Doe v. State

1

JOHN DOE, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, DIVISION OF THE STATE POLICE; JAMES MANNI, Colonel of the State Police, Defendants.

No. PC-2022-00466

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence

January 31, 2023

ATTORNEYS:

For Plaintiff: Carly B. Iafrate, Esq.

For Defendant: D. Peter DeSimone, Esq. Vincent F. Ragosta, Jr Esq. Adam Sholes, Esq.

DECISION

GIBNEY, P.J.

The Rhode Island State Police (Defendant) discharged former State Police Officer John Doe (Plaintiff) without the benefit of a hearing as is typically required by G.L. 1956 § 42-28.6-4, the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR). In a previous Decision, this Court determined that Plaintiff's right to a LEOBOR hearing-or lack thereof-was dependent in part upon an unresolved issue of material fact that precluded granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Doe v. State of Rhode Island, Division of the State Police, No. PC-2022-00466, Nov. 28, 2022, Gibney P.J. (November 2022 Decision). Now before the Court are the parties' subsequent competing cross-motions: 1) Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [of the Court's November 2022 Decision] and Summary Judgment, see generally Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Recons. &Summ. J. (Pl.'s Mem.); and 2) Defendant's Motion that the Existing "Disputed Issue of Material Fact" [as identified in the Court's November 2022 Decision] Be Determined as a Matter of Law. See generally Def.'s Mem.^[1] Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 8-2-13 and 42-28.6-4.

I Facts and Travel

The underlying facts and travel of this matter are detailed in the Court's November 2022 Decision. (November 2022 Decision, at 2-4.) There, this Court held that a Disciplinary Consent Agreement (the Agreement) executed as between the parties to resolve an October 2021 disciplinary matter (the First Disciplinary Dispute) was valid and enforceable, including a provision whereby Plaintiff agreed "to be placed on probationary status . . . for.... [three months]" (the Probationary Period). Id. at 3; see also (Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.'s Summ. J. Mem.) Ex. C (Agreement), at 4.). During the Probationary Period, Plaintiff would "not be afforded rights under the LEOBOR." (Agreement, at 4.) By the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiff would be suspended without pay for two days, "to be served by January 31, 2022" (Suspension Days), and the Probationary Period would then begin "[u]pon [Plaintiff's] return from serving the suspension days[.]" (Agreement, at 3-4.) The Agreement left open the specific dates of suspension, requiring only that they be served by January 31, 2022. Id. at 3.

Plaintiff was scheduled to work on December 25 and 26, 2021 but was absent from work on those days without prior authorization (the Second Disciplinary Dispute). (Appl. for an Order Directing Def. to Show Cause Why Certain Rights Should Not Be Afforded Pursuant to LEOBOR (Pl.'s Appl.) ¶¶ 32-33; Def.'s Answer ¶ 33.) Defendant "initially marked [December 25 and 26, 2021] as . . . sick day[s]"; but subsequently retroactively recategorized those days as unpaid leave to reflect Defendant's unilateral determination that December 25 and 26, 2021 would be designated as Plaintiff's two Suspension Days under the Agreement. (Aff. of Colonel James Manni ¶¶ 10-11; Pl.'s Appl. ¶ 37; Def.'s Answer ¶ 37.)

In deciding Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court's November 2022 Decision stated that-as a matter of contract interpretation-it was unclear "whether the parties intended that Defendant could unilaterally and retroactively determine dates of suspension." (November 2022 Decision, at 14.) That issue of intent constituted a material factual dispute that precluded summary judgment "because commencement of the Probationary Period-and hence waiver of Plaintiff's LEOBOR rights-was tied to the dates of his suspension." Id.

The Court also declined to grant summary judgment for Plaintiff based on his argument that the Probationary Period's condition precedent-requiring a "return from serving the suspension days"-necessitated that Plaintiff physically work a shift, especially in light of the unresolved issues of fact surrounding the nature of his work status on December 25 and 26, 2021. Id. at 12-14 ("Assuming [Plaintiff's failure to report to work due to voluntary intoxication] to be true, as we must at this stage, adopting Plaintiff's proposed interpretation would give Plaintiff unilateral authority to avoid the Agreement by repeatedly failing to report to work[.]").

Now before the Court is Plaintiff's request that this Court reconsider two aspects of that Decision. See generally Pl.'s Mem. First, Plaintiff requests reconsideration of the Court's determination that an issue of material fact remains in dispute. Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends that the Second Disciplinary Dispute occurred on December 25, 2021 and that-even if his Suspension Days were served on December 25 and 26, 2021-the express terms of the Agreement provided that the Probationary Period began only after those suspension days-i.e., December 27, at the earliest. Id. at 4. As a result, Plaintiff maintains that it is undisputed that he was not in the Probationary Period on December 25 when the Second Disciplinary Dispute occurred, and he was therefore entitled to a LEOBOR hearing because, by Plaintiff's reading of the Agreement, "the waiver applies to misconduct committed during the probationary period[.]" Id. (emphasis in original). Second, Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider its assessment of the Agreement's use of the word "return" in conditioning commencement of the Probationary Period on Plaintiff's "return from serving the suspension days." Id. at 5-8.

In response, Defendant both objects to Plaintiff's request for reconsideration and asserts a cross-motion, supported by additional documentary evidence, seeking to resolve the disputed issue of intent in its favor. See generally Def.'s Mem. In light of this expanded evidentiary record, Defendant argues that "the superintendent's unilateral authority to 'retroactively' determine [P]laintiff's suspension days is clear and determinable as a matter of law[.]" Id. at 1.

II

Standards of Review

A Motion for Reconsideration

"Although . . . the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure say nothing [about] a motion to reconsider," our Supreme Court has noted that "'a party's motion to reconsider has been treated by this Court as a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b).'" Atmed Treatment Center, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 285 A.3d 352, 359 (R.I. 2022) (quoting McLaughlin v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Tiverton, 186 A.3d 597, 604 n.9 (R.I. 2018)). "'It is well settled that [a] motion to vacate a judgment is left to the sound discretion of the trial justice[.]'" Id. (quoting Renewable Resources, Inc. v. Town of Westerly, 110 A.3d 1166, 1171 (R.I. 2015)).

However, consideration of a motion to reconsider under the Rule 60(b) standard applies only to a final judgment, order, or proceeding and does not apply to interlocutory orders. Id. at 361-62. "In contrast to final judgments, '[i]nterlocutory orders are those that are provisional or temporary, or that decide some intermediate point or matter but are not a final decision of the whole matter.'" Id. at 361 (quoting Coit v. Tillinghast, 91 A.3d 838, 843 (R.I. 2014)). "A trial justice retains the authority 'to modify any interlocutory judgment or order prior to final judgment.'" Id. at 362 (quoting Renewable Resources, Inc., 110 A.3d at 1171).

Nevertheless, "a motion for reconsideration should not be undertaken lightly" and "a trial justice must balance the interests of the parties against a thoughtful determination that a change of course is proper under the circumstances[.]" Id. Further, the trial justice must rely on the parties' original arguments when reconsidering a prior judgment and not on any "after-the-fact arguments" advanced for the first time in the motion for reconsideration. Id. (citing Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003) ("It is generally accepted that a party may not, on a motion for reconsideration, advance a new argument that could (and should) have been presented prior to the district court's original ruling.")).

B Motion for Summary Judgment

Although Defendant does not caption its cross-motion as being one for summary judgment, its request that this Court determine an issue as a matter of law in light of the available evidence in the record is, in substance, a motion for partial summary judgment. "Summary judgment is appropriate when . . . the court determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123, 1126 (R.I. 2001); see also Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, [a] [c]ourt views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., 82 A.3d 527, 532 (R.I. 2013). Moreover, "'the moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact.'" McGovern v. Bank of America, N.A., 91 A.3d 853, 858 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Robert B. Kent et al., Rhode Island Civil Procedure § 56:5, VII-28 (West 2006)). The "nonmoving party bears the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions[,] or mere legal opinions." Mruk, 82 A.3d at 532 (internal quotation omitted).

III Analysis

A

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff's Probation Status as of December 25, 2021

Plaintiff's request for reconsideration of this Court's Novembe...