Doherty v. Turner Broad. Sys.

MARTIN DOHERTY, Plaintiff, v. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 1:20-cv-00134 (TNM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

February 1, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Martin Doherty, proceeding pro se, filed a second amended complaint against his former employer, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. ("Turner"). He raises several claims under federal and D.C. law, alleging mainly that Turner submitted false information to the Internal Revenue Service. Turner filed an answer to Doherty's federal-law claim. Before the Court is Turner's motion to dismiss Doherty's remaining D.C. law claims. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion.

I.

A.

Before bringing this suit, Doherty twice sued his previous employer.¹ In the first suit, Doherty filed a ten-count complaint against Cable News Network ("CNN"). See First Am.Compl. ("Doherty I Compl.") at 1, Dougherty v. Cable News Network, No. 17-cv-00769-RC (D.D.C. filed July 7, 2017) ("Doherty I"), ECF No. 10.² As relevant here, Doherty raised claims of discrimination and retaliation under the D.C. Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01, et seq. Doherty I Compl. at 17-20. The claims stemmed from a knee injury that Doherty suffered while working as a photojournalist. Id. at 2. He argued that CNN "discriminated against [him] on the basis of his disability by treating him differently from and less preferably then [sic] similarly situated employees outside of [his] protected class." Id. at 17; see also id. at 20-21 (also raising a claim of age discrimination under the DCHRA). In support of his retaliation claim, Doherty asserted that he "engaged in protected activities" under the DCHRA and Turner subjected him to "adverse employment actions," including his ultimate termination in March 2016. Id. at 2, 20.

In the second suit, Doherty also alleged DCHRA violations. He argued that CNN continued to retaliate against him after his firing. First Am. Compl. ("Doherty II Compl.") at 1, Doherty v. CNN America, Inc., No. 20-cv-00567-RC (D.D.C. filed March 20, 2020) ("Doherty II"), ECF No. 7. He claimed that he "continue[d] to engage in protected activities," including by participating in the Doherty I suit, and was subject to the "adverse employment action[]" of being denied the opportunity to obtain other employment with CNN "despite his more than 50 applications." Id. at 1, 6, 8.

In June 2020, Doherty and CNN filed joint stipulations of dismissal with prejudice in both cases. See Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice ("Doherty I Joint Stipulation"),Doherty I, ECF No. 66; Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice ("Doherty II Joint Stipulation"), Doherty II, ECF No. 16.³

B.

The present litigation began when Doherty sued in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. Turner removed the action here. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. The Court denied Doherty's motion to remand the case to Superior Court and granted Doherty leave to file his first amended complaint. 4/20/2020 Mem. Order at 3, ECF No. 14. Turner's motion to dismiss that complaint was granted in part and denied in part. See 6/22/2020 Mem. Order at 11, ECF No. 20.

Doherty filed a second amended complaint—the operative one here. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 24. He raises claims under 26 U.S.C. § 7434 (Count I), as well as the DCHRA and the D.C. Workers' Compensation Act ("DCWCA"), D.C. Code § 32-1501, et seq. (Count II). Second Am. Compl. at 4-10. Doherty also alleges that Turner has violated § 32-1516(a) of the DCWCA in the way that it has administered its disability program (Count III). Second Am. Compl. at 10-11. His complaint centers on the allegation that Turner "willfully provided the [IRS] with false information returns." Id. at 3.

Turner answered Count I, see Answer, ECF No. 26, but moves to dismiss Counts II and III of Doherty's second amended complaint "for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failureto state a claim," Def.'s Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 25; Def.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mem.") at 5, ECF No. 25-1. The motion is ripe for disposition.⁴

II.

Turner argues that Doherty's claims should be dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Def.'s Mem. at 5. A plaintiff must establish the Court's jurisdiction over his claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The Court "assume[s] the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). In deciding this motion, the Court "may consider materials outside the pleadings." DePolo v. Ciraolo-Klepper, 197 F. Supp. 3d 186, 189 (D.D.C. 2016).

Rule 12(b)(6) places a less onerous standard on plaintiffs than Rule 12(b)(1). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Hurd v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court considers only "the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [it] may take judicial notice." Hurd, 864 F.3d at 678 (cleaned up). The Court treats astrue the complaint's factual allegations and grants the plaintiff "all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." L. Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). The Court need not, however credit "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).

Doherty is proceeding pro se. Thus, his pleadings are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). "But even a pro se complainant must plead 'factual matter' that permits the court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The Court also must consider a pro se complaint "in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss." Brown, 789 F.3d at 152 (cleaned up).

III.

Two counts of Doherty's complaint are the subject of Turner's motion to dismiss: (A) Count II, which raises claims under the DCHRA and DCWCA, and (B) Count III, which alleges a separate violation of the DCWCA. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with Turner that these counts should be dismissed.

A.

In Count II, Doherty raises claims under (1) the DCHRA and (2) the DCWCA. The Court considers each set of claims.

1.

The Court construes Doherty's complaint as raising discrimination and retaliation claims under the DCHRA. See Second Am. Compl. at 8. Turner contends that Doherty's DCHRAclaims should be dismissed on several grounds, including that they are barred by res judicata. See Def.'s Mem. at 21. The Court agrees.

The doctrine of res judicata, also known as "claim preclusion," "holds that a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). When considering whether res judicata applies, the Court considers four elements: "(1) an identity of parties; (2) a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) a final judgment on the merits; and (4) an identity of the cause of action." Tembec Inc. v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140-41 (D.D.C. 2008). All four elements are met here.

First, there is an identity of parties. Turner contends—and Doherty does not appear to dispute—that Turner is in privity with the defendants in the prior lawsuits, CNN and CNN America. See Def.'s Mem. at 17; cf. Peek v. SunTrust Bank, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 201, 205 (D.D.C. 2018) ("two entities [were] in privity with each other" where the first suit was brought against "a wholly-owned subsidiary" of the defendant in the later suit). Second, this Court, which dismissed with prejudice Doherty's prior cases, was a court of competent jurisdiction. Cf. id. at 205 n.3 (finding that the "U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia is clearly a court of competent jurisdiction" and noting that the plaintiff made "no argument to the contrary").

Third, each of the stipulations of dismissal with prejudice in Doherty's two prior suits constitutes a final judgment on the merits. See, e.g., Burns v. Fincke, 197 F.2d 165, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ("Since the stipulation provides for dismissal with prejudice, the first action is res judicata of the matters covered by the cause of action and counterclaim therein."); Citibank v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a district court'sorder dismissing a complaint "with prejudice, entered by stipulation of the parties," constitutes "a final judgment on the merits" (cleaned up)). Thus, those stipulations "bar[] future suits based on the same cause[s] of action." Tembec, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 141.

Fourth, there is an identity of the causes of action between this case and Doherty's prior cases. Doherty gives more content to his DCHRA claims in his opposition. There, he references his "work injury" and explains that "disability is a protected trait." Pl.'s Opp'n to Partial Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 12, ECF No. 28. For support, he states that Turner denied two "ADA request[s]" and "retaliated against him by not letting him...