Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ.

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JOHN DOE, by and through his parent, JANE DOE Plaintiffs, v. EAST LYME BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Civil No. 3:11cv291 (JBA)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

June 10, 2022

RULING ON MOTION TO ARTICULATE AND MOTION TO STAY

Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

This case is brought by Plaintiff John Doe, by and through his parent Jane Doe, against the East Lyme Board of Education for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. After filing a notice to appeal the Substituted Amended Final Judgment, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Articulate What Constitutes Analogous Pendency Programs During Proceedings and Motion to Stay the Establishment of the Escrow Account.” (Mot. [Doc. # 356].) On July 26 2021, the Second Circuit construed Plaintiffs' “Motion to Articulate” as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and held Plaintiffs' appeal in abeyance until this Court decides their motion. (Order [Doc. # 384].)

In their Motion to Articulate, Plaintiffs ask the Court to “define what constitutes an analogous program during proceedings, ” (Mot. at 3) “amend the judgment to order reimbursement for, at least, the analogous pendency services, (id. at 7) make the reimbursement award “the same as the ‘prospective' award, ” (id. at 10) and “stay the establishment of the escrow account for the ‘prospective' award, ” (id. at 1, 12-13). Specifically, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for “analogous pendency programs to [John Doe's] evolving needs, ” including reimbursement for “pendency placement tuition or transportation, all pendency summer services, all pendency assistive technology, all pendency physical therapy, and all pendency evaluations for multiple years.” (Id. at 4.)

A Rule 59(e) motion seeks to alter or amend a judgment. There are “classically four grounds” upon which a motion to amend may be granted:

First, the movant may demonstrate that the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based. Second, the motion may be granted so that the moving party may present newly discovered evidence or previously unavailable evidence. Third, the motion will be granted if necessary to prevent manifest injustice . . . Fourth, a Rule 59(e) motion may be justified by an intervening change in controlling law.

Schwartz v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 492 F.Supp.2d 308, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quotations omitted) (quoting Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1 (1995)). The decision to grant a motion to amend rests within a district court's discretion. Id.

The Court has already determined that “analogous services” are “services which benefit John based on his current disability and needs” which have a “resemblance” to the stay-put services. Doe v. East Lyme Bd. of Ed., 262 F.Supp.3d 11, 28 (D. Conn. 2017). The Second Circuit has also opined that “analogous” services did not include “tuition, as that was not a ‘type' of service” included in John Doe's individualized education plan (“IEP”). Doe v. East Lyme Bd. of Ed. (Doe III), 962 F.3d 649, 664 (2d Cir. 2020). In the same opinion, the circuit court concluded that Plaintiffs' requests for “assistive technology, extended school year services, and other services not covered by the stay-put IEP” were barred by the law of the case doctrine, which forecloses reconsideration of issues that were decided during prior proceedings. Id. at 664; (see also Order Denying Pls.' Mot. to Stay Hr'g [Doc. # 219] at 1 (“The Court has directed that no evidence will be presented at the forthcoming trial on the issue of reimbursement for ‘uncovered services.'”).) Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any manifest errors of law or fact, newly discovered evidence, manifest injustice, or intervening controlling law which warrants an amendment of the Substituted Amended Final Judgment to include reimbursement of these “pendency” services. Instead, they cite to the purpose of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, John Doe's evolving needs, and the length of litigation. (Pls.' Mot. at 4-9.) But these factors, having already been considered, do not persuade the Court to alter its judgment.^[1] As such, Plaintiffs' request to amend the Substituted Amended Final Judgment to order reimbursement for “analogous pendency services” is denied.

Plaintiffs also contend that the establishment of an escrow account for the prospective award should be stayed because it “compromises [their] due process rights” and “unjustly engorge[es] the Board.” (Mot. at 12-13.) Plaintiffs do not clarify the length of their proposed stay. Further, they ask that, instead of an escrow agent, they be awarded “interest on the related services since [they] lost the value of the use of the money for years.” (Id. at 13.) Defendant does not take a position on Plaintiffs' request for a stay, but argues that Plaintiffs' request for interest is procedurally barred. (Defs.' Opp'n [Doc. # 361] at 18-19.)

Plaintiffs' request for a stay of the establishment of the escrow account for the prospective award is unopposed, and accordingly, the Court will grant this request, but only until Plaintiffs' fourth appeal has been resolved.^[2] As Plaintiffs have requested this stay, the Court clarifies that Defendant is not responsible for any post-judgment interest while the stay remains in effect. Further, the interest award in this case has already been calculated and affirmed on appeal. See Doe III, 996 F.3d at 661-62. Therefore, Plaintiffs' request for interest on “related services” instead of an escrow agent is barred by the law of the case doctrine. See United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he law of the case doctrine forecloses reconsideration of issues that were decided-or that could have been decided-during prior proceedings.”).

The parties also inform the Court that the originally appointed escrow agent has “declined to serve.” (Defs.' Opp'n at 19-20.) Plaintiffs ask that the Court allow them to “choose the escrow agent with the Court's approval, ” (Mot. at 13), while Defendant requests the right to choose the escrow agent because Plaintiffs do not bear the “responsibility for paying the escrow agent or any associated costs.” (Defs.' Opp'n at 19.) As with the previous appointment, the Court will consider the proposed escrow agents and any objections of both parties before appointing an escrow agent, (Order Appointing Escrow Agent [Doc. # 283] at 1-2), to take place at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' fourth appeal.

Finally Defendant requests an “injunction requiring Plaintiffs to obtain leave of the Court before filing...