Doe v. Syracuse Univ.

JOHN DOE #1, JOHN DOE #2, JOHN DOE #3,JOHN DOE #4 and JOHN DOE #5, Plaintiffs, v. SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY; KEN SYVERUD, individually and as Chancellor of Syracuse University;PAMELA PETER, individually and as Assistant Dean of Student Rights and Affairsand the Director of the Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities;ROBERT HRADSKY, individually and as Syracuse University Dean ofStudents and Associate Vice President of the Student Experience;and TERESA ABI-NADER DAHLBERG, individually and asthe Dean of the College of Engineering and Computer Science, Defendants.

5:18-CV-496 (FJS/DEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 28, 2018

APPEARANCES

SMITH, SOVIK, KENDRICK &

SUGNET, P.C.

250 South Clinton Street, Suite 600

Syracuse, New York 13202-1252

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP

1500 AXA Tower I

100 Madison Street

Syracuse, New York 13202

Attorneys for Defendants

OF COUNSEL

DAVID M. KATZ, ESQ.

KAREN G. FELTER, ESQ.

KEVIN E. HULSLANDER, ESQ.

JOHN POWERS, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 13, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction by Order to Show Cause.¹ See Dkt. No. 14. That same day, the Court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and scheduled a motion hearing regarding Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction for June 21, 2018. See id. At the conclusion of the motion hearing, the Court reserved decision on the motion and directed counsel to file supplemental briefing on several issues. The parties filed their supplemental papers on June 25, 2018. See Dkt. Nos. 21-22. Having completed its review of all of the parties' submissions, as well as their oral arguments, the following constitutes the Court's written disposition of Plaintiff's motion.

II. DISCUSSION

Generally, "[a] party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1) irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or both serious questions on the merits and a balance of hardships decidedly favoring the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest." North Am. Soccer League v. U.S. Soccer Fed'n, 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). However, when a party seeks a mandatory, as opposed to a prohibitory, injunction, "[b]ecause [such] injunctions disrupt the status quo, a party seeking one must meet a heightened legal standard by showing 'a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.'" Id. (quoting N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2012)).

Since "the proposed injunction's effect on the status quo drives the standard, [the court's first step is to] ascertain the status quo - that is, 'the last actual, peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.'" Id. (quoting Mastrio v. Sebelius, 768 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting La-Rouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 74 n.7 (2d Cir. 1994)) (footnote omitted). In the context of a preliminary injunction, "[t]he 'status quo' . . . is really a 'status quo ante.'" Id. at 37 n.5 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit explained that "[t]his special 'ante' formulation of the status quo in the realm of equities shuts out defendants seeking shelter under a current 'status quo' precipitated by their wrongdoing." Id.; see also O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1012 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) (explaining that determining the status quo is important in this context because, "[a]t the preliminary injunction stage, . . ., the function of the court is not to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent irreparable harm, but primarily to keep things as they were, until the court is able to determine the parties' respective legal rights").

Not surprisingly, the parties do not agree on what constitutes the "status quo ante." Plaintiffs assert that "the last actual, peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy" was the moment before Defendants placed a hold on their student accounts and refused to release their transcripts without a disciplinary notation. On the other hand, Defendants argue that "the last actual, peaceable uncontested status" was the situation that existed immediately prior to Plaintiffs filing this lawsuit on April 24, 2018, at which time there was a hold on Plaintiffs' academic files, including their transcripts.

After reviewing the entire record in this matter, the Court concludes that, because Defendant University's policy and regular procedure was to place a hold on a student's academic file in allstudent conduct cases that involved charges that might result in a suspension or when the case arose close to the end of the semester, see Dkt. No. 20-3 ("Nestor Decl.") at ¶ 3,² the status quo ante was the relationship that existed between the parties immediately prior to Plaintiffs commencement of this action on April 24, 2018, at which point there was a hold on Plaintiffs' academic files.

Having determined the "status quo ante," the Court must next determine whether Plaintiffs are seeking a mandatory or prohibitory injunction.

In this case, Plaintiffs are seeking an order requiring Defendant University to lift the hold on their academic files, including their transcripts, and to provide them with their transcripts without the notation "Administrative Withdrawal University Initiated." Such an order would, undeniably, alter the status quo. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are seeking a mandatory injunction, which requires that they show (1) irreparable harm; (2) a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and (3) that a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. See North Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37.³ Furthermore, because the party seeking a preliminary injunctionbears the burden of proof with regard to each prong of the preliminary injunction test, where a court concludes that a plaintiff fails to meet its burden with regard to one prong, it is not necessary for the court to consider the other prongs. See Nat'l Audubon Soc., Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 55 F. Supp. 3d 316, 365 n.21 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that, "[s]ince [the] plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any of its claims against [the] defendants, it is unnecessary to consider the 'irreparable injury' and 'public interest' prongs of a preliminary injunction motion"). Nonetheless, in the interest of completeness, the Court will discuss each of these prongs in turn.

A. Irreparable harm

Plaintiffs argue that they will suffer irreparable harm if the Court does not order Defendants to remove the hold on their academic files and provide them with unannotated transcripts by July 1, 2018, because they will not be able to complete their applications to transfer and will, as a result, lose at least one year of school, which will affect their graduation date. In other words, they assert that they will be unable to continue their education by transferring to another institution.

To the contrary, Defendants assert that, because they have already agreed, as an accommodation to Plaintiffs, to remove the hold on Plaintiffs' academic files, Plaintiffs' onlyclaimed impediment to transfer is the notation on their transcripts, "Administrative Withdrawal - University Initiated." Defendants argue that the significance of this notation to any college that receives an application from Plaintiffs is for that institution to decide, and Plaintiffs are free to provide whatever information or explanation concerning that notation they want. Moreover, Defendants contend that, according to Defendant Dean Hradsky, "many students are accepted to other schools despite such notation." See Dkt. No. 21-2 ("Hradsky Decl.") at ¶ 12. For all these reasons, Defendants argue that "it is entirely speculative and conclusory for Plaintiffs to contend that the presence of that notation on their transcripts will prevent them from transferring[, and] Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of such an effect." See Dkt. No. 21 at 14.

In Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 22 (2008), the Supreme Court stated that its "frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction." Id. at 22 (citations omitted). The Court explained that, "[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the Court's] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Id. (citation omitted); see also Allah v. Piccolo, Case # 16-CV-177-FPG, 2018 WL 2381886, *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 25, 2018) (explaining that "[t]he mere possibility of harm is insufficient to justify granting a preliminary injunction"; rather, "[t]o satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, a movant generally must show that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted' . . . and that the harm is 'not remote and speculative' but rather 'actual and imminent.' . . ." (internal quotation omitted)).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that theyare likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. They have not come forward with any evidence that would support a finding that, if they were to submit an annotated transcript as part of their applications to transfer to another institution, the institution would deny their application because of that notation. In addition, as Defendants point out, there is nothing that prevents Plaintiffs from explaining, if they think it is necessary to do so, what that notation means or the circumstances that caused Defendant University to place that notation on their transcripts.⁴ Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs...