Doe v. StarPoint Cent. Sch. Dist.

1

John Doe 1, as Parent and Natural Guardian of His Son, John Doe 2, a person under the age of 18, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STARPOINT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 23-CV-207-LJV

United States District Court, W.D. New York

April 3, 2023

DECISION & ORDER

LAWRENCE J. VILARDO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On March 7, 2023, the defendants-the Starpoint Central School District (“Starpoint”), the Starpoint Board of Education, and Starpoint Superintendent Dr. Sean Croft-removed this case to this Court from New York State Supreme Court, Niagara County. Docket Item 1. That same day the defendants moved to seal the case “indefinitely.” Docket Item 2; Docket Item 2-1 at 5. Since then, the case has remained under seal while that motion is pending.

Because this Court had serious doubts about whether this case should remain under seal, it ordered the defendants to supplement their motion to propose redactions to the sealed documents or explain why redactions were insufficient. Docket Item 5. This Court also requested the plaintiffs' position on the motion to seal. Id.

On March 24, 2023, the defendants supplemented their motion to seal. Docket Item 12. They contend that this entire case should remain under seal because of the sensitive nature of the underlying allegations. See id. In the alternative, the defendants propose that this Court should restrict access to already-filed documents and order the parties to submit redacted versions of those documents. See id. at 11. The plaintiffs say only that they “do not object to the [m]otion to [s]eal the federal docket pending remand.” Docket Item 7 at 80.

For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion to seal is granted in part and denied in part. The case is unsealed, but the documents will remain under seal until the redactions and protocol proposed by the defendants are approved by the Court. The parties shall address any changes to those redactions and that protocol at the oral argument on the plaintiffs' motion to remand scheduled for April 3, 2023.

DISCUSSION

I. UNSEALING THE CASE

One of the cornerstones of our judicial system is the right of public access to judicial proceedings, including a presumption that judicial documents are public. See, e.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our nation's history.”). “A ‘finding that a document is a “judicial document” triggers a presumption of public access, and requires a court to make specific, rigorous findings before sealing the document or otherwise denying public access.'” Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2016) (alterations omitted) (quoting Newsday LLC v. County of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 167 n.15 (2d Cir. 2013)). “The ‘presumption of access' to judicial records is secured by two independent sources: the First Amendment and the common law.” Id. (citing Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121). But “[t]he ‘right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute,'” and “a court may exercise its ‘supervisory power over its own records and files' to deny access ‘where court files might [] become a vehicle for improper purposes.'” Id. at 142 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Comm'cns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)).

It goes without saying that the documents filed so far in this case-and the docket sheet in the case itself-are “judicial records” that trigger the presumption of public access. See id. at 139 (“A ‘judicial document' or ‘judicial record' is a filed item that is ‘relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.'” (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119)). So this Court turns to whether the First Amendment and the common law presumption require public access to the docket and at least to redacted documents here. And they do.

First, the Second Circuit has “h[eld] that docket sheets enjoy a presumption of openness and that the public and the media possess a qualified First Amendment right to inspect them.” Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit also has extended the First Amendment right of public access to summary judgment motions and supporting documents, see Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124, and civil complaints, see Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 141. So the presumption of access protected by the First Amendment applies to the docket and filings here.

Second, the common law presumption of access in this case is strong. “The weight of the presumption” of access “is a function of (1) ‘the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power' and (2) ‘the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts,' balanced against ‘competing considerations' such as ‘the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.'” Id. at 142 (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119-20). Here, the material the parties seek to seal-the entire case and all the underlying documents-is obviously essential to the exercise of judicial power. See, e.g., id. (“Pleadings, such as the complaint [], are highly relevant to the exercise of Article III judicial power.”).

And just as obviously, that material has “value . . . to those monitoring the federal courts.” See id. First, this case is “of legitimate interest to the public . . . and to federal courts in the future.” Id. at 143. As the defendants themselves note, the “underlying events and allegations” at issue here have attracted “substantial press coverage.”^[1]Docket Item 12 at 9. And federal courts in the future may well have an interest in the proceedings in this case, including this Court's forthcoming decision on the plaintiffs' motion to remand. Both the First Amendment and the common law presumption of access therefore favor unsealing this case and the documents filed in it.

That said, this Court recognizes the strong privacy interests at stake here. The complaint alleges that the defendants have unjustifiably disciplined high school students based on serious but false allegations of misconduct. See generally Docket Item 1-1. Those allegations implicate the privacy interests not only of the plaintiffs, but of the alleged victim or victims of that misconduct as well.

Nevertheless, those interests can be addressed by more narrowly tailored restrictions-for example, by sealing unredacted documents and filing redacted versions-and do not require the requested extraordinary relief of sealing the entire case. Cf. Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 144 (“To overcome the First Amendment right of access, the proponent of sealing must demonstrate that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, none of the cases cited by the defendants in support of their motion to seal involved such a drastic remedy; instead, the courts protected the privacy interests at stake by, for example, sealing unredacted documents or allowing a party to proceed by pseudonym. See, e.g., Doe v. Mass. Institute of Tech., 46 F.4th 61, 73 (1st Cir. 2022) (“establish[ing] the proper framework for evaluating a party's motion to proceed by pseudonym”); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2008) (outlining ten “non-exhaustive” factors that “district courts should take into account” in deciding whether to allow parties to proceed by pseudonym); Najera v. Lilley, 2022 WL 515660, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2022) (granting motion to seal certain documents).^[2]

As an alternative to sealing this case, the defendants have proposed a protocol of maintaining restrictions on already-filed documents, filing redacted versions of those documents, and redacting future filings. See Docket Item 12 at 11. This Court believes that this alternative may well strike the balance between the parties' privacy interests and the presumption in favor of public access to judicial documents. The parties shall address this proposed protocol and any changes to it at the April 3 oral argument.

To the extent that the defendants request that the April 3 oral argument be closed to the public, however, that request is denied. Beyond addressing the proposed protocol mentioned above, the sole issue at that argument will be whether the defendants properly removed the case to this Court. That proceeding therefore will involve general questions of subject matter jurisdiction and should not require an exhaustive recitation of the factual allegations in the complaint or a detailed inquiry into whether the underlying disciplinary decisions challenged in the complaint were appropriate.

II. ANONYMIZATION

For the reasons stated above, this case is unsealed. Although this Court previously warned that it “d[id] not believe that sealing this entire case is appropriate,” Docket Item 8, it appears that the plaintiffs may not have contemplated the effect of unsealing this case. For example, the plaintiffs have not offered their position on redactions, moved to proceed by pseudonym, or said anything beyond simply noting that they “do not object to the [m]otion to [s]eal the federal docket pending remand.” Docket Item 7 at 80. That lacuna is somewhat surprising, especially because the plaintiffs appear to have some of the strongest privacy interests at stake in this case.

Because this Court recognizes those privacy interests and the possible effects of unsealing this case, and because the plaintiffs may be relying on the defendants' request to seal, the plaintiffs may temporarily proceed by pseudonym. If the plaintiffs would like to continue to proceed by pseudonym, they must move to do so as provided below.

In federal court, “[t]he title of the...