Doe v. Mayorkas

585 F.Supp.3d 49

Jane DOE, Plaintiff,

v.Alejandro MAYORKAS, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-2521 (JDB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed February 11, 2022

Garret G. Rasmussen, Sarah Hartman Sloan, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, DC, Rebecca L. Greene, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Michael A. Tilghman, II, Joseph F. Carilli, Jr., U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants Alejandro J. Mayorkas, Department of Homeland Security, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN D. BATES, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Jane Doe is a Honduran national who came to the United States in 2015 at the age of sixteen. After U.S. Customs and Border Protection placed her in removal proceedings, Doe sought and received a judgment from the 315th Judicial District Court in Harris County, Texas (the "Texas Court") declaring her "dependent upon th[e] juvenile court in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas." J.A. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Redacted), Vol. II [ECF No. 33] ("J.A. II") at 184–85. Based on the Texas Court's declaration, Doe then applied for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status ("SIJS") with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). Had Doe's petition for SIJS been granted, she would have been eligible to receive a visa. But USCIS denied her application, and USCIS's Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") upheld the denial on administrative appeal.

Doe filed suit in this Court challenging the denial of her appeal as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 – 06, and moved for summary judgment on her claims. The government filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that the denial was lawful and appropriate. The party's cross-motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for this Court's review. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant Doe's motion for summary judgment, deny the government's cross-motion, and remand to the agency for further consideration.

Background

I. Statutory Framework

The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") extends SIJS to certain at-risk migrant children in the United States who have been estranged from one or both of their parents due to abuse, abandonment, or neglect. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). There are five statutory requirements for an immigrant to obtain SIJS:

(1) The immigrant must have been "declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States";¹

(2) Reunification of the immigrant with one or both parents must not be viable "due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law";

(3) An administrative or judicial tribunal must determine that it would not be in the immigrant's best interest to return to his or her home country;

(4) The immigrant must be under twenty-one years old and unmarried at the time he or she applies for SIJS; and

(5) The Secretary of Homeland Security must consent to the grant of SIJS.

See id. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). A petitioner who obtains SIJS is eligible for a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4).

These requirements have evolved over the years since Congress first established SIJS. At its inception in 1990, SIJS was available only to immigrant children deemed eligible for long-term foster care. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005 (requiring immigrant to be "declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States and ... deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care" (emphasis added)); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 219, 108 Stat. 4305, 4316. In 1998, SIJS eligibility was narrowed to require that the applicant's long-term foster-care eligibility be based on a finding of "abuse, neglect, or abandonment" and that "the Attorney General expressly consent[ ] to the dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of [SIJS]." Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460.

But in 2008, as part of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 ("TVPRA"), Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5079–80, Congress expanded SIJS eligibility. The long-term foster care requirement was eliminated—after 2008, an immigrant is eligible for SIJS if a juvenile court either finds that the immigrant is dependent on the court or commits the immigrant to state custody, so long as "reunification with [one] or both of the immigrant's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law." Id. § 235(d)(1)(A). Further, the TVPRA altered the consent requirement: instead of requiring that the Attorney General "expressly consent[ ] to the dependency order serving as a precondition" to SIJS, the statute now simply requires that "the Secretary of Homeland Security consent[ ] to the grant of [SIJS]." Id. § 235(d)(1)(B)(i).

II. Factual Background

The basic facts are not disputed. See J.A. to Pl.’s Mot. & Defs.’ Cross-Mot. (Redacted) Vol. I [ECF No. 32-1] ("J.A. I") at 6–7. Plaintiff Jane Doe was born in Honduras in 1998. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.’s Mot.") [ECF No. 20] at 7; J.A. I at 83. She suffered a difficult and traumatic upbringing. Her father was not part of her early childhood, and she lived with her mother. Pl.’s Mot. at 7–8; J.A. I at 83–84. When Doe was around fourteen years old, her mother began dating the man who would eventually become her stepfather. Pl.’s Mot. at 8; J.A. II at 157. He sexually abused Doe when she was around fifteen years old; her mother believed the stepfather's denial and refused to support Doe, causing Doe to leave her mother's home. Pl.’s Mot. at 8; J.A. II at 156–57. She moved in with her father, stepmother, younger stepsister, and two older young-adult stepbrothers. Pl.’s Mot. at 8; J.A. II at 159. One of her stepbrothers raped Doe on her first night at her father's house, and when her father did not take sufficient action to make Doe feel safe in his home, she returned to live with her mother and stepfather. Pl.’s Mot. at 8–9; J.A. II at 159–60. There, her stepfather's sexual harassment continued, fueled by his drinking. Pl.’s Mot. at 9; J.A. II at 160–61. Eventually, the situation became unbearable for Doe and she decided to leave Honduras. Pl.’s Mot. at 9; J.A. II at 161.

Doe migrated to the United States in 2015 at age sixteen. Pl.’s Mot. at 7; Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. & Resp. in Opp'n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs.’ Cross-Mot.") [ECF No. 26-1] at 2. Shortly after she entered the country, CBP placed Doe into removal proceedings and transferred her to the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Defs.’ Cross-Mot. at 2.² She was released to the custody of a sponsor in January 2016. Id.

In May 2016, Doe petitioned the Texas Court to declare, pursuant to the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004, that she was dependent upon the juvenile court; that reunification with her parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under Texas law; and that it was not in her best interest to be returned to Honduras. See J.A. II at 106–07 (citing Tex. Fam. Code §§ 152.102(1), 153.005(c)(2), 261.001(1), (4) ).³ Doe submitted an affidavit detailing the mistreatment she had suffered in Honduras and her strained relationships with her parents. See Pl.’s Mot. at 7; J.A. II at 110–19. In September 2016, the Texas Court held a hearing on the petition and took judicial notice of the affidavit, and Doe testified under oath about her abuse. See Pl.’s Mot. at 10; J.A. II at 122–30. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Texas Court granted Doe's petition. Citing Texas Family Code §§ 15[2].102(1), 2[6]1.001(1), (4),⁴ the court issued a judgment declaring Doe dependent on the court and finding that she was abused and neglected by her parents, that reunification with her parents was not feasible, and that it was not in her best interest to be returned to Honduras. J.A. II at 185–86. In an oral statement at the end of the declaratory judgment hearing, the Texas Court also concluded that Doe was "entitled to Special Immigrant Status as defined by [ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) ]." Id. at 128–29.

After obtaining the declaratory judgment, Doe filed a Form I-360 Petition for SIJS and a certified copy of the Texas Court's judgment with the Houston Field Office of USCIS ("Field Office") in September 2016. See Defs.’ Cross-Mot. at 4; J.A. II at 170–88. In November 2016, Doe appeared with her counsel for an interview regarding her eligibility for SIJS. J.A. I at 84. The Field Office then issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Doe's petition on two grounds in May 2018: (1) that Doe's declaratory judgment was not a "qualifying" dependency declaration because the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was not a proper mechanism for obtaining such a declaration, J.A. I at 87–89; and (2) that USCIS's consent was not warranted because Doe sought the declaratory judgment "primarily or solely to obtain an immigration benefit," id. at 86–87 (quoting 6 USCIS Policy Manual, pt. J, ch. 2, § D.5). The Field Office invited Doe to submit additional supporting information, id. at 89–90, and she provided certified copies of her declaratory judgment petition and supporting affidavit, as well as an official transcript of the declaratory judgment hearing. See J.A. II at 92–102; Pl.’s Mot. at 12–13.

Two months later, the Field Office denied Doe's petition on the two grounds it had previously indicated. See Pl.’s Mot. at 13; J.A. I at 71–78. Doe appealed the denial to AAO and, in February 2019, AAO issued a final decision denying Doe's petition for SIJS. Se...