Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa

421 P.3d 284

John DOE (a pseudonym for the Plaintiff), Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.The FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH U.S.A. OF TULSA, Oklahoma, and James D. Miller, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 115,182

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Filed December 19, 2017

Rehearing Denied June 4, 2018

G. Steven Stidham, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant,

John H. Tucker and Denelda Richardson, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees.

OPINION

WATT, J.:

¶ 1 This Court retained this case to consider whether a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be granted where factual determinations are required by the trial court on issues that are central to the plaintiff's claims. The district court considered evidence outside plaintiff's petition and determined the publication of plaintiff's baptism on the world wide web was within the ecclesiastical realm of the Appellees' church hierarchy thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse the district court's order and remand this matter for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Appellant/Doe filed suit against The First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. ("FPC"), of Tulsa, Oklahoma and its minister, James D. Miller, ("Appellees"), based on theories of torts and breach of contract. Doe seeks damages arising out of alleged harm he incurred from Appellees' publishing notice of his baptism on the world wide web. Doe claimed that he advised Appellees of the need to keep his baptism private and as confidential as possible. Doe asserted that Appellees assured him that his conversion to Christianity would be held as confidential as possible. Doe alleged that because of Appellees' assurances, he proceeded with baptism by Appellees. Stated differently, Doe's allegation emphasized that he did not give consent to the FPC to publicize his baptism.

¶ 3 Doe and Appellees agreed that Doe did not become a member of Appellees' church and Doe did not consent to membership . All parties agreed that Doe consented to baptism, however, Doe asserted his consent was conditioned on insuring his privacy concerns were honored by Appellees. Appellees urged that they had no knowledge of Doe's requests for confidentiality in baptism; and even if they had, church doctrine would have prohibited them from keeping matters private. The only record before us reflects that Doe simply (1) wanted to be baptized into the Christian faith, not to become a member of Appellees' church, and (2) only sought baptism if this process could be private and not publicized.

¶ 4 Doe was born in Syria and is of Muslim descent; he has permanent resident status in the United States. He has met all qualifications for citizenship and is waiting for the U.S. to schedule him to take the citizenship oath. While living in the United States, Doe became interested in converting to Christianity. Doe expressed concern about his safety if he became baptized. A FPC member, Mrs. Slick, sent a text to Doe and advised him:

"I will call my pastor today and let you know how we will PRIVATELY work this out. Nobody will find out. We will make sure that your secret is safe."

He was baptized by Miller in a non-televised service. The day after Doe's baptism, Appellees published notice of the baptism on the world wide web. When Doe traveled to Syria, he was kidnapped and held against his will with threats of being murdered for his conversion. Doe escaped, but alleged in so doing he killed one of his captors. Doe claimed that he suffered significant physical and emotional harm from his kidnapping and escape. Doe alleged that his captors learned of his conversion from the internet publication announcing he had been baptized at the FPC.

¶ 5 This matter comes before this Court on appeal from the district court's granting Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. This was Appellees' second attempt at a motion to dismiss.

First Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

¶ 6 Appellees' urged in their first motion, that "all actions related to the baptism of Plaintiff are protected from judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution."¹ In denying the first motion to dismiss, the trial court noted that the Appellees' act of publishing Doe's baptism on the world wide web "did not arguably occur as part of the baptismal service, nor has it been established that the publication of names of those that are baptized are part of the FPC's ecclesiastical practices."² The district court also noted:

While recordation of such names appears to be part of the FPC's standard procedure, publication of those names for the general public via the internet has not been established in the record as a required ecclesiastical practice of the FPC. Additionally, as the Plaintiff has never been a member of the FPC, it has not been established that the Plaintiff consented to submission to the ecclesiastical practices of the FPC beyond the actual baptism ceremony and service.³

It is undisputed that Doe did not become a member of the Appellee church. Appellees' initial motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, noting that dismissals are disfavored by this Court;⁴ and such motions are to be denied if a plaintiff's allegations contain any set of facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory. Rogers v. Quiktrip Corp. , 2010 OK 3, 230 P.3d 853, 855.

Second Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 7 The appeal before this Court relates to the Second Motion to Dismiss, wherein Appellees asserted the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 12 O.S. 2011, § 2012 (b) (1). Doe's response to this motion was titled, "Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment".

¶ 8 Appellees' argument in the second motion to dismiss, consists of essentially two themes: (1) they disputed having knowledge of Doe's need for privacy or special considerations regarding baptism; and (2) the Presbyterian church doctrine mandates that information identifying those who have been baptized be made public. Appellees argued that publishing to the internet is so intertwined with the baptismal requirements as to render it part of the church doctrinal policy; therefore the church immunity doctrine, rooted in the guarantees of the First amendment, prohibits any secular court from making inquires into anything relating to baptism. Accordingly, Appellees asserted the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Doe's claims.

¶ 9 Doe alleged that conversion from Islam to Christianity can carry the grave consequence of death, which is often done by beheading. Doe alleged that when he discussed his desire to convert to Christianity, he advised Appellees of the potentially fatal consequences he could incur for conversion. Doe also alleged that he repeatedly expressed to Appellees his need for a private and confidential baptism. Appellees also disputed they had knowledge of Doe's concerns regarding the potential dangers for a conversion. They further denied that Mrs. Slick's representation constituted notice to the Appellees or a promise of confidentiality. Appellees submitted the following additional evidence for the trial court to resolve disputed facts: (1) excerpts from the Presbyterian ‘Book of Order,’⁵ (2) affidavits from governing church officials, and (3) deposition testimony, in support of Appellees' assertion that church doctrine would have prevented FPC from honoring Doe's request.

¶ 10 Although Appellees' arguments and supporting exhibits are difficult to follow and lack defining clarity on this issue, it is not necessary for this Court to determine the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) doctrinal positions relating to baptism. The foundational inquiry is to discern exactly what Doe asked Appellees to do with respect to baptism, what Appellees agreed to perform for Doe, and ultimately the nature and extent of Doe's consent surrounding baptism. These fundamental factual inquiries to Doe's claims for relief are clearly disputed .

¶ 11 The trial court struggled with resolution of these very fact issues stating:

This Court does not hint at deciding whether something is sacramental, but rather must make a factual determination about the sincere representation of the Church as far as the sacramental nature of the act of baptism. Again, this has been a tricky issue to consider.

Order on Hearing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, p. 7. (Emphasis added).

The district court also noted the following key points:

By admission of both parties, he did not ask to become a full member and otherwise be bound further by the numerous rules of the church and its denomination. Therefore, it could be assumed he may not have understood fully the requirements of baptism by the [FPC]. It is unclear to this Court if Plaintiff had been exposed to the detailed Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), which includes a Book of Order. Still, his baptism placed him squarely under the rules the Defendants have had for baptism.

Order on Hearing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, p. 6. (Emphasis added).

¶ 12 The findings made by the district court are pivotal to Doe's claims and inextricably intertwined with the issue of sub ject matter jurisdiction.

Under these circumstances, Appellees' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Osage Nation v. Board of Commissioners of Osage County, 2017 OK 34, 394 P.3d 1224. The trial court erred when it dismissed this matter finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Oklahoma District Courts Have Unlimited Jurisdiction Over All Justiciable Matters Unless Otherwise Provided by Law

¶ 13 We have previously recognized that the "state judiciary's subject matter jurisdiction is derived from the State Constitution which gives Oklahoma courts unlimited original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters unless...