Doe v. Wentzville R-IV Sch. Dist.

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JANE DOE, as Next Friend of Mary Doe, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WENTZVILLE R-IV SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:22-cv-00461-MTS

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

April 14, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MATTHEW T. SCHELP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This case is before the Court on both Defendant Wentzville R-IV School District's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. [84], and Defendant Laurie Berry's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. [86] Plaintiffs Jane and Mary Doe's Second Amended Complaint Doc. [83]. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant Defendant Berry's Motion in its entirety. As for the District's Motion, the Court will grant it in part dismiss the constitutional claims against the District, and deny the District's Motion in all other respects.

I. Background

Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Jane”) is the grandmother and legal guardian of Plaintiff Mary Doe (“Mary”), a seventeen-year-old student with autism and other developmental disabilities. Jane brings this action both on her own behalf and as next friend of Mary. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c). This action largely arises from two instances where Mary had sexual relations while she was, or had been and should have remained, at one of Defendant Wentzville R-IV School District's schools. Because of Mary's developmental disabilities, Plaintiffs allege Mary lacks the capacity to consent to sexual acts, and she, therefore, was raped in the two incidents at issue.^[1] Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Wentzville R-IV School District (the “District”) and Defendant Laurie Berry-the Director and Coordinator for Special Education of the District-committed several actionable statutory, constitutional, and common law claims.

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint brings a total of nine counts-four against the District alone, two against Defendant Berry alone, and three against both Defendants. In the first three counts, Plaintiff Mary Doe alleges federal statutory violations against the District alone. Count One alleges a Violation of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Education Amendment Act of 1972 against the District. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Count Two alleges a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. And Count Three alleges a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 504. Mary brings Count Four and Count Five against both Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with each count alleging a violation of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment via different theories-deliberate indifference and failure to supervise, respectively.

The remaining claims arise under Missouri law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiffs bring Count Six and Count Seven against Defendant Berry. Both Counts assert claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Missouri law, with Count Six being brought by Mary and Count Seven being brought by Jane on her own behalf. In Count Eight, Mary alleges the District violated the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 et seq. Lastly, in Count Nine, Jane raises the derivative claims of medical expenses and loss of society against both Defendants. The District moved to dismiss every Count against it except for Count Eight, which it asks the Court to dismiss in part. Defendant Berry moved to dismiss every Count against her.

II. Standard

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Such a motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court assumes all of a complaint's factual allegations are true and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but the Court “need not accept as true plaintiff's conclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989); Martin v. Iowa, 752 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2014). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege facts supporting each element of the plaintiff's claims, and the claims cannot rest on mere speculation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Specifically, the complaint “must allege more than ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements'” and instead must “allege sufficient facts that, taken as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The plausibility of a complaint turns on whether the facts alleged allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

III. Facts

Plaintiff Mary Doe is a seventeen-year-old student with autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, along with other diagnoses that affect her cognition. Mary's disabilities qualified her for an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), throughout her time in public educational settings. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. In January 2020, Mary transferred from another school district into a middle school within the District. Upon the transfer, Jane met with a representative from the middle school and told the representative that, due to Mary's disabilities, she “absolutely could not be left unmonitored.” Doc. [83] ¶ 24. The representative said she understood.

Mary graduated from the middle school, and, in the fall 2020 semester, Mary began attending Holt High School in the District. Not long into her first semester in high school, Mary, who at that time was fifteen years old, left school premises after her morning classes. Teachers and staff failed to notice and report that Mary was missing, “despite the classroom teachers having routine and mandatory attendance requirements.” Id. ¶ 37. At about 5:00 p.m. that evening, a coach called Jane to inquire about Mary, who had not shown up for an extracurricular activity she was expected to attend. Jane then began “desperately looking for Mary” and, shortly before 6:00 p.m., contacted an officer with the Wentzville Police Department. Id. ¶ 39. The police department located Mary at around 9:30 p.m. at a residence located two miles from Mary's high school. Mary's blouse was on inside-out, her underwear was in her backpack, and she had alcohol on her breath. The next morning, a physician at St. Louis Children's Hospital “confirmed” that a “sexual assault” had occurred. Id. ¶ 42.

Plaintiffs allege that the police department determined the identity of the individual that sexually assaulted Mary; it was another student who also attended Holt High School. Following the rape, Mary “was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder” and “[c]ounseling services were then provided to [her].” Id. ¶ 45. “Between the time of being raped and April of the following year, Jane kept Mary out of attending Holt High School because the boy who raped her was still there.” Id. ¶ 46. Instead, Mary received homebound education until May 2021, when Mary began attending another school in the District, North Point High School.

In November 2021, Jane sent a letter to the assistant principal at North Point High School to inform the assistant principal of Jane's “belie[f] that because of Mary's on-going behavioral problems, the Defendants needed to specifically restrict Mary's access on her school provided [computer] from all means of communicating with other students.” Id. ¶ 50. “The letter pleaded with the [assistant] principal to set up ‘firewalls' to prevent anything from happening.” Id. The Defendants did not restrict Mary's access.

In December 2021, Jane attended an IEP meeting for Mary. Present at the meeting, besides Jane, were Mary's special education teacher, an advocate with a not-for-profit organization known as Family Advocacy and Community Training (“FACT”), and the District's “IEP team.” Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiffs allege that it “was the opinion” of Mary's teacher and “the entire IEP team” that Mary's “continuing poor performance and behavior was the result of the rape.” Id. ¶ 48. In that same meeting, Jane and the FACT advocate “requested, as they had in the past, that a paraeducator be provided to Mary for both her safety and support.” Id. ¶ 49. The Defendants “refused.” Id.

In January 2022, Jane attended another IEP meeting for Mary. The FACT advocate, “the entire IEP team,” and Defendant Berry also were present at the meeting. Id. ¶ 52. In that meeting, Jane and the FACT advocate again asked for a paraeducator to be assigned to Mary. “That request was again denied.” Id. Defendant Berry “addressed the issue of Mary's safety” and “the reason no paraeducator was necessary,” saying: “We've got eyes on [Mary] from the time she gets off the bus until the time she gets back on the bus.” Id. ¶ 53. Plaintiffs allege that “[n]o reason at all existed” for why Mary “had not been provided a paraeducator,” other than a paraeducator “costs money.” Id. ¶ 54.

The day following Mary's annual IEP meeting, “an older student, who was also autistic,” “raped [Mary] in the girls' restroom at North Point...