Doe v. Legion of Christ, Inc.

588 F.Supp.3d 240

John DOE #2 ¹ , Plaintiff,

v.LEGION OF CHRIST, INC., Immaculate Conception Apostolic School, & David Consoli, Defendants.

3:21-CV-00514 (KAD)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed February 25, 2022

Gregory Alan Jones, Patrick Tomasiewicz, Fazzano & Tomasiewicz LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Elizabeth R. Leong, Jenna Scoville, Kathleen Elizabeth Dion, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendant Legion of Christ, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RE: MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, ECF No. 22

Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge:

In this personal injury suit, Plaintiff John Doe #2 seeks damages for injuries stemming from his time as a student at the Immaculate Conception Apostolic School ("ICAS"). Plaintiff generally alleges that, while a minor under Defendant ICAS's care, he suffered sexual abuse at the hands of Defendant David Consoli and that Defendants ICAS and Legion of Christ, Inc. ("LOC, Inc."), as the owner and operator of ICAS, bear responsibility for that abuse. Plaintiff suffered then and continues to suffer now from psychological and emotional injuries. Against LOC, Inc., Plaintiff brings six claims in his compliant: Negligence, Recklessness, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Breach of the Special Duty of Care.

Pending before the Court is LOC, Inc.’s motion to dismiss Counts II and V of the Complaint, asserting recklessness and breach of fiduciary duty, respectively.² For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 15, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) This is one of six cases pending before the Court raising similar allegations brought by different Plaintiffs. In addition to this action, also pending before the Court are the following: John Doe #1 v. Legion of Christ, Inc. et al. , No. 3:21-cv-00512, John Doe #3 v. Legion of Christ, Inc. et al. , No. 3:21-cv-00515, John Doe #4 v. Legion of Christ, Inc. et al. , No. 3:21-cv-00516, John Doe #5 v. Legion of Christ, Inc. et al. , No. 3:21-cv-00517, and Jane Doe v. Legion of Christ, Inc. et al. , No. 3:21-cv-00518.

ICAS and LOC, Inc. each filed a motion to dismiss. ICAS asserts that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it or, alternatively, that the case should be dismissed for the reasons advanced by LOC, Inc. in its motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 21.) LOC, Inc. seeks dismissal, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), with respect to the recklessness and breach of fiduciary duty claims under New Hampshire law. (ECF No. 22.)

Allegations

Plaintiff is an adult who was formerly a student at ICAS, which is located in Center Harbor, New Hampshire (Compl. ¶ 1.) ICAS was a private Roman Catholic boarding school for boys in grades seven through twelve, and its objective was to educate high school candidates for service in the clergy of The Legion of Christ, a religious order affiliated with the Catholic Church.³ (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 12.) LOC, Inc. owned and operated ICAS. (Compl. ¶ 4.)

In 1997, when he was around thirteen years old, Plaintiff commenced schooling at ICAS, where he remained until he was around fifteen years old. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Defendant Consoli sexually abused Plaintiff on at least twelve occasions, by fondling the Plaintiff's penis, while Plaintiff attended ICAS. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Defendant Consoli was a staff member at ICAS, and he was a superior and supervisor of the Plaintiff while the Plaintiff was at ICAS. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was "special" to Defendant Consoli, who would give Plaintiff extra attention and interaction (Compl. ¶ 16.) Defendant Consoli made it clear through his actions that Plaintiff was expected to be silent about the abuse, that he was not to challenge his superior, and that to do so was a sin. (Compl. ¶ 17.) The Plaintiff did not consent to Defendant Consoli's alleged sexual abuse and reported the conduct to another individual. (Compl. ¶ 18.) The Plaintiff also alleges that, "[u]pon information and belief, prior to the sexual abuse of the Plaintiff, Defendants were aware that [Defendant] Consoli engaged in sexual activity with other minor children at I.C.A.S." (Compl. ¶ 20.)

The administration and/or supervision of ICAS by The Legion of Christ was under the direction and control of Defendant LOC, Inc.’s headquarters. (Compl. ¶ 5.) LOC, Inc. was in a special relationship with the Plaintiff of school-student, essentially in loco parentis with the Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 21.) LOC, Inc. employed Defendant David Consoli, and LOC, Inc. knew that Defendant Consoli was unfit to work with minors, dangerous, and a threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 23–24.) And despite LOC, Inc.’s knowledge of Defendant Consoli's serious threat to the health, safety, and welfare of minors, LOC, Inc. provided Defendant Consoli with unfettered access to minors, including Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 26.) LOC, Inc. also knew of the prevalence of sexual abuse in their clergy. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Notwithstanding LOC, Inc.’s conscious awareness of the risk of harm to Plaintiff, LOC Inc. took affirmative steps to exacerbate the risk and make harm more likely by permitting Defendant Consoli to have access to Plaintiff despite knowing of Defendant Consoli's dangerous propensities and failing to take immediate and proper steps to limit contact between Defendant Consoli and Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 41.)

As a direct and proximate result of LOC, Inc.’s actions, the Plaintiff suffered and continued to suffer injuries of a serious nature, including mental and emotional distress, anxiety, psychological and psychiatric scarring, loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, inability to lead a normal life, shame, humiliation, and costs associated with medical/psychological treatment. (Compl. ¶ 38.) These injuries and damages are permanent and continuing in nature and the Plaintiff will suffer such losses in the future. (Id. ).

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Nevertheless, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw "all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor." Interworks Sys. Inc. v. Merch. Fin. Corp. , 604 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2010).

Discussion

In seeking dismissal of Counts II and V, LOC, Inc. argues that New Hampshire law does not recognize an independent cause of action for recklessness under circumstances not giving rise to an intentional tort, and further that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because New Hampshire law only recognizes fiduciary relationships, within the educational context, in post-secondary schools. In response, Plaintiff argues that Connecticut law, not New Hampshire law, applies to this case. Alternatively, Plaintiff asserts that he plausibly alleged a cause of action for both recklessness and breach of fiduciary duty under New Hampshire law.

The Court begins, as it must, with the conflict of laws analysis.

Connecticut vs. New Hampshire Law

Generally, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which that court sits to determine the rules of decision that would apply if the suit were brought in state court. Liberty Synergistics, Inc. v. Microflo Ltd. , 718 F.3d 138, 151 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. , 313 U.S. 487, 494–97, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman , 486 U.S. 717, 729–30, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) ) (further citations omitted). In Connecticut, courts apply the "most significant" relationship test set forth in §§ 6(2) and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine which rules of decision would apply in tort actions. Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc. , 322 Conn. 541, 551 n.9, 143 A.3d 564 (2016). "Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2). See also Stanley Works Israel Ltd. v. 500 Group, Inc. , 332 F. Supp. 3d 488, 498 (D. Conn. 2018) (citing Otis Elevator Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co. , 353 F.Supp.2d 274, 285 (D. Conn. 2005) ) (discussing these four factors). "[I]t is the significance, not the number of the § 145(2) contacts that determines the outcome of the choice of law inquiry under the Restatement approach." Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. , 322 Conn. at 560, 143 A.3d 564. In performing this four-factor analysis the Court is further guided by the principles and policies which are implicated in a choice of law analysis:

(a) the needs of the interstate and

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