Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.

JACOB DOE,¹ Plaintiff, v. VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:19-cv-00249

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

March 19, 2020

By: Elizabeth K. Dillon United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jacob Doe was a student at defendant Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) who alleges that he was wrongfully accused of domestic violence and was unfairly sanctioned by Virginia Tech. Doe has named as defendants Virginia Tech and individual employees of Virginia Tech who were involved in his disciplinary proceedings.² This matter is before the court on defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant in part and deny in part defendants' motions.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Charges and Sanctions Against Doe

Doe alleges that he was falsely accused of assaulting and battering "Jenna Roe" while enrolled as an undergraduate at Virginia Tech. According to Doe, he and Roe engaged in a verbal altercation in December 2017 after which Doe ended their relationship. Roe then accused Doe of criminal assault and battery for pulling earbuds out of Roe's ears during the altercation. She also accused Doe of trespassing because he waited for Roe to return his belongings before leaving her apartment and because he dropped off an apology letter to her. The Montgomery County Commonwealth Attorney dismissed the charges against Doe based in part on information that Roe "had repeatedly physically assaulted Doe during the relationship and was therefore not a credible witness." (Compl. ¶¶ 16-19, Dkt. No. 1.)

Virginia Tech then initiated an investigation into the incident, led by defendant Polidoro. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.) Doe faced seven different charges, including three "relating to sexual assault." (Id. ¶ 28.) However, the notice Doe received regarding the investigation contained no information about the specific incidents, allegations, or potential charges being investigated. (Id. ¶ 21.) Doe alleges that as part of her investigation into the allegations against Doe, Polidoro interviewed at least three of Roe's witnesses but did not interview any witnesses Doe identified. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)

Doe received Polidoro's investigation report on March 23, 2018, and was informed of the charges against him on March 28, 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) His hearing was originally scheduled for April 4, 2018, but was postponed until May 21, 2018, after Doe's mother contacted Virginia Tech staff to voice her concerns about deficiencies in the investigation process. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 37.)

Prior to the hearing, Roe's attorney contacted Doe to threaten him with a violation of a protective order if he attended the hearing. After being informed of this threat, defendant Oaks suggested neither Doe nor Roe appear for the hearing. (Id. ¶ 40.)

On May 21, 2018, Virginia Tech held a hearing concerning Roe's allegations against Doe in which defendants Rose and McCrery served as hearing officers. Doe was ultimately found responsible for domestic violence. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41.)

Doe thereafter appealed the finding against him "on several grounds including that the hearing officers were biased, the standard of proof used in the hearing was wrong, and that he did not receive proper notice of the allegations." (Id. ¶ 46.) His appeal was denied, and Virginia Tech imposed a 1.5-year suspension along with requirements that Doe participate in "mandatory counseling sessions, schedule a mandatory mental health assessment and participate in various educational programs, including one on anger management." (Id. ¶¶ 41-42, 50.)

B. Doe's Complaint Against Roe

During the investigation into Doe's charges, Doe reported twice to Polidoro that he had been a victim of domestic abuse by Roe and had submitted an e-mail describing Roe's alleged abuse. (Id. ¶ 25.) Although Doe provided an informal statement alleging that Roe, who holds a black belt, physically attacked Doe while he was sleeping and hit Doe in front of Doe's roommate, Virginia Tech failed to initiate an investigation. On March 30, 2018, defendant Settle explained that Doe's statement regarding Roe's domestic violence was insufficient to trigger an investigation and that Doe would need to file a formal complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) In April 2018, Doe filed a formal complaint against Roe for domestic abuse. Doe alleges that Virginia Tech opened a "superficial" investigation into his report. As a part of the investigation, Doe alleges that "Polidoro was finally forced to interview Doe's witnesses." (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.)On the same day as Doe's hearing, Virginia Tech held a hearing on Doe's allegations against Roe in which Rose and McCrery again served as hearing officers. Roe was found responsible for "dating violence" and received probation. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.)

Based on the disparities in Virginia Tech's investigations into his and Roe's complaints, and the differences in charges and sanctions resulting therefrom, Doe asserts that Virginia Tech's hearing process is biased against males. Accordingly, his complaint asserts the following claims: violations of his due process rights under the United States and Virginia Constitutions against Virginia Tech and the individual defendants in both their individual and official capacities (Counts One and Two); a violation of Title IX against Virginia Tech (Count Three); breach of contract and breach of duties owed under Virginia's law of associations against Virginia Tech (Counts Four and Five); and a declaratory judgment action against all defendants seeking a declaration that defendants violated his due process rights and sanctioned him unjustly (Count Six).

Defendants seek dismissal of all claims on various grounds. Specifically, they argue that the court lacks jurisdiction over claims against Virginia Tech and its officials pursuant to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and that neither Virginia Tech nor its officials are "persons" subject to liability for Doe's due process claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They further argue that, regardless of whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, Doe has failed to state any claim for which relief may be granted.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

1. Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "the district court is to regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). It must, however, "view[] the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, similar to an evaluation pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Evans, 166 F.3d at 647 (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 945 F.2d at 768).

2. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's allegations must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard "requires the plaintiff to articulate facts, when accepted as true, that 'show' that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to relief, i.e., the 'plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The plausibility standard requires more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In determining whether the plaintiff has met this plausibility standard, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Sec'y of State for Defence v. TrimbleNavigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). Further, it must "draw[] all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor," Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999), but it "need not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or 'unwanted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,'" Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008)).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is premised on a number of grounds. Specifically, defendants argue that neither Virginia Tech nor its officials and employees, in their official capacities, are "person[s]" for the purposes of § 1983 and that defendants are entitled to the protections of sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment with regard to the § 1983 claim and state claims.³

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), the Supreme Court held that neither states nor state officials in their official capacities are persons subject to suit under § 1983. Id. at 71. But see Cobb v. The Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 69 F. Supp. 2d 815, 824 (W.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he 11th Amendment does not prohibit the plaintiffs from suing the individual defendants in their personal capacities." (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991))). It noted the exception, however, that an official is nonetheless a "person" under § 1983 when sued for injunctive relief because "official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State." Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v.Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Doe...