Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified Sch. Dist.

316 Cal.Rptr.3d 382

John HR DOE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.MARYSVILLE JOINT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

C095446

Court of Appeal, Third District.

Filed December 21, 2023

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yuba County, Debra L. Givens, Judge. Affirmed. (Super. Ct. No. CVPO2100697)

MANLY, STEWART & FINALDI, John C. Manly, Morgan A. Stewart, Irvine, Saul E. Wolf, Santa Ana, Cristina J. Nolan; ESNER, CHANG, BOYER & MURPHY, Shea S. Murphy, Pasadena, Kevin K. Nguyen, and Holly N. Boyer, Pasadena, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

SPINELLI, DONALD & NOTT and Lynn A. Garcia, Sacramento, for Defendant and Respondent.

MAURO, Acting P. J.

John HR Doe filed and dismissed a state court action against the Marysville Joint Unified School District (the School District). Other Does filed and dismissed their own state court action against the School District. After that, John HR Doe and the other Does (collectively the Doe plaintiffs) filed and dismissed a federal court action. And then the Doe plaintiffs filed the instant state court action, their third action against the School District. All of the law- suits alleged that William Babcock, a counselor at an elementary school in the School District in the 1990’s and 2000’s, committed sexual misconduct causing the Doe plaintiffs to sustain injury and damages.

In this third action, the trial court sustained the School District’s demurrer and dismissed the Doe plaintiffs’ complaint. The trial court ruled that, under rule 41(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.),¹ the Doe plaintiffs’ dismissal of the second action in federal court constituted res judicata.

In their original briefing on appeal, the Doe plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer based on res judicata. They did not dispute that they dismissed their federal action or that rule 41(a)(1)(B) provides that such a dismissal, a second voluntary dismissal, operates as an adjudication on the merits. Rather, they contended that, because the School District argued in the federal court that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provided immunity on most of the Doe plaintiffs’ claims, it divested the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims on the merits.

After the original briefing was completed, the Doe plaintiffs filed a letter identifying new case authority, and we directed the parties to file supplemental letter briefs addressing the effect of the authority on the res judicata issue. In their supplemental letter brief, the Doe plaintiffs argued that, in considering the effect of rule 41(a)(1)(B) in this context, California state law controls, under which a second voluntary dismissal does not constitute res judicata. They contend rule 41(a)(1)(B) does not support dismissal of this third action.

Finding no merit in the Doe plaintiffs’ contentions, we will affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2020, John HR Doe (HR) filed a complaint in Yuba County Superior Court against the School District, Babcock, and a church. Because Babcock and the church are not parties to this appeal, we will summarize the procedure only with respect to the School District. As to the School District, the complaint alleged causes of action for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and failure to perform a mandatory duty.

The School District demurred to HR’s complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to some causes of action but without leave to amend as to others. On October 9, 2020, HR filed a first amended complaint in Yuba County Superior Court. However, he subsequently filed a request for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which was entered as requested on November 12, 2020.

Meanwhile, on July 20, 2020, the other Does filed a similar complaint against the School District in Yuba County Superior Court. The School District demurred to the complaint and the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to some causes of action but without leave to amend as to others. The other Does filed a request for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which was entered as requested on November 12, 2020.

On the same day the requests for dismissal were entered in the two Yuba County Superior Court actions, the Doe plaintiffs filed a complaint against the School District in the United States Dis- trict Court for the Eastern Distinct of California. The complaint asserted the causes of action that had previously been alleged in the superior court but also added causes of action under title VIII of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (20 U.S.C. § 7926) (Title VIII), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) et seq.) (Title IX), and 42 U.S.C § 1983.

On January 13, 2021, the School District moved to dismiss the Doe plaintiffs’ federal complaint. The motion argued the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provided immunity in the federal court on most of the claims against the School District. However, the School District acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment did not provide such immunity on the Title IX claim. On February 18, 2021, the Doe plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their federal complaint under rule 41(a).

On March 11, 2021, the Doe plaintiffs filed the instant action against the School District in Ventura County Superior Court. The complaint asserted causes of action for negligence, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring; it did not assert any federal claims. The parties stipulated that the action should have been filed in Yuba County Superior Court, and the action was transferred to that court. After the transfer, the Doe plaintiffs filed a peremptory challenge disqualifying the judge who sustained the demurrer in the original action, and the action was assigned to a different judge.

The School District demurred to the complaint, asserting that the action was barred by res judicata because of the Doe plaintiffs’ second voluntary dismissal of the complaint in federal court. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. It ruled that res judicata barred the action because the dismissal in federal court operated as an adjudication on the merits.

DISCUSSION

I

The Doe plaintiffs contend their dismissal of the federal action did not constitute an adjudication on the merits because the federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over their claims.

Federal courts have two different sources of subject matter jurisdiction as relevant here. Diversity jurisdiction arises when opposing parties are citizens of different states (28 U.S.C. § 1332), and federal question jurisdiction gives the federal courts jurisdiction if the action arises under federal law (28 U.S.C. § 1331). If the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, it may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims that would not otherwise have been within the federal court’s jurisdiction. (28 U.S.C. § 1367.)

In the Doe plaintiffs’ federal case, the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction because the Doe plaintiffs filed their federal action as a federal question case (based on Title VIII, Title IX, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983) with supplemental federal jurisdiction over the Doe plaintiffs’ state-law claims. All parties in this action are California-based, so the federal court never had diversity jurisdiction.

The Doe plaintiffs nevertheless argue that because the School District relied on the Eleventh Amendment in its motion to dismiss the federal complaint, it divested the federal court of authority to adjudicate the Doe plaintiffs’ claims on the merits. For this proposition, the Doe plaintiffs cite Wages v. Internal Revenue Service (9th Cir. 1990) 915 F.2d 1230, 1234.) In that case, a person sued the Internal Revenue Service in a federal district court, but the district court dismissed the action because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. (Id. at p. 1233.) The United States Court of Appeals held it was improper for the district court to consider whether the complaint stated a claim on which relief could be granted because that went to the merits, and once the district court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction it had no power to address the merits. (Id. at p. 1234.)

[1] Wages is distinguishable from this case. The federal court involved in the Doe plaintiffs’ action did not determine that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the School District acknowledged that the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Title IX claim,² which was predicated on the same harm as the other causes of action. The Doe plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit.

Under the circumstances, there is no merit to the Doe plaintiffs’ contention that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

II

After briefing was completed in this case, the Doe plaintiffs filed a notice of additional citations for oral argument. In that notice, they cited a recent case relevant to the application of rule 41(a)(1)(B). That case is Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 932, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 870 (Gray) decided by the Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District. We directed the parties to provide supplemental letter briefs on the effect of Gray, which held that a second dismissal in a federal district court did not, under rule 41(a)(1)(B), preclude filing the same claim in a third action in state court. (Gray, at p. 1225, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 870.) Before discussing Gray, we will describe the relevant background law and the legal developments preceding Gray.

[2, 3] Res judicata or claim preclusion bars a second suit on the same cause of action when the cause of action has already been adjudicated on the merits. (Mycogen...