Dongxiao Yue v. Trigmax Sols.

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DONGXIAO YUE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TRIGMAX SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

A167577

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fifth Division

August 29, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC1601118

JACKSON, P. J.

Dongxiao Yue appeals from an order dismissing defendants Trigmax Solutions, LLC (Trigmax), Muye Liu (Liu), and Yeyeclub.com for failure to bring the action to trial within the mandatory five-year period. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310.)^[1] The question presented is whether an oral stipulation to continue the trial date made in open court and entered into the minutes of the court is an agreement to extend the five-year deadline when the stipulated continued trial date is later determined to be beyond the five-year statutory period. The answer is yes. We reverse the dismissal order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 13, 2016, Yue filed a complaint in Contra Costa Superior Court against Trigmax, Yeyeclub.com, Liu, and Wenbin Yang alleging causes of action for unfair competition and defamation. Defendants Liu and Trigmax filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.16), which was partially denied. Liu and Trigmax appealed from the partial denial of their anti-SLAPP motion, and we affirmed the ruling in an unpublished decision. (Yue v. Trigmax Solutions LLC (Apr. 30, 2018, A151067).) The remittitur issued on July 13 2018. Codefendant Yang, who lives in Canada, filed a motion to quash service of summons and complaint, arguing a lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted his motion and Yue filed a separate appeal. The first scheduled trial date was February 8, 2021. The remaining parties appeared remotely for the bench trial. The trial judge continued the trial until March 8, 2021, due to the need to review the voluminous records submitted by the parties.

On March 8, 2021, counsel for defendants Trigmax, Liu and Yeyeclub.com (defense counsel) informed the trial court that this court had filed its decision reversing the trial court's order granting codefendant Yang's motion to quash service of summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Yue v. Yang (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 539.) The trial court did not go forward with the trial. On November 12, 2021, the trial court scheduled a bench trial for November 7, 2022, and an issue conference for October 12 2022.

The minute order for the October 12, 2022, issue conference states that defense counsel appeared remotely and was admonished by the court that all parties were ordered to appear live in the courtroom for issue conferences. Defense counsel informed the court that he was unable to travel because of a recent death in his immediate family. The court offered condolences and stated it "believes there is good cause to continue the 11/7/22 trial. The court is concerned about the 5 year rule for this 2016 case and asks [plaintiff] if he has calculated the dates. Mr. Yue responds the case was in the Court of Appeal for about a year and may have until April 2023. [¶] The court makes it clear the responsibility lies with [plaintiff] to calculate the 5 year deadline. Setting the case outside the 5 year rule could prove fatal. [Plaintiff] may stipulate with defendants to continue the matter but, if not stipped to, the burden is entirely on [plaintiff] to calculate the date. [¶] Counsel Mr. Pohl^[2] states he will stipulate to a 6 month continuance of the trial date." The trial court then scheduled an issue conference for February 24, 2023, and a trial for March 27, 2023.

On March 6, 2023, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss for failure to bring the case to trial within five years, as required by section 583.310. The motion calculated the five-year period beginning with the filing of the complaint on June 16, 2016. Applying California Rules of Court, emergency rule 10's six-month extension of the statutory five-year period,^[3] the defendants calculated five years six months from June 16, 2016, to be December 13, 2021. They argued that the statutory period was tolled while the case was stayed during the appeal of the anti-SLAPP ruling, from April 7, 2017, to July 13, 2018, a period of 462 days. The defendants concluded the statutory deadline to bring the case to trial was March 20, 2023.

The defendants' motion was originally calendared for April 27, 2023, but at a March 16, 2023 ex parte hearing the trial court rescheduled the hearing for March 27, 2023, which coincided with the trial date. Yue filed his opposition on March 21, 2023. He argued the motion was untimely because it was not served and filed 16 days before the March 27, 2023, hearing as required by sections 1005 and 1010 and California Rules of Court, rule 2.250. Yue opposed the motion on the merits on multiple grounds, including that the defendants stipulated to continue the trial to March 27, 2023; they were estopped from seeking dismissal; and multiple additional tolling periods applied which extended the statutory deadline to December 14, 2023.

The trial court heard the motion on March 27, 2023. There is no reporter's transcript in the appellate record; however, the minute order states that following argument the trial court orally stated that the motion as to defendants Trigmax and Liu was granted and that a written decision was forthcoming. On April 3, 2023, the trial court issued an amended order granting the motion and explaining its reasoning.^[4] The amended order deemed the motion timely and found that Yue had sufficient time to file an opposition and prepare for the hearing. As to the merits, the trial court found that there was no stipulation to extend the five-year period. The order states that defense counsel's agreement entered into the October 12, 2022, minute order was an agreement "to a continuance of the trial date only. There is no convincing evidence that the parties agreed to an extension of the 5-year period in open court." The trial court found that the only appliable tolling period was the 463 days from April 7, 2017, to July 13, 2018, while Trigmax and Liu's appeal of the partial denial of their anti-SLAPP motion was pending. The court rejected Yue's arguments under section 583.340 that multiple other periods should also toll the five-year deadline because it was impossible, impracticable or futile to proceed. The trial court concluded that the statutory deadline for bringing the case to trial was March 21, 2023, which is five years six months from the filing of the June 13, 2016 complaint, plus 463 days during which the anti-SLAPP appeal was pending.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Principles

"An action must be brought to trial within five years after it is commenced. (§ 583.310.) If this deadline is not met, the action 'shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of the defendant, after notice to the parties ....' (§ 583.360, subd. (a).) 'The requirements of this article are mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.' (§ 583.360, subd. (b).)" (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1089-1090.)

Section 583.330 provides that the parties may extend the five-year period by written stipulation or "[b]y oral agreement made in open court, if entered in the minutes of the court or a transcript is made." (§ 583.330.) A written agreement to extend the trial date to a specific date beyond the five-year period necessarily waives the right of dismissal under the five-year statute through the stipulated trial date. (Munoz v. City of Tracy (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 354, 360 (Munoz).) Similarly, an oral stipulation under subdivision (b) of section 583.330 to continue trial to a specific date beyond the five-year statutory deadline constitutes an agreement to extend the statutory deadline. (Nunn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 346, 356-357 (Nunn) [interpreting oral agreement prong of § 583.330 to be consistent with its written stipulation counterpart and holding that "[b]y explicitly agreeing to the January trial date, the parties implicitly agreed to extend the statutory period to January 13, 2020"].)

Section 583.340 provides for periods of tolling of the statutory period when "(a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended[;] [¶] Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined[; or] [¶] (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile."

We review a trial court's determination of whether prosecution was impossible, impracticable, or futile for abuse of discretion. (Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1271.) Under this standard,"' "[t]he trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious." '" (Nunn, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 354.) We independently review the trial court's interpretation of stipulations unless the interpretation depends on resolution of factual questions regarding the credibility of extrinsic evidence. (Munoz supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) We also independently review the trial court's construction of the applicable statutes. (Nunn, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 354.) Finally, "[o]ur consideration of whether a stipulation extends the five-year limit under section 583.330 is guided by section 583.130, which states that 'the policy favoring the right of parties to make stipulations in their own interests and the policy favoring trial or other disposition of an action on the merits are generally to be preferred over the policy that requires dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable...