Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ.

873 F.Supp.2d 460

DONGGUK UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff,

v.YALE UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

Case No. 08–cv–0441 (TLM).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

June 8, 2012.

Andrea M. Alegrett, Andrew B. Kratenstein, Audrey Lu, Jun Yung Bae, Robert A. Weiner, McDermott, Will & Emery, LLP, New York, NY, Ira B. Grudberg, Ira B. Grudberg, LLC, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.

Felix J. Springer, Jeffrey Mueller, Day Pitney LLP, Hartford, CT, Howard Fetner, Day Pitney LLP, New Haven, CT, for Defendant.

RULING

TUCKER L. MELANÇON, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant Yale University's Motion for Reconsideration [Rec. Doc. 329] of the Court's February 10, 2012 Ruling, 2012 WL 441250 [Rec. Doc. 324] on its Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff Dongguk University's Memorandum in Opposition thereto [Rec. Doc. 332], and the parties' supplemental memoranda of law [Rec. Docs. 346, 347, 350, 351, 353, and 354] filed pursuant to the Court's April 2, 2012 order [Rec. Doc. 343]. For the reasons that follow, Yale's Motion for Reconsideration will be GRANTED and Dongguk's remaining claims will be dismissed in their entirety.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 1, 2011, Yale moved for summary judgment on all of Dongguk's claims [Rec. Doc. 249]. After reviewing the parties' summary judgment papers and the combined 359 exhibits consisting of approximately 3,000 pages, on February 10, 2012 the Court issued its ruling [Rec. Doc. 324] (the “Summary Judgment Ruling”) granting in part and denying in part Yale's Motion for Summary Judgment. In the Summary Judgment Ruling, the Court granted Yale's motion as to: (1) plaintiff Dongguk University's reckless and wanton conduct claim (Summary Judgment Ruling at 10–11); (2) the portion of Dongguk's defamation claim that sought “non-economic” damages (Summary Judgment Ruling at 11–22); and (3) the portion of Dongguk's negligence claim that was based on the incorrect statements Yale published to third persons (Summary Judgment Ruling at 22–23). The Court denied Yale's motion as to: (1) the portion of Dongguk's defamation claim that sought “economic” damages (Summary Judgment Ruling at 11–22) and (2) the portion of Dongguk's negligence claim that was based on Yale's inaccurate statements made directly to Dongguk and Yale's failure to timely correct those inaccuracies (Summary Judgment Ruling at 23–28).

On February 17, 2012, Yale moved for reconsideration [Rec. Doc. 329] of the Summary Judgment Ruling, seeking dismissal of Dongguk's defamation and negligence claims in their entirety. Shortly after conducting a telephone conference with the attorneys on March 26, 2012 [Rec. Doc. 338], the Court issued a one-page ruling [Rec. Doc. 339] on Yale's motion stating, inter alia, that it would, in due course, issue written reasons for its ruling. In its March 26, 2012 ruling, the Court granted the motion with respect to Dongguk's claim for defamation damages arising from the alleged loss of grants and the denial of its application to open a law school, and with respect to Dongguk's negligence claim in its entirety. The Court denied the motion in all other respects.

By order dated April 2, 2012 [Rec. Doc. 343], after conducting a telephone conference with the attorneys [Rec. Doc. 342], the Court vacated its March 26, 2012 ruling on the motion. The April 2, 2012 order stated, inter alia, that:

In drafting its written reasons for the March 26, 2012 Ruling and reviewing what the Court perceives to be controlling jurisprudence, some cited by the attorneys for the parties, some not, which requires closer scrutiny, the presiding Judge is left with the definite and firm view that the Court's March 26, 2012 Ruling on defendant's Motion for Reconsideration must be vacated. [Rec. Doc. 343 at 1].

The April 2, 2012 order also set a schedule for additional briefing on issues raised in Yale's motion, and set an on the record hearing for April 25–26, 2012.

On April 19, 2012, the Court conducted a telephone conference [Rec. Doc. 355] with the attorneys, during which the attorneys were advised that based on their submissions pursuant to the April 2, 2012 order and the Court's own research, a hearing was not necessary. Thereafter, the Court entered an order [Rec. Doc. 356] canceling the April 25–26, 2012 hearing and upsetting the June 4, 2012 trial.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995). “[T]he function of a motion for reconsideration is to present the court with an opportunity to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to consider newly discovered evidence.” LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 822 F.Supp. 870, 876–77 (D.Conn.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DONGGUK'S DEFAMATION CLAIM

In the seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a public official cannot prevail in a defamation suit unless he establishes, with “convincing clarity,” that the defendant published a defamatory statement with actual malice—that is, with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 376 U.S. at 279–80, 285–86, 84 S.Ct. 710.¹ A speaker acts with reckless disregard of the falsity of his statement if he “entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of his statement, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968), or if he possessed a “high degree of awareness of [his statement's] probable falsity.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). A failure to investigate by itself is not enough to prove actual malice unless that failure to investigate amounted to “a purposeful avoidance of the truth.” Harte–Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 693, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). A defendant's refusal to admit his allegedly defamatory statement was inaccurate “does not establish that he realized the inaccuracy at the time of publication.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984).

Under Connecticut law, each allegedly defamatory statement is a separate cause of action. Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 267 Conn. 210, 217, 837 A.2d 759 (2004). Thus, to prevail with respect to a given statement in a defamation suit, a public-official or public-figure plaintiff must prove that the statement in question was made with actual malice and must also prove the other elements of a defamation claim with respect to the statement. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 794 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“But defamation plaintiffs cannot show actual malice in the abstract; they must demonstrate actual malice in conjunction with a false defamatory statement.”); see also Cweklinsky, 267 Conn. at 217, 837 A.2d 759.

Moreover, when the defendant is an organization, a plaintiff must prove that a particular agent or employee of the defendant acted with actual malice at the time that agent or employee participated in the publication of the statement in question; an organizational defendant is not charged with the collective knowledge of all its agents and employees for purposes of the actual malice inquiry. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287, 84 S.Ct. 710 (holding that “the state of mind required for actual malice [has] to be brought home to the persons in the [defendant's] organization having responsibility for the publication of the advertisement”); Holbrook v. Harman Automotive, Inc., 58 F.3d 222, 225 (6th Cir.1995) (“Because Loepp was the [defendant-corporation's] employee responsible for the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements, we focus solely on his state of mind.”).

The “convincing clarity” by which Sullivan held actual malice must be proved was subsequently interpreted to be synonymous with the more familiar “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof. DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.2005). Clear and convincing evidence is “a more exacting standard” than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 672 (2d Cir.2001). To satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard, it is not enough that the thing to be proved is more probable than not. Rather, there must be “evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” Ragbir v. Holder, 389 Fed.Appx. 80, 84–85 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted; emphasis added).

A. Actual Malice Inquiry: Publication Responsibility

At the summary judgment stage of a defamation suit involving a public-official or public-figure plaintiff, a court must first address, based on the record before it, applying the appropriate standard of proof, the threshold issue of which of the defendant's agent(s) or employee(s) was(were) “responsible” for the allegedly defamatory publication. In the Summary Judgment Ruling, applying the default preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, the Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Susan Carney—Yale's Deputy General Counsel—“approved and/or offered input into” the allegedly defamatory statements published by Gila Reinstein, Associate Director of Yale's Public Affairs Office. (Summary Judgment Ruling at 18). Yale asserts that Dongguk's burden of proof as to this threshold issue is by clear and convincing evidence [Rec. Doc. 346 at 1–2]. Dongguk contends that its burden of proof is by a mere preponderance of the evidence [Rec. Doc. 347 at 1–2]. Yale cites two cases in support of its position, which in turn cite Sullivan for their holdings. Speer v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 828 F.2d 475, 476 (8th Cir.1987)...