Doe v. Morehouse Coll., Inc.

622 F.Supp.3d 1279

Alexis DOE, Plaintiff, v. MOREHOUSE COLLEGE, INC. and Clark Atlanta University, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02572-SDG

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

Signed August 16, 2022

Christopher Wallace Ford, Pro Hac Vice, John Clune, Pro Hac Vice, Lucy Kennedy Walker, Pro Hac Vice, Hutchinson Black and Cook, LLC, Boulder, CO, Jonathan David Grunberg, Wade, Grunberg & Wilson, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Joshua W. B. Richards, Pro Hac Vice, Levi R. Schy, Pro Hac Vice, Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Joshua Isaac Bosin, Holland & Knight LLP, Atlanta, GA, Megan Christine Eckel, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Morehouse College, Inc.

Rodney Gregory Moore, Dentons US LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Clark Atlanta University, Inc.

OPINION AND ORDER

Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Court Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Clark Atlanta University's (Clark) motion to dismiss Count III of Plaintiff Alexis Doe's First Amended Complaint [ECF 24] and Defendant Morehouse College, Inc.'s (Morehouse) motion to dismiss Doe's First Amended Complaint [ECF 25].¹ After careful consideration of the parties' briefing, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court GRANTS Clark's motion to dismiss and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Morehouse's motion to dismiss. Doe's deliberate indifference claim against Clark and her official policy claim against Morehouse are DISMISSED.

I. Background

The following well-pled allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this Order.² While enrolled as a student at Spelman College,³ in October 2017, Doe was raped by a Morehouse student, JK,⁴ at his off-campus apartment. Doe became pregnant and decided to terminate the pregnancy.⁵ Though he initially agreed that Doe should terminate the pregnancy, JK quickly changed his mind and began a campaign of harassment against Doe.⁶ Over the next three years, JK, with the help of three Clark students, harassed and extorted Doe, threatened her with physical violence, posted about Doe on social media, and intimidated her at school events.⁷

In February 2018, Spelman indicated it would notify Morehouse of the harassment.⁸ Doe herself disclosed the rape and harassment to Morehouse's Title IX coordinator in April 2018,⁹ and officially reported the rape in June 2018,¹⁰ but Morehouse failed to take any action against JK and did not resolve Doe's claims until June 2020, after Doe graduated.¹¹ Doe reported the involvement of the Clark students to Clark and, in October 2018, Clark sanctioned those students, though it failed to tell Doe what those sanctions were or what protective measures it had put in place.¹²

Spelman, Morehouse, and Clark are three of the Historically Black Colleges and Universities that make up the Atlanta University Center Consortium (AUC).¹³ Undergraduate students who attend an AUC institution may register for classes at any other AUC institution.¹⁴ The AUC institutions are located on one tract of land and the students can walk freely between them as if they were one larger campus.¹⁵ Doe chose to enroll in Spelman because of the AUC and the availability of cross-registration, which allowed her to pursue a public health major on the pre-medical school track because some required classes were offered by Clark and Morehouse.¹⁶ However, because of the harassment she endured, Doe changed her major to sociology to avoid taking classes anywhere but Spelman and, in doing so, was unable to stay on the pre-med track.¹⁷ Doe also avoided AUC services, events, and clubs to prevent further interaction with her harassers.¹⁸ In the summer of 2019, Doe accepted a paid research position and moved onto Morehouse's campus because she believed JK would not be on campus, but after Morehouse's Title IX coordinator informed JK that Doe was residing there, Doe moved into temporary housing for her own protection.¹⁹

Doe attributes her sexual assault and Morehouse's failure to appropriately respond to her reports on the institution's culture of hypermasculinity and discrimination.²⁰ She alleges that Morehouse fails to educate its students on consent and sexual misconduct,²¹ frequently mishandles reports of sexual assault (which fosters a culture of sexual violence),²² and has unusually frequent turnover with Title IX coordinators.²³ As a result, Doe alleges, women at Spelman and other AUC institutions are more vulnerable to sexual violence,²⁴ such as the sexual violence she experienced.²⁵

Doe filed suit against Morehouse and Clark, alleging discrimination in violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, based on both institutions' alleged deliberate indifference to the sexual assault and harassment she reported,²⁶ and Morehouse's alleged official policy permitting practices of sexual hostility and violence.²⁷ Both Morehouse and Clark move to dismiss, arguing that Doe has failed to state a claim and that her claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.²⁸ Doe responded in opposition to both motions,²⁹ and the institutions filed replies in support.³⁰ The Court held oral argument on both motions on June 22, 2022.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While this standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must now contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A complaint is plausible on its face when a plaintiff pleads sufficient factual content for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Am. Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1289 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A complaint does not state a facially plausible claim for relief if it shows only a sheer possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully." Waters Edge Living, LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., 355 F. App'x 318, 322 (11th Cir. 2009).

At the motion to dismiss stage, "all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)). This principle, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. Discussion

Morehouse argues that Doe is impermissibly attempting to hold it strictly liable for the sexual assault, which also occurred outside the applicable two-year limitations period, and that her deliberate indifference claim fails to meet the elements articulated in Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999).³¹ Clark similarly argues that the relevant conduct occurred outside the two-year limitations period, but also argues that Doe's claims fail because she lacks standing and failed to allege that the conduct of the Clark students was severe and pervasive or that Clark's response was unreasonable.³²

The Court disagrees with Morehouse's characterization of Doe's claims and finds that she has stated a claim for deliberate indifference that is not time barred. The Court also finds, however, that Doe failed to state an official policy claim against Morehouse, that her official policy claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and that she has failed to state a claim of deliberate indifference against Clark.

A. Deliberate Indifference Claim Against Morehouse

To preface, the Court is unpersuaded by Morehouse's attempt to characterize Doe's claims as pertaining to the sexual assault itself. Doe alleges that, after the assault, JK harassed and extorted her for terminating her pregnancy,³³ harassed and threatened her for reporting the extortion and the assault,³⁴ recruited Clark students to harass and threaten her,³⁵ and that Morehouse not only failed to act in response to these actions,³⁶ but fostered an environment that encouraged this behavior.³⁷ So contending that Doe's deliberate indifference claim is akin to holding Morehouse strictly liable for the sexual assault is flatly wrong. With this understanding, the Court considers the sufficiency of Doe's deliberate indifference claim.

1. Doe states a claim for deliberate indifference against Morehouse.

Interpreting Davis, the Eleventh Circuit has articulated a four-prong analysis for student-on-student harassment. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). First, the defendant must be a Title IX funding recipient. Id. (citing Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802, 119 S.Ct. 33, 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999)). Second, an official with authority to take corrective action must have actual knowledge of the alleged harassment. Id. (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998)). Third, the funding recipient must have acted with deliberate indifference to the known harassment in such a way that "subjects" the plaintiff to discrimination. Id. (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 633, 119 S.Ct. 1661). Fourth, the discrimination must be " 'so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively...