Doe v. Harrisburg Sch. Dist., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-1027

JANE DOE, a minor by her mother and natural guardian,JAKLYN BROWN, and JAKLYN BROWN, individually, Plaintiffs v. HARRISBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT d/b/a ROWLAND ACADEMY,J. PATRICK NEWTON, in his individual and official capacity,SYBIL KNIGHT-BURNEY, in her individual and official capacity,minor MH; IMANI CROWDER, in her individual and official capacity,and QUINTON COBB, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-1027

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 10, 2020

(Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs Jane Doe, a minor, and her mother, Jaklyn Brown, assert constitutional, statutory, and state common-law claims against defendants Harrisburg School District ("the District") and several of its employees. Presently before the court is defendants' partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant defendants' motion in part and deny it in part.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Doe is a former student at Rowland Academy, a middle school within the District. (Doc. 33 ¶ 15). This case arises from Doe's allegation that she was sexually assaulted by a fellow minor student while at school. (Id. ¶¶ 39-52). Plaintiffs assert that school staff knew Doe was in danger of being sexually assaulted and failed to prevent the assault. (Id. ¶¶ 99-102). The following facts are derived from plaintiffs' second amended complaint.

Plaintiffs allege that on December 19, 2018, fellow eighth-grade student MH raped then-15-year-old Doe in a school bathroom. (Id. ¶¶ 37-42). Immediately prior to the alleged assault, Doe and MH were in a basement classroom together supervised by defendant Imani Crowder.¹ (See id. ¶¶ 39-45). School policy requires students to receive a bathroom pass from a teacher to use the bathroom. (See id. ¶ 43). Crowder issued Doe a bathroom pass. (Id. ¶ 45). Before Doe returned to the classroom, Crowder also granted MH a bathroom pass, despite a single-occupancy bathroom being the only student-accessible bathroom located on the basement floor. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 51). Plaintiffs allege that MH then entered the bathroom and sexually assaulted Doe. (Id. ¶¶ 52-54). Plaintiffs describe a physical struggle between Doe and MH and aver that MH ordered Doe to "be quiet" multiple times "in a voice loud enough to be heard from the hallway." (Id. ¶¶ 52-58). Plaintiffs further aver that defendant Quinton Cobb, a school janitor, walked by the bathroom and made no attempt to stop the alleged assault, even though considerable noise was emanating from the bathroom. (Id. ¶ 59).

According to plaintiffs, defendants knew of MH's propensity to engage in deviant behavior, including sexual assault. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 64). Plaintiffs aver that justover a month before the alleged assault, Brown filed a complaint with the District alleging that MH had been "inappropriately touching . . . Doe in a sexually aggressive manner and saying inappropriate remarks to her." (Id. ¶ 99). Defendants purportedly took no action in response to Brown's complaint. (Id. ¶ 100). Plaintiffs further assert that Doe told other faculty members at Rowland Academy of MH's behavior, that those faculty members informed defendant Principal J. Patrick Newton, and that Principal Newton failed to act. (Id. ¶¶ 101-102).

On January 12, 2019, Doe wrote a letter to Brown telling her of the alleged sexual assault. (Id. ¶ 68). Brown went to Rowland Academy the following Monday, January 14, and told Principal Newton that Doe had been sexually assaulted. (Id. ¶¶ 69-71). Brown requested that Principal Newton remove Doe from any classes she shared with MH during the District's investigation of Doe's allegations. (Id. ¶ 73). According to plaintiffs, Principal Newton failed to take any action, demanded proof in support of Doe's claim, and stated that Doe had "lied before" and must be "lying this time." (Id. ¶ 74). In response, Brown apparently cursed at Principal Newton. (Id. ¶ 75). Plaintiffs allege that Principal Newton immediately retaliated against Brown by filing a police report and banning her from school premises on January 15. (Id. ¶¶ 76-77).

Brown filed a complaint with the District the next day. (Id. ¶ 78). She challenged Principal Newton's refusal to separate Doe and MH and stated: "My daughter cannot go to school and be faced with the perpetrator." (Id.) Despite this complaint, defendants did not separate Doe and MH. (Id. ¶ 81). Brown claims that,because of this inaction, she later felt compelled to remove Doe from Rowland Academy and to transfer her to a different school. (Id. ¶ 91). Plaintiffs further allege that, in retaliation for Brown's complaint to the District, Principal Newton and other employees of the District began calling the detective assigned to Doe's case. (Id. ¶¶ 92, 98). Those individuals accused Doe of posting inappropriate things on social media and sending an explicit photograph to MH. (Id. ¶¶ 93, 95). The detective later determined these accusations to be untrue. (Id. ¶ 97).

Plaintiffs commenced this action on June 17, 2019, and the case is now proceeding on their second amended complaint. Plaintiffs assert constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District, Principal Newton, District Superintendent Sybil Knight-Burney, and Crowder, in addition to two Title IX claims against the District. Plaintiffs also assert pendent state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence against the District, Principal Newton, Superintendent Knight-Burney, Crowder, and Cobb. Defendants move to dismiss the state-law claims against all defendants; all official-capacity claims against the individual defendants; all claims against Superintendent Knight-Burney; and all claims for punitive damages.² The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, the court may also consider "matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide "the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, "the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts "that allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

Defendants raise several challenges to plaintiffs' complaint. First, defendants contend that certain defendants must be dismissed from plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim. Second, defendants seek dismissal of all state-law claims on the basis of governmental immunity. Last, defendants move to dismiss all claims for punitive damages. We address each claim in turn, beginning with the viability of the Section 1983 claims.

A. Constitutional Claims

Plaintiffs allege claims under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights, but serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 96 F.3d 119, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To establish Section 1983 liability, a plaintiff must prove a deprivation of a "right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . by a person acting under color of state law." Kneipp,95 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Defendants do not challenge Doe and Brown's Section 1983 claim on the merits. Defendants maintain the court should dismiss the official-capacity claim against Principal Newton, Superintendent Knight-Burney, and Crowder because it is redundant of the claim against the District. Defendants also argue that the court should dismiss the claim against Superintendent Knight-Burney because she was not personally involved in depriving Doe of any constitutionally protected right.

1. Official-Capacity Claim

Plaintiffs assert a claim against Principal Newton,...