Doe v. Univ. of Miss.

1

JOHN DOE PLAINTIFF v. UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-201-DPJ-FKB

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division

March 29, 2023

ORDER

DANIEL P. JORDAN III, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This lawsuit is before the Court on Defendants' second motion to dismiss [53]. Plaintiff John Doe has responded in opposition. For the reasons explained, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background

The Court recounted the factual background in another Order [47] and incorporates that opinion by reference. In very general terms, Plaintiff, a Black former medical student at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC), claims he was wrongfully expelled following false accusations of “sexual misconduct” and “unprofessional behavior.” Am. Compl. [51] ¶¶ 3 4.^[1]

Relevant to this motion, Plaintiff addresses three events in his Amended Complaint: (1) a physical encounter with two white male classmates (Sam and Karam), who were purportedly defending a white female student who had complained that Plaintiff sexually harassed her, id. ¶¶ 57-83; (2) Plaintiff's dismissal by the Dean's Council based on charges of unprofessional behavior id. ¶¶ 84-110; and (3) Plaintiff's expulsion on grounds of sexual harassment following a Title IX hearing, id. ¶¶ 121-171. Plaintiff believes his expulsion was “punish[ment] for being a Black man who dated a white woman.” Id. ¶ 36.

Plaintiff pleaded these same accusations in his initial Complaint, and Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that (1) Plaintiff failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and (2) qualified immunity applies to the individual-capacity claims. The Court granted that motion in part but gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Order [47]. Plaintiff complied, and Defendants now seek dismissal of that pleading based on the same grounds. This Order will address first the Rule 8 argument and then qualified immunity as to the individual-capacity claims contained in causes of action one through three.

II. Rule 8

Plaintiff's first Complaint failed to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), but the Court believed he could fix it. It therefore granted leave to amend, noting that “[t]he amended complaint will streamline the pleadings by (1) eliminating the conceded claims and parties; (2) eliminating unnecessary commentary and legal arguments; [and] (3) specifically identifying the facts supporting the remaining counts against the individual defendants.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [51] accomplished some of those goals.

On the positive side, Plaintiff removed the conceded claim (count six), omitted the dismissed parties (University of Mississippi and the Board of Trustees for the Mississippi State Institutions of Higher Learning), and dropped his claims against Defendants Greenwood and Hospodor.^[2] He also omitted some superfluous background information and historical commentary, trimming 30 pages from the original 92-page pleading.

But, as Defendants highlight in their motion, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is still 62 pages long with 286 numbered paragraphs (many with extensive subparagraphs). While the length makes the pleading less clear, it is not the sole issue. As before, Plaintiff often co-mingles the issues and the actors while including too many conclusory statements and tangential factual assertions. This makes it difficult to determine whether plausible claims have been asserted as to the separate defendants and causes of action.

While the Amended Complaint arguably violates at least the spirit of Rule 8-and has made it difficult for the Court to assess Plaintiff's efforts to overcome qualified immunity- dismissing the case would be draconian. District courts “should construe the procedural rules with a preference toward resolving the case on the merits and avoiding any dismissal based on a technicality.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 (requiring the rules to be “construed, administered, and employed by the court . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding” (emphasis added))). Here, the Amended Complaint is undoubtedly long, densely worded, and at times too general as to who did what, but it is an improvement and minimally gives Defendants notice of the claims against them. Where it falls short, it will not survive Rule 12(b)(6). The Court declines to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety under Rule 8.

III. Qualified Immunity

Next, the following Defendants assert qualified immunity as to the individual-capacity claims against them: Gerald Clark, Associate Dean for Student Affairs at UMMC; Loretta Jackson-Williams, Vice Dean at UMMC; Katie McClendon, Lead Title IX Investigator; and Mark Ray, Attorney with UMMC General Counsel's Office (collectively the “Individual Defendants”).

They assert that defense as to the first three causes of action. The First Cause of Action alleges that the Individual Defendants violated Plaintiff's procedural-due-process rights and the second alleges substantive-due-process violations. Those causes of action arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil cause of action against persons who, under color of state law, deprive someone “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” Id. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action alleges that Individual Defendants engaged in race discrimination, thereby violating § 1981 and the equal-protection clause (asserted under § 1983).^[3]

A. Applicable Legal Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the “court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). It follows that “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). “This standard ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary claims or elements.” In re S. Scrap Material Co., 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

2. Qualified Immunity

A qualified-immunity defense protects government officials from individual liability “as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). To do so, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Khan v. Normand, 683 F.3d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).

In considering the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, the Court asks “whether the facts alleged, viewed ‘in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,' establish that ‘the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.'” Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2019)). “[A] plaintiff is required to ‘allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation.'” Jordan v. Wright, No. 3:08-CV-454-TSL-JCS, 2008 WL 4279576, at *3 (S.D.Miss. Sept. 12, 2008) (quoting Cranford v. Payne, No. 1:04-CV-544-LG-JMR, 2006 WL 2701273, at *4 (S.D.Miss. Aug. 23, 2006)).

If the plaintiff meets the burden of showing that a federal violation has been sufficiently pleaded, the Court next considers the second prong of the analysis-whether the right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. As explained by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,

For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Thus, the right must already be clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. When considering whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must ask whether the law so clearly and unambiguously prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the law. To answer that question in the affirmative, we must be able to point to controlling authority-or a robust consensus of persuasive authority-that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree

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