Doe v. The Hill Sch.

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JOHN DOE v. THE HILL SCHOOL

Civil Action No. 23-1210

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

April 10, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Gerald Austin McHugh, United States District Judge.

This is an action brought on behalf of a high school student at a residential boarding school who was required to withdraw as a result of his participation in an encounter with a fellow student that the school deemed to be an incident of bullying. Before that incident occurred, Plaintiff had been identified as a student who had problems with substance abuse, as a result of which he was enrolled in a health and wellness program at the school. He contends that he was wrongly expelled, because his expulsion was influenced in part by conduct related to his substance abuse for which he could not be sanctioned because of his participation in the program. He further contends that his expulsion violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and seeks a temporary restraining order reinstating him to the school. This young man's struggles are unfortunate, and I recognize that his expulsion is a meaningful setback for him, but he has not met the demanding standard for preliminary relief,^[1] and his motion must therefore be denied.

I. Plaintiff cannot show a probability of success on his contract claim.

Once plaintiff was admitted to the Hill School, his parents signed an enrollment contract. Enrollment Contract 2022-2023 School Year, ECF 20-1 at 122. That contract refers to the Hill School Handbook and the rules and regulations that govern student conduct. Id. at 2. Included within the Handbook is a description of a program known as Immediate Care, commonly referred to as I-Care. Student Handbook at 94-96, ECF 20-1 at 102-04. That program provides an option for students to avoid discipline connected to substance abuse by participating in a process of a therapeutic nature designed to divert them from continued self-destructive behavior. Id. It requires a student to enter a contract with certain commitments. Id.; see also I-Care Contract, ECF 20-1 a 127. As part of the consideration for these students' participation, the school agrees to forego discipline for actions related to the students' substance abuse so long as the student complies with program requirements. Student Handbook at 94.

Plaintiff contends that the I-Care program placed limitations on the school's ability to impose discipline, and that he was ultimately expelled only because the school improperly considered conduct related to Doe's substance abuse when sanctioning him for his later conduct. Specifically, before the bullying incident, Doe received a retroactive suspension for a major incident of misconduct and was placed on Conduct Warning, which provided notice that any additional violations could constitute a ground for immediate dismissal. Ariel Baum Decl. at ¶ 16, ECF 20-1 at 2. That sanction was imposed because school officials learned as part of their investigation into drug use on campus that Doe had attempted to assist another student in avoiding a positive test result for drug use by procuring a type of cleansing agent that would purportedly mask usage. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. According to Doe, in the absence of this prior discipline-which he maintains was improperly imposed-he would not have been expelled for his participation in the bullying incident.

This argument suffers from fundamental flaws. First, the enrollment contract sets forth the following, in a separate paragraph in bold italic font:

Under this agreement and the Handbook, the headmaster or his/her designee has the sole discretion to require a student to withdraw, without the need to call for a Discipline Committee meeting, for the student's violation of any major School rule, accumulation of violation of minor School rules, suspected or confirmed criminal activity, and/or being a dangerous, negative, or detrimental influence on the school and/or its community.

Enrollment Contract at 2. Somewhat similar language appears within the Handbook itself. Student Handbook at 68-70. Doe contends that this broad language is limited by the promise of immunity made to students when they enroll in I-Care, and that he relied upon such a promise when he admitted to certain drug-related conduct after his substance abuse was brought to the attention of school authorities. As an initial matter, given the breadth and clarity of this language, any limitations on the Headmaster's discretion stemming from a student's participation in I-Care should be strictly construed according to its terms. For present purposes, Doe can reasonably claim protection for discipline related to his own substance use. The scope of any further immunity rests within the discretion of school officials.^[2]

Second, Doe's argument depends upon an unsupportable premise. Five students were disciplined as a result of the bullying incident: two were suspended and three were expelled. Baum Decl. at ¶¶ 28, 48, 53; Dr. Sylvia Rodriguez Vargas Decl. at ¶¶ 9-14, ECF 20-2 at 2-3. The other two students expelled, like Doe, had a prior disciplinary record. Vargas Decl. at ¶ 14. This leads Doe to conclude that in the absence of the prior suspension he would have been entitled to a lesser penalty. But such an assumption is unfounded, as there is no set formula that governs disciplinary decisions. As a student in a private school, Doe cannot invoke any rights of due process or equal protection unless they are rights conferred by contract. See Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 918-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). Here, under the terms of the enrollment contract and handbook alike, the Headmaster would have had absolute discretion to expel Doe even in the absence of any prior disciplinary record. The incident involved Doe dousing a sleeping classmate with water mixed with protein powered in the middle of the night, with two accomplices videotaping the incident and two watching from the doorway. Baum Decl. at ¶ 28. The Headmaster attested that the determining factor in her decision to require the withdrawal of three of the five students involved was their active role in the bullying incident, as compared to the others present who watched from the doorway. Vargas Decl. at ¶¶ 9, 14; see also Baum Decl. at ¶ 48. And within the subset of those actively involved, Doe had volunteered to throw the water. Baum Decl. at ¶ 28.

Finally, the evidence does not reflect a violation of the School's promises related to I-Care. Specifically, a student who enrolls is told that they will not be subject to discipline for conduct related to their substance abuse. The conduct for which Doe was first suspended did not involve his own usage but stemmed from his attempt to assist another student in circumventing the school's drug testing program. Plaintiff is correct that his participation in this conduct first came to light when Doe gave the school access to text messages on his phone as part of the I-Care enrollment process. But the record is also clear that the school was already aware that someone had delivered a bottle of cleansing agent to the testing room. Baum Decl. at ¶ 12. It was engaged in a wide-ranging investigation involving forty students, and staff separately learned of Doe's involvement in supplying the cleansing agent from other sources. Id. at ¶ 13; Vargas Decl. at ¶ 7. At argument, Doe's counsel summarily contended that once Doe made the admission in connection with his enrollment in I-Care, the school was required to ignore information from any other source. Counsel cited no language from the contract or handbook to support such a proposition, nor any legal authority, and I note that, even in the context of constitutional law, a violation of Fourth Amendment rights is deemed harmless where the same evidence would have inevitably been discovered. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Doe's attempt to help another student evade detection had nothing to do with his own substance abuse and was not therefore covered by the I-Care promise of immunity. And school officials appropriately deemed the risk to fellow students had his efforts been successful to be of grave concern. Baum Decl. at ¶ 14-16.

Nor can it be said that Doe was unaware of the risk presented by virtue of his disciplinary status when he participated in the dormitory bullying. His statement to school officials after the incident reflected his knowledge that any further infraction could be grounds for dismissal. The “but for” chain of events on which he now relies is a retrospective analysis conjured by counsel.

II. Plaintiff cannot show a probability of success on his ADA claim

The ADA is applicable here because Hill constitutes a ...