Doe v. McLean Cnty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs.

2012 IL 112,479

973 N.E.2d 880

362 Ill.Dec. 484

283 Ed. Law Rep. 1118

JANE DOE–3 et al., Appellees,

v.McLEAN COUNTY UNIT DISTRICT NO. 5 BOARD OF DIRECTORS et al., Appellants.

Nos. 112479, 112501.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Aug. 9, 2012.

James C. Kearns, Tamara K. Hackmann, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Urbana, for appellants McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors et al.

Peter W. Brandt, John K. Kim, Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, Bloomington, for appellant Dale Heidbreder.

Ellyn J. Bullock, Champaign, for appellees Jane Doe-3 and Julie Doe-3.

Sean M. Britton, Britton & Swann, LLC, Charleston, for appellees Jane Doe-7 and Julie Doe.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[362 Ill.Dec. 488]¶ 1 At issue in this case is whether defendants owed plaintiffs a duty of care. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims for willful and wanton conduct, finding defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs. The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 409 Ill.App.3d 1087, 351 Ill.Dec. 396, 951 N.E.2d 216. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the appellate court that plaintiffs have alleged a duty owed by defendants, but we do so on grounds other than those relied on by the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Plaintiffs, Jane Doe–3 and Jane Doe–7, were sexually abused by their teacher, Jon White, at Thomas Paine Elementary School in Urbana, Illinois. Prior to his employment at Thomas Paine, White was employed as a teacher in the McLean County school district at Colene Hoose Elementary School in Normal, Illinois. Plaintiffs, along with their mothers, Julie Doe–3, and Julie Doe–7, filed suit against White, the Urbana School District No. 116 Board of Directors (Urbana), and individual administrators at Urbana,¹ as well as the defendants involved in this appeal—the McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors (McLean) and five individual administrators at McLean—Jim Braksick, Alan Chapman, Dale Heidbreder, Edward Heinemann, and John Pye (McLean administrators).

¶ 4 Jane Doe–3's second amended complaint and Jane Doe–7's amended complaint were filed in February 2009. Both complaints contain the same allegations against McLean and the McLean administrators. Plaintiffs alleged that White was employed as an elementary school teacher at Brigham Elementary School in Bloomington, Illinois, and Colene Hoose ElementarySchool in Normal, Illinois, during the 2002 through 2005 school years. Defendants Chapman and Pye were employed by the McLean County school district as the superintendent and assistant superintendent of Operations and Human Resources, respectively. Defendants Braksick and Heinemann were employed as principals, and Heidbreder was employed as an assistant principal, at Colene Hoose Elementary School.

¶ 5 Plaintiffs alleged that, at some time between 2002 and 2005, the McLean administrators acquired actual knowledge of White's teacher-on-student sexual harassment, sexual abuse, and/or sexual “grooming” ² of minor female students. However, defendants never recorded these incidents in White's personnel file or employment record. In addition, defendants failed to make timely mandated reports of the abuse by White and failed to investigate parental complaints. Also, according to the complaint, during the 2004–05 school year, defendants disciplined White for “sexual harassment, sexual grooming, and/or sexual abuse” of minor female students. The discipline occurred in October 2004, and again in April or May 2005. White was “kept out of his classroom because of his teacher-on-student sexual harassment and/or sexual grooming and/or sexual abuse.” In 2005, prior to the close of the 2004–05 school year, defendants entered into a severance agreement with White which concealed his sexual abuse of students. Also in 2005, defendants “created a falsely positive letter of reference for White” which concealed known sexual abuse of female students.

¶ 6 Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants “passed” ³ White to the Urbana school district while concealing his past sexual abuse by intentionally giving false information regarding White's employment to the Urbana school district. Plaintiffs alleged that, during White's transition to Urbana in 2005, defendants falsified employment information about White on an Urbana school district “Verification of Employment Form” by stating that White had worked during the entire school year. This statement concealed the fact that White had been subject to disciplinary removal from his classroom twice during the 2004–05 school year and left before the end of the school year.

¶ 7 In August 2005, White was hired as a teacher at Thomas Paine Elementary School in the Urbana school district. Plaintiffs alleged that Urbana hired White “while relying on false information provided by McLean County School District.” Plaintiff Jane Doe–3 was a student in White's first-grade class during the 2005–06 school year; plaintiff Jane Doe–7 was a student in White's second-grade class during the 2006–07 school year. Both plaintiffs were victims of sexual abuse by White during White's employment at Thomas Paine.

¶ 8 Both complaints allege that the McLean administrators, individually, and McLean, as respondeat superior, acted willfully and wantonly by providing false information on the employment verification form. The other counts based on different theories of law are not at issue in this appeal.

¶ 9 Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints pursuant to section 2–619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–619.1 (West 2010) (allowing combined motions to dismiss)). First, defendants contended, pursuant to section 2–615 (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2010)), that plaintiffs' complaints should be dismissed because, among other reasons, the complaints failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, defendants contended that plaintiffs' willful and wanton conduct claims failed to allege a viable legal duty on the part of defendants, and that plaintiffs' claims were precluded by the common law public duty rule.

¶ 10 Defendants also argued that plaintiffs' claims against the individual McLean administrators should be dismissed pursuant to section 2–619 (735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2010)) because those claims were barred by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1–101 et seq. (West 2010)).⁴

¶ 11 The trial court dismissed with prejudice all counts against the McLean defendants, finding that defendants owed no legal duty to plaintiffs. Even if a duty existed under the law, the court held that either the common law public duty rule or the Tort Immunity Act precluded any duty owed to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' motions to reconsider were denied.⁵

¶ 12 The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings, finding that plaintiffs adequately alleged a duty on the part of defendants. 409 Ill.App.3d 1087, 351 Ill.Dec. 396, 951 N.E.2d 216. The court held that defendants' act of “creating and sending” a letter of recommendation on behalf of White supported a duty based on the theory of either voluntary undertaking (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965)), or negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 (1965)). Id. at 1097–99, 351 Ill.Dec. 396, 951 N.E.2d 216. The court further held that defendants owed a duty either to warn Urbana of White's conduct or to report White's conduct to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Id. Based on its findings, the appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' actions.

¶ 13 This court allowed defendants' petitions for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)), and the appeals were consolidated.

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 The issue before us is whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' complaints based on its finding that defendants owed plaintiffs no duty. A motion to dismiss under section 2–615 of the Code challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on its face. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d 422, 429, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048 (2006). A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2–619 admits the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint, but asserts affirmative matter which defeats the claim. Review under either section 2–615 or section 2–619 is de novo. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill.2d 1, 12, 293 Ill.Dec. 657, 828 N.E.2d 1155 (2005).

¶ 16 Under section 2–615, the critical question is whether the allegations in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill.2d 223, 228, 271 Ill.Dec. 649, 785 N.E.2d 843 (2003). In making this determination, all well-pleaded facts must be taken as true. King, 215 Ill.2d at 11–12, 293 Ill.Dec. 657, 828 N.E.2d 1155. A court should dismiss a complaint pursuant to section 2–615 only where no set of facts can be proved which would entitle the plaintiff to recovery. Marshall, 222 Ill.2d at 429, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048.

¶ 17 I. Duty of Care

¶ 18 As noted above, the appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints, finding that plaintiffs stated a cause of action based on defendants' willful and wanton conduct and that defendants owed plaintiffs a duty. Therefore, we first turn to that issue.

¶ 19 In the only count before us, plaintiffs allege that defendants acted willfully and wantonly when they “passed” White to the Urbana school district by misrepresenting White's employment record on a verification form. There is no separate, independent tort of willful and wanton conduct. Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 238 Ill.2d 215, 235, 345 Ill.Dec. 1, 938 N.E.2d...