Doran 610 Apartments, LLC v. State

Doran 610 Apartments, LLC, et al., Appellants, v. State of Minnesota by and through its Governor Tim Walz, Attorney General Keith Ellison and Executive Council, et al., Respondents.

No. A21-0869

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

March 14, 2022

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-21-1081

Jack Y. Perry, Jason R. Asmus, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Liz Kramer, Solicitor General Thomas S. Madison, Michael Goodwin, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Slieter Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

KIRK JUDGE ^[*]

Appellant-landlords challenge the district court's dismissal under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) of their petition for a writ of mandamus and their complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that the district court erred in determining that (1) respondent Minnesota Executive Council is not a legal entity subject to suit, and (2) the governor's emergency executive orders, which temporarily limited the ability of residential landlords to evict tenants in specified circumstances, do not constitute a "commandeering" of private properties. Because Minnesota Statutes chapter 9 does not provide authority for the Executive Council to sue or be sued and because the governor does not "commandeer" property within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 12.34, subd. 1(2) (2020), of the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996 (MEMA) by issuing executive orders during a peacetime emergency that impose a temporary moratorium on eviction actions, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellants are the owners of residential apartment buildings in Hennepin County, Minnesota. Respondents are the State of Minnesota, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, and the Executive Council. At issue in this case are the several COVID-19-related executive orders that limit landlords from evicting tenants from residential properties: Executive Orders 20-14, 20-73, and 20-79 (the Orders).^[1] On January 27, 2021, appellants brought claims before the district court for a writ of mandamus, or alternatively, a declaratory judgment that the governor, by way of the Orders, commandeered appellants' "right to repossess their residential rental properties for their tenants' non-payment of rents or the expiration of their leases for the duration of the Orders" under Minn. Stat. § 12.34, subd. 1(2). Respondents moved to dismiss the Executive Council on the basis that it is not a legal entity subject to suit and moved to dismiss the petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, contending that appellants' properties had not been commandeered. Appellants moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that they are entitled to just compensation under Minn. Stat. § 12.34, subd. 2 (2020) because no genuine issue of material fact exists about whether their properties were commandeered by the Orders.

The district court granted respondents' motion to dismiss both the Executive Council and the petition. It ruled that, as a matter of law, the Orders did not constitute the compensable commandeering of appellants' properties under Minn. Stat. § 12.34, subd. 1(2).

Appellants sought review of the district court's dismissal. Appellants also filed a petition for accelerated review (PAR) by the Minnesota Supreme Court and filed a motion to consolidate this case with a petition for further review (PFR) in Buzzell v. Walz, 962 N.W.2d 894 (Minn.App. 2021), rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 21, 2021). The Minnesota Supreme Court denied appellants' PAR and the motion to consolidate this appeal with Buzzell, which is now pending in the Minnesota Supreme Court.

DECISION

We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e). Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc. 834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013). "In doing so, we consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true." Id. (quotation omitted). We also apply a de novo standard of review to issues involving statutory interpretation. White Bear Lake Restoration Ass'n ex rel. State v. Minn. Dep't of Nat. Res., 946 N.W.2d 373, 379 (Minn. 2020).

I. The Minnesota Executive Council is not an entity subject to suit.

Appellants challenge the district court's dismissal of the Executive Council from this suit. To sue or be sued, a party must be a legal entity. Galob v. Sanborn, 160 N.W.2d 262, 265 (Minn. 1968). State entities "are creatures of statute and they have only those powers given to them by the legislature." In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010).

The enabling statute creating a state entity must provide the entity the ability to sue or be sued in its own name. See Galob, 160 N.W.2d at 265 (stating that court lacked power to make division of municipality an entity capable of suing or being sued absent statutory authorization); see also, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 216A.09 (2020) (providing that the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission may sue or be sued in its own name).

Minnesota Statutes chapter 9, which establishes the Minnesota Executive Council, provides no express authority for the Executive Council to sue or be sued. See Minn. Stat. §§ 9.011 to 9.071 (2020) (providing the members, duties, and powers of the council). And appellant has failed to identify any other provisions that convince this court the Executive Council has that authority. Because the enabling legislation pursuant to which the Executive Council was established does not make it a legal entity that can be sued, the dismissal of the Executive Council is affirmed.

II. The COVID-19-related Executive Orders that temporarily limited the ability of residential landlords to evict tenants in specified circumstances do not constitute a commandeering of private properties under Minn. Stat. § 12.34, subd. 1(2).

Appellants assert that they are entitled to just compensation because the governor, by way of the Orders, commandeered their properties within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 12.34, subd. 1(2).^[2] As such, the issue before this court is whether the Orders facilitated a "commandeering" under MEMA, which is an issue of statutory interpretation.

The goal of statutory interpretation is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Binkley v. Allina Health Sys., 877 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2014)). "In interpreting statutes, we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning." Id. (quotation omitted). "When legislative intent is clear from the statute's plain and unambiguous language, [appellate courts] interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to other principles of statutory interpretation." Id. (quotation omitted). But "[i]f a statute is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous and [appellate courts] may resort to the canons of construction or legislative history in order to determine the intent of the [l]egislature." Id. at 550-51.

In relevant part, Minn. Stat. § 12.34 of the MEMA provides:

Subdivision 1. Emergency Powers. When necessary to save life, property, or the environment during a national security emergency or during a peacetime emergency, the governor . . . may: [. . .]

(2) commandeer, for emergency management purposes as directed by any of the persons described above, any motor vehicles, tools, appliances, medical supplies, or other personal property and any facilities.

Subd. 2. Compensation. The owner of commandeered property must be promptly paid just compensation for its use and all damages done to the property while so used for emergency management purposes. The governor . . . according to the use of the property, shall make a formal order determining the amount of compensation.

"Commandeer" is not defined in MEMA. In ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute, we may look to dictionary definitions when the statute does not define a term. State v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 2019). The word "commandeer" generally means "to seize for military or police use; confiscate," "to take arbitrarily or by force," or "to force into military service." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 370 (5th ed. 2018); see also Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 248 (11th ed. 2014) (defining "commandeer" as "to compel to perform military service," "to seize for military purposes," or "to take arbitrary or forcible possession of"). These definitions demonstrate four fundamental aspects of the term "commandeer": (1) direct action; (2) through force or seizure; (3) of private property; and (4) with control or possession.

For appellants to state a claim that respondents commandeered appellants' residential properties here, appellants must allege that respondents directed action to seize the appellants' property and respondents had control and possession of the seized property for emergency management purposes. But those are not the circumstances described in appellants' complaint. Rather, appellants' complaint alleges that their properties were occupied by tenants that appellants selected and contracted with, not by emergency management employees, the military, or other individuals chosen by the government. Further, under the Orders challenged by the complaint, appellants can still evict tenants, terminate leases, or non-renew leases in certain circumstances; they can still lease vacant units and collect rent; and if tenants do not pay rent, appellants maintain the right to sue for rent owed. We are satisfied that, for purposes of MEMA, this type of government order...