Doe v. Univ. of Iowa

80 F.4th 891

John DOE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA; Board of Regents, State of Iowa;Tiffani Stevenson Earl, individually and in official capacity; Iris Frost,individually and in official capacity; Lyn Redington, individually and in official capacity;Angie Reams, individually and in official capacity; Constance Schriver Cervantes,individually and in official capacity; John Keller, individually andin official capacity; Monique DiCarlo, individually and in official capacity;Mark Braun, individually and in official capacity, Defendants - AppelleesStop Abusive and Violent Environments, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)

No. 21-3340

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

Submitted: October 19, 2022

Filed: September 14, 2023

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the brief was Rockne Ole Cole, of Ossian, IA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellees and appeared on the brief was Kayla L. Burkhiser Reynolds, AAG, of Des Moines, IA. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellees brief; Christopher Jordan Deist, AAG, of Des Moines, IA.

Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

The University of Iowa expelled graduate student John Doe after investigating two accusations of sexual misconduct brought against him by different complainants. The Iowa Board of Regents affirmed the decision. Doe sued the University and University officials, claiming, in part, discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), and procedural due process violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court¹ granted qualified immunity to the University officials, dismissed the procedural due process claims against them, and granted the University summary judgment on the remaining claims. Doe appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I.

John Doe, who proceeds under pseudonym, was a graduate student at the University of Iowa when he was accused of sexual assault and sexual harassment by Complainant 1 and Complainant 2, both of whom were female undergraduate students at the University at the time. Doe met the Complainants in the Sociology Undergraduate Research Group (SURG) Lab, which was supervised by Professor Michael Lovaglia, Doe's mentor. Doe was the only graduate student in the SURG Lab. Complainant 1, Complainant 2, and Lovaglia testified that Doe had an informal managerial role in the Lab, although Doe disclaimed the title "lab manager."

In October 2016, Complainant 1 told Lovaglia that she and Doe had engaged in sexual activity and that she had asked Doe "to not pursue her anymore." Lovaglia met with Doe to discuss Doe's professionalism and conduct in the SURG Lab.

In February 2017, Complainant 1 told Lovaglia of Doe's repeated inappropriate conduct. She further said that in September 2016 Doe had touched her breast and kissed her without her consent. Lovaglia reported the complaints to Monique DiCarlo, the University's Sexual Misconduct Response Coordinator and Title IX Coordinator, and the University began its investigation that same month.

Another complaint against Doe was also filed in February 2017. Complainant 2 reported that Doe had brought alcohol into the SURG Lab and touched her breast without her consent. Doe received a Notice of Complaint and Investigation and Interim Sanctions for each complaint from Lyn Redington, the University's Assistant Vice President and Dean of Students. Tiffini Stevenson Earle, a compliance specialist in the University's Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, investigated the allegations and found sufficient evidence to charge Doe with violating University policies. In written reports, Stevenson Earle recommended a formal hearing on the charges.

Constance Schriver Cervantes, compliance coordinator in the University's Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, issued Doe a Notice of Formal Hearing, listing the specific charges and policy violations. Iris Frost, a University professor of rhetoric and former prosecutor, was appointed adjudicator of Doe's hearing. Frost found Doe responsible for sexual assault and sexual harassment and filed a written Decision. Redington issued a Notice of Sanctions, informing Doe of his immediate expulsion. Doe appealed, and John Keller, the University's Associate Provost of Graduate Education, upheld the decision. Doe appealed again to the Iowa Board of Regents, which affirmed the University's decision.

Doe sued the University and its officials, alleging, in part, discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), and procedural due process violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court found the University officials entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the procedural due process claims against them. The district court also granted summary judgment to the University on the Title IX claim and the remaining procedural due process claim. Doe appeals.

We review all of Doe's claims on appeal de novo. See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (standard of review for a grant of summary judgment); Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for the grant of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity). "Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). The nonmovant "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009)).

II.

Doe appeals the grant of summary judgment on his Title IX claim. "Title IX provides that '[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.' " Does 1-2 v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 999 F.3d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)); Rossley v. Drake Univ., 979 F.3d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 2020) ("Title IX prohibits federally funded universities from discriminating against students on the basis of sex." (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a))). "Title IX is 'understood to bar[ ] the imposition of university discipline where [sex] is a motivating factor in the decision to discipline.' " Rowles v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 983 F.3d 345, 359 (8th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2016)).

To survive summary judgment on his Title IX claim, Doe had to present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that the University disciplined him on the basis of sex. See Rossley, 979 F.3d at 1192 (first citing Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 667 (7th Cir. 2019); and then citing Doe v. Univ. of Ark.-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858, 864 (8th Cir. 2020)); see also Univ. of Ark.-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d at 864 (clarifying the pleading standard for Title IX claims: a plaintiff "must allege adequately that the University disciplined him on the basis of sex—that is, because he is a male"). Doe argues that he has raised a genuine factual dispute as to whether the University disciplined him because he is a male based on evidence that (1) the adjudicator reached a decision that was against the substantial weight of the evidence; (2) decisionmakers exhibited express anti-male bias; and (3) the University was under outside pressure to bring disciplinary proceedings against him as a male accused of sexual misconduct.

A.

First, Doe argues that we should infer bias in the University's decision because it was rendered against the substantial weight of the evidence.² Doe asserts that Frost omitted material information from her Decision: Lovaglia's testimony that he understood the "sexual behavior" between Doe and Complainant 1 was consensual. But Doe highlights only a limited portion of the relevant testimony. At the hearing, Lovaglia interrupted the questioning "to clarify" that it was his "recollection" that Complainant 1 "conveyed the idea that all of [the] sexual behavior was consensual." But, he continued, he "[a]bsolutely" considered the possibility that the real reason Complainant 1 "did not want to make a complaint against [Doe]" was that she "didn't want to cause any trouble." And Lovaglia was not confident of his own recollection, stating "[he] really hoped [he] did not misunderstand [Complainant 1]." Frost did not find the totality of Lovaglia's observations helpful,³ and Doe fails to explain how this equivocal testimony is "exculpatory."

Doe also asserts that evidence he considers material was omitted as early in the proceedings as Stevenson Earle's initial reports. But Stevenson Earle's investigation spanned three months, culminating in two reports, each over twenty pages, in which she summarized the interviews she conducted and the evidence she gathered. Doe has not explained how Stevenson Earle's choices in winnowing the collected information into usable reports resulted in a decision against the substantial weight of the evidence. Stevenson Earle's reports did not omit material information establishing that either Complainant consented to the sexual conduct with Doe. And nothing in the record suggests that any of the omissions Doe identifies affected...