Doheny v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 17-2168

PATRICK J. DOHENY, JR., an adult individual, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, a government agency; JANET L. DOLAN, an adult individual;KARA N. TEMPLETON, an adult individual; WILLIAM A. KUHAR, JR., an adult individual;TERRENCE EDWARDS, an adult individual; DONALD J. SMITH, an adult individual;WILLIAM J. CRESSLER, an adult individual; PHILIP MURRAY BRICKNELL, an adult individual

No. 17-2168

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Submitted: May 23, 2019

July 23, 2019

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-01744)

District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

May 23, 2019

Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.

OPINION^*

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Patrick J. Doheny, Jr. appeals the District Court's orders granting Defendants' motion to dismiss and granting in part and denying in part his motion for reconsideration. Because the Court soundly exercised its discretion in remanding Count I and correctly dismissed Counts II through IV of Doheny's complaint, we will affirm.

I

A

Doheny was involved in a car accident, resulting in his criminal conviction and sentence for violating two provisions of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. Following his sentence, the Department of Transportation Bureau of Driver Licensing ("PennDOT") sent him two "Official Notice of Suspension" letters, each with a mail date of July 3, 2013, informing him of a one-year suspension of his driver's license. App. 109-14. The letters, signed by then-PennDOT Director Janette Dolan, directed Doheny to surrender his license by August 7, 2013. In addition, the first letter stated that his suspension period, based on a violation of 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3735.1, would begin on August 7, 2013, and the second letter said that his suspension period, based on a violation of 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3802(b), would begin on August 7, 2014. Theletters also advised Doheny of his right to appeal within thirty days of the July 3, 2013 mail date. On August 20, 2013, Doheny received another letter from PennDOT, confirming that he would not be eligible for reinstatement of his operating privileges until August 2015 and describing the reinstatement process.

In September 2013, Plaintiff filed a "petition to file appeal nunc pro tunc" in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, asserting that the suspension notices were deceptive and prevented his timely appeal. App. 33 (capitalization omitted). The court granted Doheny's petition to file an untimely appeal, but ultimately dismissed his appeal challenging the suspension notice on the merits. Doheny appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which held that pursuant to 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1550 and 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5571, the Court of Common Pleas erred in granting Doheny's petition to file an untimely appeal. Doheny v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., No. 2019 C.D.2014, 2015 WL 9393952 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015), amended 2016 WL 1002079 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 17, 2016), pet. for allowance of appeal denied 141 A.3d 436 (Pa. 2016) (Mem.) (per curiam).

B

Doheny sued PennDOT, Dolan, current PennDOT director Kara Templeton, and various PennDOT attorneys¹ in state court. Defendants removed the case to federal court. Doheny filed an amended complaint: (1) seeking declaratory judgments that thetwo-year suspension is void (Count I) and that 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1550 and 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5571 are unconstitutional (Count II); and (2) requesting prospective injunctive relief (Count III) and damages (Count IV) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.²

Defendants moved to dismiss Doheny's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the motion, holding that (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar consideration of Doheny's claims, Doheny v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., Civ. A. No. 16-1744, 2017 WL 1282716, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2017); (2) Defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because Doheny "seeks in Count I a declaration that the Defendant state agency and state official violated state law," id. (emphasis omitted); (3) the thirty-day appeal deadline for a license suspension is constitutional, id. at *5-6; (4) PennDOT is not a person subject to suit under § 1983, id. at *6; (5) PennDOT's attorneys are absolutely immune, id.; and (6) Doheny failed to state a procedural due process claim against Templeton and Dolan because he did not timely invoke the appellate process, and the time period for filing appeals does not violate his due process rights, id. *7.

Doheny moved for reconsideration, which the District Court granted with respect to Count I, remanding that Count to the state court. The Court explained that, even if Defendants had waived Eleventh Amendment immunity, it would decline to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over Count I because it is "grounded entirely in state law and the Court has dismissed with prejudice all federal claims."³ Doheny v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., Civ. A. No. 16-1744, 2017 WL 1493857, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2017). The Court did not reconsider its other rulings. Id.

Plaintiff appeals these orders.

II⁴

A

Doheny is not entitled to a declaratory judgment that his second suspension notice is void ab initio based on state law. This is a state law claim over which a district courtmay exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Here, the District Court acted within its discretion in declining to do so since it "dismissed all claims over which it ha[d] original jurisdiction."⁵ 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009) ("We review a district court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.").

Moreover, even if Count I were not dismissed under § 1367, dismissal would be warranted because Doheny fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Doheny received two one-year suspensions, one pursuant to 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1532(a), and the other pursuant to 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3804(e)(2)(i). Doheny's argument that the two should have merged into a single one-year suspension is meritless. Under Pennsylvania law, the suspension of Doheny's license and driving privileges was a collateral consequence of his criminal convictions, and thus are not subject to the criminal doctrine of merger. Bell v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., 96 A.3d 1005, 1019 (Pa. 2014).⁶ In addition, the language of § 1532(a) shows thatsuspensions are not intended to merge.⁷ Id. Therefore, because the consecutive suspensions are lawful, Doheny is not entitled to declaratory relief stating that his second suspension notice was invalid under state law. For this additional reason, the District Court properly dismissed Count I of the complaint.

B

In Count II, Doheny asserts that, facially or as applied, 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1550(a) and 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5571(b) unconstitutionally deprive individuals like him of a right to seek relief from illegal action by PennDOT. This claim fails.

The statutes do not unconstitutionally restrict a petitioner's ability to challenge license suspensions. The Vehicle Code affords a person "whose operating privilege has been recalled, suspended, revoked or disqualified by [PennDOT] . . . the right to appeal," 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1550(a), if the appeal is "commenced within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken," 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat.Ann. § 5571(b). Thus, the statute provides an adequate period to seek judicial review of a driver's license suspension, and it is facially constitutional.⁸

Doheny's "as applied" challenge, App. 86, also fails because it is actually an effort to have a federal court review the state court order denying his untimely appeal. When a plaintiff sues in federal court after filing suit in state court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a district court from exercising jurisdiction. See ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int'l, 366 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2004). For the doctrine to apply, four requirements must be met: "(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 'complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments'; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments." Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

Here, all four elements are satisfied. First, Doheny lost in his state court proceedings where the Commonwealth Court declined to permit an untimely appeal of his suspensions. Second, Doheny's "as applied" challenge, App. 86, attacks the statecourts for treating PennDOT as a "preferred litigant in statutory appeals" and for failing to credit his argument that his delay in appealing is irrelevant since PennDOT, according to Doheny, never had the jurisdiction to impose consecutive license suspensions in the first place, Appellant's Br. at 35. Therefore, he is complaining of an injury caused by the state court, not by PennDOT's actions or the relevant statutes governing his appellate rights. Third, the Commonwealth Court decision predates this action. Fourth, the relief he seeks would "effectively would reverse a state court decision or void its ruling." Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Therefore, Rooker-Feldman bars a federal court from granting Doheny relief.

For these reasons, the District Court properly dismissed Count II.

C

Doheny's § 1983 claim...