole, felony probation, or other mandated supervision for a felony conviction ( § 203(a)(10) ). He suggested the Legislature could have rationally determined that, because these groups are "subject to continuing, intrusive monitoring by the authorities," they "are more likely to harbor bias against the State than other felons, and therefore should continue to be excluded from jury service."

On July 15, 2020, the Los Angeles County trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. It accepted the Attorney General's argument that a plausible reason S.B. 310 excluded from jury service persons who are currently incarcerated, persons under mandated supervision for a felony conviction, and persons required to register as sex offenders is that these groups are more likely than persons convicted of felonies generally to harbor bias against the government and the judicial process. Thus, the Los Angeles County court determined, the exclusions of S.B. 310 ( § 203(a)(9)–(11) ) serve the legitimate aim of ensuring fair and impartial juries. The court noted that, " ‘under the rational relationship test, the state may recognize that different categories or classes of persons within a larger classification may pose varying degrees of risk of harm, and properly may limit a regulation to those classes of persons as to whom the need for regulation is thought to be more crucial or imperative,’ " quoting Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 644, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 283, 982 P.2d 154 ( Warden ).

The Los Angeles County court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument that the Legislature had rejected the premise that persons convicted of felonies would be biased jurors; the court reviewed the legislative committee reports and found no support for the plaintiffs’ argument.⁴ The court also observed that whether the Attorney General's proffered rational basis for excluding current sex offender registrants from jury service was the Legislature's true purpose in enacting the bill was irrelevant.

An order of dismissal was filed in September 2020, and the plaintiffs did not appeal in the Los Angeles County case.

Current lawsuit

On July 31, 2020, Alliance and an individual identified only as John Doe initiated this action in Alameda County Superior Court naming Chad Finke in his official capacity as Executive Director/Clerk of the Superior Court (Clerk) as the only defendant. Plaintiffs alleged S.B. 310's exclusion of persons required to register as sex offenders from eligibility for jury service denies those persons equal protection of the law and sought a judicial declaration that section 203(a)(11) violates equal protection and an injunction preventing the Clerk from enforcing section 203(a)(11).

The Clerk demurred on the ground plaintiffs’ sole claim for relief was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and asked the trial court to take judicial notice of various documents filed in the Los Angeles County lawsuit, including the first amended complaint, demurrer papers filed by the Attorney General, and the order sustaining the demurrer.⁵ The trial court granted the request for judicial notice and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.

In March 2021, plaintiff John Doe alone filed a first amended complaint against the Clerk and the Judicial Council of California. The next month, defendants filed a demurrer. They argued plaintiff failed to state a claim for the reasons articulated by the Los Angeles County Superior Court in the identical prior action and plaintiff's claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.

The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court considered the merits of the equal protection argument, stating that it "conducted its own analysis" and then "adopt[ed] the analysis and conclusion" of the ruling of July 15, 2020, in the Los Angeles County lawsuit.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

An equal protection claim may be addressed by demurrer. (E.g., Kimco Staffing Services, Inc. v. State of California (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 875, 877–878, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 852 ( Kimco ) [affirming judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to an equal protection challenge to a newly enacted law]; Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd . (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 426, 432, 442, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 408 [equal protection challenge to a newly enacted voter initiative].)

Our review is de novo; we exercise independent judgment in determining whether plaintiff stated a cause of action as a matter of law. ( Kimco, supra , 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 884, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 852.) " ‘ " ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ " ’ " ( Walgreen Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 424, 433, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 498 ( Walgreen ).)

Here, plaintiff argues the trial court applied the wrong standard in deciding the demurrer. But we review the ruling, not the trial court's rationale. ( Walgreen, supra , 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 433, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 498.) " ‘We affirm if any ground offered in support of the demurrer was well taken but find error if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory.’ " ( Ibid . )

In considering a claim that a statute is unconstitutional, we begin with the premise that the law is presumed valid, and we "resolv[e] all doubts in favor of the Legislature's action." ( Wilson v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1134, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 745.) That a statute is unconstitutional must be clearly shown. ( California Renters Legal Advocacy &...