Doors Acquisition, LLC v. Rockford Structures Constr. Co.

39 N.E.3d 8

DOORS ACQUISITION, LLC, as Assignee of ARC One, LLC, Plaintiff

v.ROCKFORD STRUCTURES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; Nu–Con Construction Company ; Fred Lenz, d/b/a Lenz Decorators ; Rock Valley Glass Of Rockford, Inc. ; City Wide Insulation Inc. ; and Unknown Owners and Nonrecord Claimants, Defendants (District Council No. 30 of the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO, Plaintiff–Appellee; Norman J. Weitzel, Defendant–Appellant).

No. 2–12–0052.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

March 8, 2013.

Donald Q. Manning, McGreevy Williams P.C., Rockford, for appellant.

Raphael E. Yalden II, Craig A. Willette, Yalden, Olsen & Willette, Rockford, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In 2006, defendant, Norman J. Weitzel, contracted with Rockford Structures Construction Company (Rockford Structures) to build a hotel in Rockford. As the general contractor, Rockford Structures retained D & P Chicago, Inc. (D & P), as a subcontractor to supply, install, and finish drywall in connection with the project. After Rockford Structures terminated D & P, plaintiff, District Council No. 30 of the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO (the union), filed a subcontractor mechanics lien on the property pursuant to the Mechanics Lien Act (the Act) (770 ILCS 60/1 et seq. (West 2008)). The lien resulted from union members not being paid wages and the union not receiving benefit contributions. Weitzel countered that on January 10, 2008, Rockford Structures furnished a contractor's sworn statement averring that D & P had been paid in full for its work on the project.

¶ 2 Thereafter, the trial court entered an order finding that payment in full to D & P did not invalidate the union's mechanics lien and ordering Weitzel to pay the union $32,619.90, plus interest and costs, within 30 days or be subject to a judgment of foreclosure. Weitzel timely appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

¶ 3 I. Background

¶ 4 The parties' stipulated facts reflect that Rockford Structures was the general contractor pursuant to a contract with Weitzel to build a hotel. In May 2007, Rockford Structures retained D & P to supply, install, and furnish drywall for the project. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, D & P employed union members who performed covered work and made improvements to the property.

¶ 5 In November 2007, Rockford Structures terminated its contract with D & P. However, D & P failed to pay $6,591.30 in wages to five union members who performed work on the project, and it failed to pay $17,003.98 in benefits to the union's benefit funds for covered work. The unpaid wages and benefit funds related to work performed from August 2007 through November 9, 2007.

¶ 6 On January 10, 2008, Rockford Structures provided a sworn statement to Weitzel. The sworn statement specified that “the following are names of all parties who have furnished material or labor * * * and the amount due or to become due to each.” Line 15b of the sworn statement specified that D & P had been paid $130,398.34, no further balance remained due to D & P, and D & P was “100%” complete. The union workers were not separately listed in the sworn statement.

¶ 7 On March 6, 2008, the union filed its subcontractors mechanics lien pursuant to the Act. The lien claimed that the union was owed a credit of $23,595.28 for work performed by its members, in addition to interest and attorney fees. The union served the lien on Weitzel, Rockford Structures, and D & P. When he received notice of the lien, Weitzel was not aware that D & P had failed to make wage and benefit payments under its collective bargaining agreement with the union. After receiving notice of the lien, Weitzel made payments to Rockford Structures and other subcontractors who worked on the project.

¶ 8 On November 11, 2008, the union filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of the mechanics lien. The union also brought a claim of unjust enrichment. On December 21, 2011, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order finding that the union had a valid lien and ordering Weitzel to pay $32,619.90, plus $289.76 in costs, within 30 days. The order provided that, if Weitzel failed to pay the union within 30 days, the sheriff would execute a judgment of foreclosure. The order further provided that it was a “final order and that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement of this [j]udgment or appeal therefrom.” Weitzel timely appealed.

¶ 9 II. Discussion

¶ 10 The only issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly held that, under the Act, the union was entitled to a lien on the property. Weitzel argues that, because D & P had been paid in full when Weitzel received notice of the union's lien, the union could not recover an amount beyond what was owed to its immediate contractor. The union counters that, pursuant to the Act, the only limitation placed on a subcontractor mechanics lien is the contract price between the owner and the general contractor, in this case the contract price between Weitzel and Rockford Structures.

¶ 11 Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the Act. 770 ILCS 60/1 et seq. (West 2010). The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. Gardner v. Mullins, 234 Ill.2d 503, 511, 334 Ill.Dec. 617, 917 N.E.2d 443 (2009). The statute “ ‘should be read as a whole with all relevant parts considered.’ ” Id. (citing Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill.2d 178, 189, 149 Ill.Dec. 286, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990) ). If the statutory language is clear, a reviewing court does not need to resort to extrinsic aids of construction, such as legislative history. Northern Kane Educational Corp. v. Cambridge Lakes Education Ass'n, 394 Ill.App.3d 755, 758, 333 Ill.Dec. 474, 914 N.E.2d 1286 (2009). In such a situation, a court may not depart from the plain language of the statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are inconsistent with the express legislative intent. Landheer v. Landheer, 383 Ill.App.3d 317, 321, 322 Ill.Dec. 684, 891 N.E.2d 975 (2008). Nonetheless, when reviewing a statute, we also consider the subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting the statute, while presuming that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Fisher v. Waldrop, 221 Ill.2d 102, 112, 302 Ill.Dec. 542, 849 N.E.2d 334 (2006). The construction of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill.2d 485, 510–11, 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101 (2007).

¶ 12 The Act “aims to ‘protect those who in good faith furnish material or labor for construction of buildings or public improvements.’ ” LaSalle Bank National Ass'n v. Cypress Creek 1, LP, 242 Ill.2d 231, 243, 351 Ill.Dec. 281, 950 N.E.2d 1109 (2011) (quoting Lawn Manor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Hukvari, 78 Ill.App.3d 531, 532, 33 Ill.Dec. 914, 397 N.E.2d 247 (1979) ). Toward that end, section 5 of the Act provides:

“(a) It shall be the duty of the contractor to give the owner, and the duty of the owner to require of the contractor * * * a statement in writing, under oath or verified by affidavit, of the names and addresses of all parties furnishing labor, services, material, fixtures, apparatus or machinery * * * and of the amounts due or to become due to each.” 770 ILCS 60/5 (West 2010).

Section 21(a) of the Act defines subcontractors and provides that, subject to section 5, subcontractors “shall have a lien for the value [of the services provided], with interest on such amount * * *, on the same property as provided for the contractor * * * [and] on the moneys or other considerations due or to become due from the owner under the original contract.” 770 ILCS 60/21(a) (West 2010). Section 24 of the Act further provides:

“[Subcontractors] or parties furnishing labor * * * may at any time after making his or her contract with the contractor, and shall within 90 days after the completion thereof, * * * cause a written notice of his or her claim and the amount due or to become due thereunder * * *.” 770 ILCS 60/24 (West 2010).

Finally, section 27 outlines the preferences after an owner receives a lien, providing:

“When the owner or his agent is notified as provided in this Act, he shall retain from any money due or to become due the contractor, an amount sufficient to pay all demands that are or will become due such sub-contractor * * *.” 770 ILCS 60/27 (West 2010).

¶ 13 Our supreme court recently addressed a claim by a subcontractor under the Act. In Weather–Tite, Inc. v. University of St. Francis, 233 Ill.2d 385, 330 Ill.Dec. 808, 909 N.E.2d 830 (2009), the university hired a general contractor for the renovation of a residence hall, and the general contractor entered into a contract with a subcontractor, Excel, to provide electrical labor, materials, and services. Id. at 388, 330 Ill.Dec. 808, 909 N.E.2d 830. On five separate occasions, the general contractor furnished the university a section 5 sworn statement requesting payment from the university, and each statement listed Excel as a subcontractor and the amount due to Excel. Id. After receipt of the first four statements, the university paid the general contractor, which in turn paid Excel the amounts listed in the statement. Id. After the fifth statement, however, the general contractor's bank applied part of the university's payment to an outstanding debt owed by the general contractor. As a result, Excel did not receive its final payment. Id. Thereafter, Excel filed a subcontractor mechanics lien against the university for its work on the project. Id.

¶ 14 The supreme court concluded that Excel was entitled to enforce its mechanics lien. Id. at 395, 330...