Doe v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n

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JOHN DOE 1, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Defendant.

No. 1:23-cv-00542-SEB-MJD

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

July 2, 2024

Arend J. Abel

COHEN & MALAD LLP

Nicholas Blake Alford

FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP (Indianapolis)

Hailyn Jennifer Chen

Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

Melissa Ryan Clark

Fegan Scott LLC

Lynn A. Ellenberger

Elizabeth A. Fegan

FEGAN SCOTT, LLC

Kathleen Foley

Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

Michelle A. Lamy

LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP

Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke

Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

Jessica A. Moldovan

Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP

Andrea Roberts Pierson

FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP (Indianapolis)

Jonathan David Selbin

LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP

Paige Smith

Fegan Scott LLC

Ariel Tal Teshuva

Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

Lynn A. Toops

COHEN & MALAD LLP

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE

Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike First Amended Complaint [Dkt. 54]. Plaintiffs in this putative class action are thirteen current and former college student-athletes who are proceeding anonymously as John Does^[1]1-6 and 8-14,^[2] and have brought this action against the Defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), alleging that they have been harmed as a result of the NCAA's deliberate decision to remain silent in the face of rampant sexual abuse and harassment by various coaches at NCAA-member institutions. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA should have adopted policies to prevent harassment by their coaches, that its failure to do so constitutes a breach of contract (Counts I-III) and negligence (Counts IV-VII), and that the NCAA is vicariously liable for the emotional distress they allege was inflicted on them by their coaches (Counts VIII-IX). The prospective class is a nationwide group of all student-athletes currently participating in any NCAA sport at any member institution.

The NCAA has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that the relevant statute of limitations bars the claims asserted by Does 4-14, that none of the Plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief, and that the remaining allegations fail to state claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To the extent any portion of the amended complaint survives dismissal, Defendants contend that the class allegations must be stricken. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motion to dismiss and/or to strike. For the reasons detailed below, we GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

Factual Background^[3]

The Parties

Plaintiffs are thirteen current and former student-athletes each of whom was a member of the baseball team at the University of San Francisco ("USF") between 1999 and 2022. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-28. Does 4-6 and 8-14 are former student-athletes who allege that two of their coaches at USF, Troy Nakamura and Anthony Giarratano (the "Coaches"), engaged in conduct that created a sexualized, abusive environment, which caused them harm. See, e.g., id. ¶ 5. Does 1 and 2 are current student-athletes who allege that they suffered retaliation as well as emotional and sometimes physical abuse perpetrated by the Coaches when they refused to "play along" with the sexually charged atmosphere at USF. Id. ¶¶ 193, 220. These two Plaintiffs have since transferred to other NCAA member organizations where, at least so far, they have not experienced sexual abuse or harassment but nonetheless face an increased risk of such harm in the future, given the NCAA's alleged pattern of inaction and turning a blind eye. Id. ¶¶ 4, 94, 476. Plaintiffs allege that Doe 3, who has departed USF, "will continue playing college baseball," but is not a current student-athlete at any NCAA member institution. Id. ¶ 260.

The NCAA is a voluntary unincorporated association geographically located in Indiana. Id. ¶ 29. Its members include approximately 1,100 colleges and universities dotted across the country who have voluntarily delegated to the NCAA the power to administer intercollegiate athletic competitions. Id.

Procedural History

This case was originally filed in the Northern District of California by three current and nine former student athletes (Does 1-12), against the Coaches who allegedly had sexually harassed them, as well as against the NCAA, USF, and the Coaches who were responsible for that harassment. The Northern District of California Court dismissed without prejudice all claims against the NCAA based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Doe 1 v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 22-cv-01559-LB, 2023 WL 105096, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2023). Currently, certain claims against USF and the Coaches remain pending in the Northern District of California.

The Instant Litigation

On March 28, 2023, Does 1-12 filed their complaint in our district, adding Does 13-14 as additional Plaintiffs; they later amended their complaint on June 20, 2023. Plaintiffs' claims are framed as actions brought on their own behalf as well as brought on behalf of the prospective nationwide class of "[a]ll student-athletes who are currently participating in NCAA sports at NCAA member institutions." Am. Compl. ¶ 516. Their primary contention is that the NCAA should have adopted policies to prevent the alleged harassment by the Coaches. Accordingly, Plaintiffs nine claims include theories of relief for breach of contract (Count I); breach of implied contract (Count II);^[4] breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries (Count III); gross negligence (Count IV); negligence (Count V); breach of fiduciary duty (Count VI); negligent failure to warn, train, or educate (Count VII); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII); and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count IX). Plaintiffs seek to recover monetary damages as well as obtain injunctive and declaratory relief.

The NCAA's Motion to Dismiss and/or to Strike seeks dismissal of all the claims alleged in the amended complaint. To the extent any of Plaintiffs' claims survive dismissal, the NCAA moves to have Plaintiffs' class allegations stricken for lack of an adequate representative. Plaintiffs have filed their response in opposition to the NCAA's motion, making the motion now fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

Legal Analysis

I. Applicable Legal Standard

Defendant has moved for the dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (standing) and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1), we first must determine whether a factual challenge or a facial challenge to standing has been raised. Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015). A factual challenge rests on the argument that "there is in fact no subject matter jurisdiction," even if the pleadings in a formal sense are sufficient, while a facial challenge is premised on an argument that the plaintiff has not sufficiently "alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction." Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). We construe Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to be "a facial challenge because [it] contend[s] that Plaintiffs' complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to establish standing." Silha, 807 F.3d at 173. "In reviewing a facial challenge, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. (citing Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443-44). "When assessing standing on the basis of the facts alleged in a complaint, this means we apply the same standard of review we use when assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Finkelman v. National Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2016).

Similarly, in addressing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and draws all ensuing inferences in favor of the non-movant. Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059, 1060 (7th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” and its “[f]actual allegations must . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The complaint must therefore include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Stated otherwise, a facially plausible complaint is one which permits “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

ORDER

II. Discussion

The NCAA's motion to dismiss targeting all the claims brought against it by Plaintiffs rests in part on its contention that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective relief, which thus necessitates the striking of the class allegations. The motion also asserts that the claims brought by Does 4-6 and 8-14 are time-barred and that any claims which have survived must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). As previously noted, Plaintiffs oppose the NCAA's motion on all grounds. We address the parties' arguments in turn below.

A. Standing Entitling Prospective Relief (Does 1-3)

The NCAA seeks dismissal of Does 1-3's request for injunctive and declaratory relief un...