Doe v. Univ. of Mich.

78 F.4th 929

John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN; Board of Regents of the University of Michigan;Pamela Heatlie; Robert Sellers; Martin Philbert; Erik Wessel; Laura Blake Jones;E. Royster Harper; Suzanne McFadden; Paul Robinson, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 22-1654

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

Argued: May 5, 2023

Decided and Filed: August 21, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 2:18-cv-11776—Terrence George Berg, District Judge.

ARGUED: Amanda K. Rice, JONES DAY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Molly Savage, DEBORAH GORDON LAW, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Amanda K. Rice, Stephen J. Cowen, Andrew J. Clopton, JONES DAY, Detroit, Michigan, Joshua W. B. Richards, Patrick F. Nugent, SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Molly Savage, Deborah L. Gordon, Elizabeth Marzotto Taylor, Sarah Gordon Thomas, DEBORAH GORDON LAW, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

On its surface, this appeal concerns an award of attorney fees. It presents, however, issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness that have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. John Doe was an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan ("the University") who was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University's investigation had concluded and before any discipline had been issued, he filed a lawsuit alleging that the University's disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due-process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction enjoining the disciplinary process from moving forward, and the University appealed, arguing that Doe did not have standing to file his lawsuit and therefore the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018), in which we held that the University's disciplinary procedures violated due process, and in light of the University's new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision. The district court granted in part and denied in part the University's motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe's motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal could be heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate in the disciplinary process. We determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the district court's order granting summary judgment. Doe then moved for attorney fees, which the district court granted, and the University appealed once again. We hold that Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript, but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. We further hold that Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due-process claim seeking the release of his transcript. We therefore VACATE the district court's order and REMAND for recalculation of attorney fees.

I. BACKGROUND

When the events precipitating this lawsuit transpired, John Doe was an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan. In March 2018, a fellow student ("the complainant") accused Doe of sexual assault. R. 53 (Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 4) (Page ID #1794). At the time, the University had in place a policy for adjudicating claims of sexual harassment and assault that did not grant accused students a live hearing or permit them to cross-examine their accusers ("the 2018 Policy"). Id. at 3 (Page ID #1793); R. 47-1 (2018 Policy at 23-29) (Page ID #1391-97). Instead, the policy required that an investigator interview both the complainant and the accused student and compile a preliminary report to which both parties could respond. R. 47-1 (2018 Policy at 23) (Page ID #1391). The investigator would then issue a final report containing the investigator's findings. Id. at 29 (Page ID #1397). If the investigator found a policy violation, the Office of Student Conflict Resolution ("OSCR") would then issue a sanction. Id.

A. Investigation & Suit Filed

Doe was notified on April 2, 2018 that he was under investigation. R. 21-1 (McFadden Decl. ¶ 5) (Page ID #386). The investigator first met with the complainant and then invited Doe to interview. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6 (Page ID #386-87). Doe participated in the interview with the investigator, after which the investigator prepared an initial report and shared it with both parties. Doe responded to the initial report with eighty pages of feedback. Id. ¶ 19 (Page ID #389). Beginning on April 19, 2018, the University placed a temporary hold on Doe's student account that prevented him from accessing his transcript while the investigation was pending. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 325 F. Supp. 3d 821, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2018), vacated and remanded by Doe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., Nos. 18-1870, 18-1903, 2019 WL 3501814 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2019). On June 4, 2018, before the investigator issued her final report and before the University issued any discipline, John Doe filed this lawsuit. R. 1 (Compl. at 1) (Page ID #1). He alleged both that he had been denied due process because his transcript had been placed on hold and he was unable to send it to graduate schools to which he had applied and been accepted and also that he was going to be denied due process because his case would be adjudicated without a live hearing or the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant. Id. ¶¶ 92-104 (Page ID #22-24). He alleged that "if he is found to have violated the [2018 Policy] . . . his record will permanently bear that imprimatur," "if [his] disciplinary record and the Appeals Board report are not vacated, he will suffer irreparable harm to his reputation, as well as to his educational and career opportunities," and "[i]f [he] is unable to graduate from the University he will lose his significant investment of time and money in his University education." Id. ¶¶ 88-90 (emphasis added). He also alleged claims of gender discrimination under Title IX and the Michigan anti-discrimination statute. Id. ¶¶ 105-143 (Page ID #24-32).

In his complaint, Doe requested as relief, among other things, (1) "[a]n injunction . . . halting the investigation and decision-making process with regard to the [sexual assault] complaint because the process is unconstitutional and deprives Plaintiff of due process"; (2) "[a]n injunction from this Court prohibiting all Defendants from further use of the [2018 Policy] as to any student because it is unconstitutional and is a deprivation of due process rights"; and (3) "a ruling that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's due process rights were violated." R. 1 (Compl. at 32-33) (Page ID #32-33). On June 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. R. 4 (Mot. for Temporary Restraining Order and Prelim. Inj.) (Page ID #133-62). Plaintiff requested as relief that the court order the University to "immediately releas[e] the 'hold' on Plaintiff's official transcript and graduation credentials; halt[ ] the investigation and process currently under way, which intentionally deprives Plaintiff of due process; and enjoin[ ] Defendants from using, for any student, the [2018 Policy] in any case where credibility is an issue." Id. at 3 (Page ID #135).

On June 11, 2018, the district court held a conference during which it strongly encouraged the University to release the hold on Doe's transcript. R. 20 (6/11/2018 Status Conf. Tr. at 9) (Page ID #279). The University's lawyer explained that they had offered to provide Doe with an academic transcript that included a notation that he was under a disciplinary investigation, which Doe had rejected. Id. at 8 (Page ID #278). The University explained that it issued transcripts in these circumstances with notations because otherwise students might transfer out of or withdraw from the University, depriving the University of its ability to issue sanctions or to complete the investigation. Id. at 9-10 (Page ID #279-80). The district court suggested that Doe agree to participate in the disciplinary process after leaving the University even if he received an unmarked transcript, which he did. Id. The district court then explicitly asked the University's attorney, "[w]ill you recommend to your client that they should agree to [give Doe an unmarked transcript]? I know that you understand the process and I know that you understand what my position is." Id. at 13 (Page ID #283). The University's attorney responded that he would make that recommendation. Id. at 14 (Page ID #284). On June 12, the day after the status conference, the University released Doe's unmarked transcript. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 325 F. Supp. 3d at 825-26 & n.2. On June 14, having heard nothing from the parties, the district court issued an order granting in part Doe's motion for a preliminary injunction and ordering the University to release an unmarked copy of Doe's official transcript, R. 19 (Order Granting in Part Mot. for TRO & PI at 1-2) (Page ID #269-70), which it later said "reflect[ed] the parties' agreement with respect to the transcript." Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 325 F. Supp. 3d at 825-26.

The district court then held a preliminary injunction hearing to consider Doe's broader challenge to the 2018 Policy. R. 29 (Prelim. Inj. Hr'g Tr. at 38-41) (Page ID #702-05). The University argued that because Doe had not yet suffered an injury, he lacked standing to challenge the 2018 Policy or, in the alternative, his claims were unripe. Either way, the University argued, the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Doe's claims. Id.; R. 21 (Resp. to Mot. for TRO/PI at 14-16) (Page ID #323-25). The district court found that Doe's suit was ripe for review, granted the preliminary injunction, and...