Dorsainvil v. City of N.Y.

JOERY DORSAINVIL, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MICHELLE MORRA,and MICHELLE GERLICK, Defendants.

19-CV-02323 (RPK) (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

November 4, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Joery Dorsainvil brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York and two New York City Police Department ("NYPD") detectives, alleging that an arrest and subsequent prosecution violated his constitutional rights. Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, municipal liability, and a violation of substantive due process rights that are contained in the Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), which is the current operative pleading. See Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' MTD Br.") (Dkt. #46). Plaintiff has filed several motions seeking to amend his complaint another time, which were referred to Magistrate Judge Gold for a report and recommendation ("R. & R.") (Dkt. #71). Judge Gold has issued an R. & R. recommending that plaintiff's motions seeking to amend the complaint be denied because the proposed amendments would be futile. As described below, I adopt Judge Gold's R. & R. and deny plaintiff's motions seeking to amend the complaint. And for substantially the reasons set out in Judge Gold's R. & R., I also grant the partial motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

I assume familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, see R. &. R. at 3-6, which I describe here only as needed to address plaintiff's motion to amend and R. & R objections.

Plaintiff's TAC asserts nine claims under Section 1983, which "provides a cause of action against any person who deprives an individual of federally guaranteed rights 'under color' of state law." Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). He alleges false arrest, false imprisonment, a violation of substantive due process based on "reckless investigation," malicious prosecution, municipal failure to train and to supervise, two counts of fabrication of evidence, and two counts of denial of the right to a fair trial. See generally TAC (Dkt. #43). Plaintiff names as defendants the City of New York, NYPD Detective Michelle Morra, and former NYPD Detective Michelle Gerlick. Defendants seek to dismiss the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and municipal liability, as well as plaintiff's claim that defendants violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights by conducting a reckless investigation. See generally Defs.' MTD Br.

Plaintiff has filed several related motions seeking to amend the complaint again. These are (i) a motion to amend the complaint, see Pl.'s Mot. to Amend (Dkt. #55), along with a proposed fourth amended complaint ("Orig. Proposed Compl.") (Dkt. #55-1); (ii) a motion to supplement his proposed fourth amended complaint, see Pl.'s Mot. to Suppl. (Dkt. #61); (iii) a motion to withdraw those motions to amend and supplement, see Pl.'s Mot. to Withdraw (Dkt. #65); and (iv) a revised motion to amend the complaint, see Pl.'s Revised Mot. to Amend (Dkt. #66), along with a supplemental proposed fourth amended complaint ("Suppl. Proposed Compl.") (Dkt. #66-1) (collectively, the "amendment motions"). In plaintiff's amendment motions, he seeks to revise his municipal liability and substantive due process claims, as well as expand his claims of denial ofthe right to a fair trial. He also seeks to add a procedural due process claim. See generally Suppl. Proposed Compl.

Judge Gold has recommended that plaintiff be denied leave to make these changes because they would be futile. Specifically, Judge Gold concludes that plaintiff fails to state a claim for municipal liability in his amendment motions; that his reckless investigation claim could not move forward as a claim of substantive due process; and that there was no reason for plaintiff to revise his claims of denial of a right to a fair trial because plaintiff already adequately pleaded them in the TAC. See R. & R. at 8-19. Judge Gold also determined that plaintiff's proposed claim of procedural due process was time-barred. See R. & R. at 20-22.

Plaintiff filed timely objections to Judge Gold's R. & R. See Pl.'s Obj. to R. & R. ("Pl.'s Obj.") (Dkt. #72). He argues in his objections that the false arrest and false imprisonment claims should not be dismissed. Plaintiff also objects to Judge Gold's recommendation that he be denied leave to amend his substantive due process and municipal liability claims. Id. ¶¶ 1-3. Plaintiff generally objects to the denial of his motions to amend, supplement, and withdraw. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Defendants urge the Court to adopt the R. &. R. in full. See Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Obj. (Dkt. #73).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) directs a court to dismiss a complaint that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To avoid dismissal on this basis, a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The facial "plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'" but it requires a plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to enable the court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged." Ibid. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof [of the facts alleged] is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quotations omitted).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court, however, is not obligated to adopt "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" that are "supported by mere conclusory statements." Ibid.

II. Review of a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

The standard of review a district court should use when considering an order or recommendation from a magistrate judge depends on whether the issue "is dispositive of a party's claim or defense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive issue, then the district court "must consider" those objections and "modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). If a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's recommendation on a dispositive issue, then the district court must "determine de novo" those parts of the ruling that have been "properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Statements that "simply reiterate previous arguments or make only conclusory statements" do not suffice as objections. Fischer v. Forrest, 286 F. Supp. 3d 590, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citations omitted); see Mario v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Merely referring the court to previously filed papers or arguments does not constitute an adequate objection . . . ."). Those parts of an R. & R. that are uncontested or are not properly objected to may be reviewed for "clear error." Alvarez Sosa v. Barr, 369 F. Supp. 3d 492, 497 (E.D.N.Y.2019) (citation omitted); see Nelson v. Smith, 618 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note to 1983 addition). Clear error will only be found if after reviewing the entire record, the court is "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2015).

Courts have recognized some division in this circuit "on the issue of whether, and under what circumstances, motions to amend a pleading are dispositive or nondispositive." Wilson v. City of New York, No. 06-CV-229 (ARR) (VVP), 2008 WL 1909212, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2008); compare Fielding v. Tollaksen, 510 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2007) (suggesting that motions to amend are nondispositive), with Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 461 F. App'x 18, 25 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that magistrate judge's denial of leave to file any amended complaint that contained state-law claims "effectively dismissed [plaintiff's] existing state-law claims" and "amounted to a ruling on a dispositive matter"). Although it is not apparent that de novo review of the R. & R. is required, I have conducted a de novo review of the portions of the R. & R. to which plaintiff has raised non-conclusory objections, because those portions are all closely related to the motion to dismiss that was not referred to Judge Gold. I have reviewed the remaining portions of the R. & R. for clear error.

DISCUSSION

Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims is granted because those claims are time-barred. In addition, plaintiff's claims against the City of New York are dismissed because plaintiff has failed to adequately plead municipal liability. Finally, plaintiff's claim that the individual defendants deprived him of substantive due process by conducting a reckless investigation must be dismissed because plaintiff has failed to plead a valida substantive due process claim. And plaintiff is denied leave to amend the municipal liability and substantive due process claims because the proposed amendments would be futile.

I. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment must be dismissed because they are time-barred. In New York, the statute of limitations for claims under Section 1983 is three years from the date on which the claim accrued. See Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2009)); Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 963 (2d...