Doe v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts

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JANE DOE, also known as T.R.S., Plaintiff, v. WYNDHAM HOTELS AND RESORTS, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-01676-DAD-CSK

United States District Court, E.D. California

June 20, 2024

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

(DOC. NOS. 45, 46, 47)

DALE A. DROZD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on three motions to dismiss, one filed by defendant Marriott International Inc. d/b/a Courtyard by Marriott San Jose Campbell (“defendant Marriott”) (Doc. No. 45), one filed by defendants Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (“WHR”), Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. (“DIW”), and Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC (“WHG”) (collectively, “the Wyndham brand defendants”) (Doc. No. 46), and one filed by Vitarag Hospitality, Inc. (“defendant Vitarag”) (Doc. No. 47). All three motions were filed on February 29, 2024, and on March 29, 2024, they were taken under submission on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (Doc. No. 57.) For the reasons explained below, the court will grant in full defendant Vitarag's and the Wyndham brand defendants' motions to dismiss, and will grant in part and deny in part defendant Marriott's motion. Leave to amend will also be granted.

BACKGROUND

On August 11, 2023, plaintiff Jane Doe, also known as T.R.S initiated this action asserting that she suffered harms and losses due to the sex trafficking she allegedly endured at the Days Inn Sacramento Downtown hotel (the “Sacramento Days Inn”) and the Courtyard by Marriott San Jose Campbell hotel (the “Campbell Marriott”) (collectively, the “Subject Hotels”). (Doc. No 1.) On December 29, 2023, defendants Marriott and WHR filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. Nos. 28 32.) On January 11, 2024, plaintiff filed her operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) which rendered moot the motions to dismiss that had been filed in December 2023. (Doc. Nos. 36, 37.)

In her FAC, plaintiff asserts a single cause of action under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1581, et seq., against each of the following defendants: defendant Marriott, the Wyndham brand defendants, defendant Vitarag, defendant SKAVP Enterprises, LP (“defendant SKAVP”), and defendant Campbell HHG Hotel Development, LP (“defendant Campbell HHG”) (collectively, “the defendants”).^[1]

In her FAC, plaintiff alleges as follows. Plaintiff is a resident of Kansas City, Missouri and a victim of sex trafficking. (Doc. No. 36 at ¶¶ 9-10.) On or about August 10 and August 11, 2013, plaintiff was unlawfully trafficked at the Sacramento Days Inn. (Id. at ¶ 37.) The Wyndham brand defendants, defendant Vitarag, and defendant SKAVP owned, operated, and controlled the Sacramento Days Inn. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 19, 21.) Plaintiff's traffickers had in the past routinely used the Sacramento Days Inn for purposes of sex trafficking. (Id. at ¶ 42.) There were obvious signs of plaintiff being trafficked at the Sacramento Days Inn, including the fact that hotel rooms would be paid for in cash or prepaid card, she would be in the hotel with a group of girls and an older female/male, she had few or no personal items, the car used to transport her to that location would be parked in a spot where the license plate was not visible, she would not leave her room, the “Do Not Disturb” sign was constantly on the door to the room being used, and there was a constant heavy foot traffic in and out of her room involving men who were not hotel guests. (Id. at ¶ 45.) These individuals entered and left at unusual hours and were present at the hotel for brief periods of time. (Id.) Further, hotel staff at the Sacramento Days Inn interacted directly with plaintiff's trafficker.^[2] (Id. at ¶ 46.) Hotel staff came to plaintiff's room, looked in the room, and saw evidence of prostitution and drug use, including condoms, lubricant, and illegal drugs. (Id.)

On or about September 4-7, 2013, plaintiff was unlawfully trafficked at the Campbell Marriott. (Id. at ¶ 48.) Defendants Marriott and Campbell HHG owned, operated, and controlled the Campbell Marriott. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 27.) The same obvious signs of plaintiff being trafficked were present at the Campbell Marriott as well. (Id. at ¶ 55.)

At both hotels, plaintiff did not have access to her identification card, which was controlled by her trafficker. (Id. at ¶ 106.) Her trafficker would present plaintiff's identification card when reserving a room in her name. (Id.) Her trafficker was also familiar to the staff at both hotels. (Id. at ¶¶ 158, 168.) Plaintiff and her trafficker would stay for an extended period of time but pay for a room on a day-to-day basis.^[3] (Id. at ¶ 106) Plaintiff had limited access to clothing and would be forced to wear inappropriate clothing. (Id. at ¶ 107.) She appeared malnourished and sleep-deprived, had visible bruises, showed obvious signs of fear and anxiety, also showed obvious signs of disorientation and impairment due to her drugged state, and was frequently yelled at by her trafficker in a way that could be heard by hotel staff. (Id.) Her trafficker was violent with her in public areas of the hotel, and hotel staff saw specific incidents of physical abuse and heard sounds indicating her abuse coming from her room. (Id. at ¶¶ 107, 109.) Plaintiff would decline room service for several consecutive days and would be confined to her room for excessively long periods. (Id. at ¶ 109.)^[4] Her traffickers would order or require her to order excessive additional towels and sheets, and hotel staff would enter her room to find the room littered with condoms, sex paraphernalia, and signs of illegal drug use left behind. (Id.) Hotel staff entered plaintiff's room to find her but did not take any steps to inquire about her wellbeing or to assist her. (Id.) The Franchisee defendants of both hotels also failed to appropriately report suspected trafficking activity to law enforcement authorities. (Id. at ¶ 122.)

The Franchisor defendants monitored the criminal activity occurring in their branded hotels. (Id. at ¶ 75.) They also directly received payments and real-time guest information. (Id. at ¶¶ 129, 141.) Multiple news stories reported sex trafficking at various Days Inn and Marriott properties, and online reviews discussed prostitution and criminal activity at the Subject Hotel locations. (Id. at ¶¶ 79, 81, 86, 88, 101.) Traffickers chose to operate at hotels run by the Franchisor defendants because their policies, practices, and single-minded focus on profitmaximization were known to create a favorable environment for sex trafficking. (Id. at ¶¶ 135, 139, 147, 151.)

Based on these and other allegations in her FAC, plaintiff asserts her single cause of action for sex trafficking under the TVPRA against all of the named defendants. (Id. at 86.) With respect to that cause of action, plaintiff pursues a beneficiary liability theory against all defendants, a perpetrator liability theory against the Franchisee defendants, and a vicarious liability theory against the Franchisor defendants for violations by the Franchisee defendants as both beneficiaries and perpetrators. (Id. at 87-91.)

On February 29, 2024, defendant Marriott, defendant Vitarag, and the Wyndham brand defendants (collectively, “the moving defendants”) each filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's FAC in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. Nos. 45, 46, 47.) On March 14, 2024, plaintiff filed oppositions to those motions. (Doc. Nos. 51, 52, 53.) The moving defendants each filed replies thereto on March 25, 2024. (Doc. Nos. 54, 55, 56.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. StarInt'lv. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

ANALYSIS

The TVPRA makes forced labor and sex trafficking criminal offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1591; see also J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., No. 20-cv-00155-WHO, 2020 WL 6318707, at *3 ...