Doe v. Lee

1

JOHN DOE, a/k/a SEAN W. LEE, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM LEE, Governor of the State of Tennessee, and DAVID B. RAUSCH, Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-02156-SHL-atc

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

January 25, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART MOTION TO AMEND

ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Before the Court by order of reference^[1]is Plaintiff John Doe, a/k/a Sean W. Lee's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, filed October 6, 2022. (ECF No. 60.) Defendants William Lee, Governor of the State of Tennessee, and David B Rausch, Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigations filed a response to that motion (ECF No. 61) and, with leave of Court, Plaintiff a reply (ECF No. 66). For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that the motion be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

On August 25, 2022, the undersigned submitted a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R,” ECF No. 52) to Grant in Part and Deny in Part Defendants' partial motion to dismiss (ECF No. 40). That motion sought to dismiss several of the claims in Doe's First Amended Complaint, which challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004 (“SORA” or the “Act”), as amended, on several grounds.

The R&R recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted as to Doe's Due Process claims found in Counts III(a)-(f), as they are either untimely or fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or both. (ECF No 52, at 9-25.) The R&R also recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied as to Doe's Count V claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 23-25.)

Defendants filed objections to the R&R on September 20, 2022 (ECF No. 55), and Doe filed his objections two days later (ECF No. 56). Doe responded to Defendants' objections on October 3, 2022 (ECF No. 57), and Defendants filed their response to Doe's objections the next day (ECF No. 58).

Doe now seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, so that he may “allege additional causes of action arising from a recent decision from the Court of Common Pleas in Chester County, Pennsylvania.” (ECF No. 60, at 3.) He asserts “that the proposed amendments include additional arguments and allegations related to the punitive nature of the act under” the factors laid out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). (Id.) That argument, according to Doe, “is a supplementation of the argument set forth in Count 5 of the Complaint alleging the Act inflicts cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, the amendment seeks to add a sixth count asserting that the act as applied to Plaintiff, damages his reputation.” (Id.) The proposed Second Amended Complaint thus seeks to amend Count V and add a new Count VI. (ECF No. 60-1.)

Defendants argue that the motion to amend should be denied as futile. They assert that Counts III(a)-(f), which are unchanged from the First Amended Complaint, are subject to dismissal for the reasons stated in the R&R. (ECF No. 61, at 3.) Additionally, though Defendants' response does not address Doe's proposed supplementation of Count V, they previously argued in their objections to the R&R that Count V should be dismissed because Doe does not allege that SORA is punitive, but even if he did, that claim should nevertheless be dismissed because “[a] statute does not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because it is punitive.” (ECF No. 55, at 3-4 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991).) Defendants do not address Doe's proposed new Count VI at all.

In his Reply, Doe states that he “takes no issue with those three specific sub counts (Counts III (b), (c) and (f)) being stricken from the operative complaint.” (ECF No. 66, at 1.) However, he asserts that “Defendants have failed to raise any objection to the substantive amendments or allege any actual prejudice by the granting of the motion as it relates to Counts V and VI.” (Id. at 2.)

In summary, Doe does not seek to amend, and Defendants have not sought dismissal of, Counts I, II, III(g), and IV, and those counts shall remain in the operative complaint in this case. Doe has also conceded that Counts III(b), (c), and (f) shall not. The claims remaining in dispute are III(a), (d), and (e), V, and VI.

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Standard of Review for Amending Pleadings

“[M]otions for leave to amend are reviewed under the deferential standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, and the Court ‘should freely give leave when justice so requires.'” Porter v. AAR Aircraft Servs., Inc., 316 F.R.D. 691, 692 (W.D. Tenn. 2016) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2)).

An exception to this forgiving standard is when a proposed amendment is futile. Id. (citing Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Child., Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 729 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962). “A proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Berry v. Regions Fin. Corp., 507 F.Supp.3d 972, 977 (W.D. Tenn. 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 21-5038, 2021 WL 1511687 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2021) (quoting Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010)). Denial of a motion to amend also “is appropriate where there is ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.'” Joy v. Burchyett, No. 1:21-cv-01190-STA-jay, 2022 WL 16787846, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2022) (quoting Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 613 (6th Cir. 2005)).

II. Doe's Motion to Amend

Doe's motion to amend effectively moots the R&R. Thus, the analysis herein will address the parties' original arguments regarding dismissal of the First Amended Complaint, arguments raised in objection to the R&R, and arguments now presented on the motion to amend.

A. Doe's Due Process Claims Under Counts III(a), (d), and (e) Are Untimely

Count III of Doe's Second Amended Complaint alleges the Act violates Doe's Due Process rights in three ways relevant here: by classifying him as a violent offender, by retroactively imposing the Act on him, and in constituting a breach of his plea agreement.

“Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). “The due process clause has both procedural and substantive components.” Id. (citing EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 2012)). Procedural Due Process provides a guarantee of fair procedure. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty. Sch., 47 F.Supp.3d 665, 678-79 (W.D. Tenn. 2014) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).

Substantive Due Process, on the other hand, “prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. at 678 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003)). “The interests protected by substantive due process are . . . much narrower than those protected by procedural due process.” Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 249-250 (6th Cir. 2003). “When reviewing a substantive due process claim,” courts “first craft a careful description of the asserted right and then determine whether that right is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that it can be considered a fundamental right.” Doe v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Legislation that infringes on a fundamental right is reviewed under the strict-scrutiny test and will be invalidated unless it is ‘narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'” Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). At the same time, “‘[l]egislation that does not proscribe fundamental liberties . . . violates the Due Process Clause' where it imposes burdens without any ‘rational basis' for doing so.'” Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sheffield v. City of Fort Thomas, Ky., 620 F.3d 596, 613 (6th Cir. 2010)). “This rational basis test, though not toothless, is highly deferential; courts hold statutes unconstitutional under this standard of review only in rare or exceptional circumstances.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Under rational basis review, “the law must be upheld if there is ‘any plausible reason' for its passage, ‘no matter how unfair, unjust, or unwise.'” Newsome v. Lee, No. 3:21-CV-00041, 2021 WL 1697039, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 29, 2021) (quoting DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 2014), rev'd sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)).

As discussed in the R&R, Counts III(a), (d), and (e) are untimely. Because Plaintiff's claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state law provides the statute of limitations applicable to the claim. Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 action is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claim arises.”) (citing Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 1997)).) In Tennessee, the one-year statute of limitations for personal...