Doe v. Schuylkill Cnty. Courthouse

JANE DOE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHUYLKILL COUNTY COURTHOUSE, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 3:21-CV-477

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

May 6, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARTIN C. CARLSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

I. Introduction

This case involves allegations of abhorrent workplace misconduct at the Schuylkill County Courthouse involving alleged sexual harassment, assault, and predation coupled with assertions of official indifference to the plight of the alleged victims of this workplace violence. The plaintiffs, four Jane Doe employees of Schuylkill County, filed this action against the County and several individual defendants. Their claims stem from the alleged sexual abuse and harassment perpetrated by County Commissioner George Halcovage over a period of several years while the plaintiffs were employed by the County. The plaintiffs assert that the County, as well as the individual supervisory defendants, knew of the sexual abuse and harassment and did nothing to stop it. Instead, the plaintiffs contend that these defendants retaliated against them for reporting the sexual abuse and harassment.

Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by one of the defendants, George Halcovage.^[1] (Doc. 73). With respect to Defendant Halcovage, the plaintiffs allege that he discriminated and retaliated against them, and that he aided and abetted discriminatory conduct in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). They also assert that Halcovage violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting them to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment. The plaintiffs also assert a claim against Halcovage for First Amendment retaliation. Finally, Doe 1 and Doe 2 have asserted a state law claim against Halcovage for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In his motion to dismiss, Halcovage contends that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He further argues that the First Amendment retaliation claim fails because the plaintiffs were speaking as employees, rather than as citizens about a matter of public concern. With respect to the PHRA claims, Halcovage contends that the discrimination and retaliation provisions do not apply to individuals, and that the plaintiffs have not stated a claim for aiding and abetting against him. Halcovage further asserts that the plaintiffs have failed to state an Equal Protection claim for disparate treatment and a hostile work environment. Finally, Halcovage challenges the plaintiffs' request to proceed under their “Jane Doe” pseudonyms.^[2]

This motion is fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 84, 88, 92). For the reasons that follow, we will grant the motion to dismiss with respect to the PHRA discrimination claim but deny the motion in all other respects.

II. Background

The factual background of this case is taken from the factual allegations set forth in the plaintiff's second amended complaint (Doc. 63), which we must accept as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss.

George Halcovage was elected as a Commissioner of Schuylkill County in 2012. (Doc. 63, ¶ 45). At this time, Plaintiffs Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 were employed with the County as the Tax Claim Director and Clerk Typist One, respectively. (Id., ¶¶ 43-44). The complaint alleges that upon the start of his term as County Commissioner, Halcovage frequently visited the Tax Claims Office and subjected the female employees to unwelcomed sexual harassment. (Id., ¶ 47). This harassment, which included discriminatory sexist and inappropriate comments, was sometimes directed at and witnessed by Doe 3 and Doe 4, and caused them to feel extremely uncomfortable, humiliated, and distressed. (Id., ¶¶ 47-48). The plaintiffs allege that Glenn Roth, the First Assistant County Solicitor and Risk Manager, and Gary Bender, the County Administrator, witnessed this behavior by Halcovage but did nothing to stop it. (Id., ¶ 49).

Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 was hired by the County in February of 2014. (Id., ¶ 51). According to the complaint, Halcovage visited Doe 1's workspace often, which caused her coworkers to make comments about Doe 1 talking with Halcovage who was “a sucker for pretty girls.” (Id., ¶¶ 52-53). Halcovage began making unwanted comments about Doe 1's physical appearance, which increased in frequency and intensity throughout Doe 1's first year with the County. (Id., ¶¶ 55-56). These comments about Doe 1's physical appearance eventually escalated into more forceful sexual advances, with Halcovage grabbing Doe 1 and kissing her after a fundraiser that Doe 1 attended in late 2014 or early 2015. (Id., ¶¶ 57-61). After this incident, Halcovage allegedly made comments to Doe 1 which she believed implied that her job was contingent on submitting to Halcovage's sexual advances. (Id., ¶ 64).

Around this same time, Plaintiff Jane Doe 2 was hired by the County, and the complaint alleges that she was almost immediately subject to unwanted sexual comments from Halcovage. (Id., ¶¶ 65-66). It is alleged that these sexually charged comments caused Doe 2 issues with her female coworkers, who either ignored her or gave her one-word answers, which she believed to be due to her coworkers' incorrect impression that she was in a relationship with Halcovage. (Id., ¶¶ 68-72). The complaint further alleges that the plaintiffs witnessed Halcovage making inappropriate and sexist comments about other female coworkers. (Id., ¶¶ 76-77). According to the plaintiffs, Defendants Roth and Bender were present for some of these comments but did nothing to stop Halcovage or inform him that his behavior was inappropriate. (Id., ¶¶ 78-79). This led the plaintiffs to believe that any efforts they made to report Halcovage's conduct would be futile. (Id., ¶ 81).

Halcovage's alleged sexual harassment of the Doe plaintiffs continued and intensified. In 2015, Halcovage made a comment to Doe 2's husband at a fundraising event about “using” his wife, a comment which allegedly insinuated that Halcovage and Doe 2 had sexual intercourse. (Id., ¶¶ 83-86). The complaint asserts that Defendant Roth was present for this comment and later mentioned that the comment made him uncomfortable, remarking that Halcovage “didn't have to say it that way.” (Id., ¶¶ 87-89). However, Roth did not report Halcovage's behavior to HR. (Id., ¶ 90).

Doe 1 and Doe 2 also attended a fundraiser in March of 2015 at Halcovage's request. (Id., ¶ 91). According to the complaint, Halcovage insisted he drive Doe 1 home after the event. (Id., ¶ 92). Upon arriving at Doe 1's home, Halcovage was verbally and physically affectionate with her, kissed her, and ultimately unzipped his pants and exposed his genitals to her. (Id. ¶¶ 94-95). Doe 1 took this to mean that Halcovage wanted her to perform oral sex on him, which made her feel overwhelmed and uncomfortable. (Id., ¶¶ 97-98). Due to his position of authority over her, Doe 1 ultimately performed oral sex on Halcovage. (Id., ¶ 97). The complaint alleges that immediately following this incident with Doe 1, Halcovage called Doe 2 demanding to know where she was and who she was with. (Id., ¶ 98).

The complaint alleges another instance of sexual assault by Halcovage in 2018, where Halcovage took Doe 1 into the tax filing room inside the courthouse, forcibly pushed her head down, exposed his genitals, and forced her to perform oral sex on him. (Id., ¶¶ 109-12). While Doe 1 and Doe 2 consistently attempted to rebuff Halcovage's sexual advances, it is alleged that Halcovage also inserted himself into their personal and family lives, particularly when they refused his sexual advances. (Id., ¶ 101). The complaint asserts that Halcovage frequently made appearances at Doe 1's home late at night with alcohol or early in the morning, causing her to be late for work. (Id., ¶ 104). Moreover, when Doe 1 rebuffed Halcovage's advances, Halcovage's harassment of Doe 2 intensified. (Id., ¶ 119). The plaintiffs allege that over time, Halcovage's requests for oral sex turned into requests for sexual intercourse. (Id., ¶ 116).

In 2019, Doe 3 became Doe 1's direct supervisor. (Id., ¶ 142). In July and November of 2019, Doe 3 twice reported incidents of Halcovage's sexual harassment to Defendant Roth. (Id., ¶¶ 145-47). According to the complaint, Roth did not document the incidents, make any inquiries, or report the incidents to HR. (Id., ¶ 148). Around this same time, Roth allegedly knew that Halcovage was contacting Doe 1 and Doe 2 outside of work hours but did not report Halcovage's behavior to anyone. (Id., ¶¶ 154-55). In 2020, Doe 3 pleaded with Roth to intervene with respect to Halcovage's harassment, and Roth told her to take her complaints to HR. (Id., ¶¶ 156-57).

Thus, in May of 2020, Doe 1 sent Doe 3 a formal email reporting Halcovage's sexual harassment and sexual assault. (Id., ¶ 159). This email was promptly forwarded to HR, after which HR conducted formal interviews of the plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 160-61). One month later, Halcovage stepped down as Chief Commissioner but remained in the Commissioner position. (Id., ¶ 162). At this time, the County put out a press release stating that an investigation revealed that Halcovage had violated the County's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Conduct and Disciplinary Action Policy, and the Physical and Verbal Abuse Policy. (Id., ¶ 164). This press release also stated that Halcovage could not be removed from his position as Commissioner absent a criminal conviction or impeachment. (Id.)

Following the Doe Plaintiffs' reports of sexual misconduct, they allege that they were subject to retaliation by Halcovage the County, and the other individual defendants. On...