Dorval v. Tinsley

WILNICK DORVAL, Plaintiff, v. MELISSA TINSLEY and JACK A. TINSLEY, JR., Defendants.

Civ. No. 19-23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

January 15, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.¹

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Melissa Tinsley and Jack Tinsley, Jr. (collectively, "Defendants"). (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff Wilnick Dorval ("Plaintiff") opposes. (ECF No. 14.) The Court has decided this Motion on the written submissions of the parties, pursuant to Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Sapphire Village Condominium Complex ("Sapphire Village") is a condominium complex located in St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands. Plaintiff has rented Unit 265 at Sapphire Village since October 1, 2015. (Compl. ¶ 4.1.7, ECF No. 1.) On April 1, 2019, Plaintiff commenced this civil action by filing the Complaint, alleging that the Sapphire Village Condominium Association (the "Association"), along with the owners and tenants of SapphireVillage, have conspired with each other to drive Plaintiff out of his apartment primarily by making excessive noise. (See id. ¶¶ 4.1-4.2.10.)

For example, Plaintiff alleges that the Association and other Sapphire Village tenants conspired to tamper with all of the screen doors in the St. Vincent building to make loud noises that reverberated through Plaintiff's apartment. (Id. ¶¶ 4.2.1-4.2.10.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that the Association has made coordinated efforts to conduct construction and repairs around his apartment to create noise. (Id. ¶¶ 4.7.1-4.7.12.) Plaintiff also claims that several Sapphire Village tenants follow him around St. Thomas blocking his path, harassing him, moving their heads "wildly" at him, and intentionally provoking him. (Id. ¶¶ 4.10.1-4.10.7.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that the Association engages in "unlawful discovery," through which Sapphire Village employees and residents search his apartment and trash without his consent. (Id. ¶¶ 4.12.1-4.12.7.)

Plaintiff alleges that the motivation for this conduct is racial discrimination because he is black and from Haiti. (Id. ¶ 1.1.) Plaintiff claims that, due to his race, the Association, owners, and tenants seek to force him out of his apartment and out of the United States. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff states that:

Defendants have no legitimate non-discriminatory reason to justify their treatment of Plaintiff, rather, Defendants based their action on Plaintiff's race and national origin. Because of Defendants' discriminatory act, Plaintiff is deprived of the use of his apartment and bedroom; of the privileges and benefits of Sapphire Village Development and was denied the right to make and enforce a contract, was subject to unlawful discrimination and was denied equal treatment in a place of public accommodation.

(Id. ¶ 1.3.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants Melissa Tinsley and Jack Tinsley, Jr. own Unit 273 at Sapphire Village and lease it out. (Id. ¶ 4.4.29.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants and theirunnamed tenants conspired with the Association and others to "make loud banging, stumping and screaking noise disturbances to cover-up the hammering noise disturbances" made by the prior tenants of Unit 273. (Id. ¶ 4.4.31.) Dorval specifically alleges noise disturbances from Unit 273 between the dates of October 29, 2019 and November 9, 2019 as well as between February 25, 2019 and March 13, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 4.4.38-4.4.39.)

The Complaint alleges eleven causes of action. Counts 1 and 2 allege violations of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). (Id. ¶¶ 5.1.1-5.2.10.) Count 3 alleges violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id. ¶¶ 5.3.1-5.3.10.) Count 4 alleges violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. (Id. ¶¶ 5.4.1-5.4.8.) Count 5 alleges violations under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. (Id. ¶¶ 5.5.1-5.5.3.) Count 6 alleges violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Id. ¶¶ 5.6.1-5.6.8.) Count 7 alleges unlawful entry, trespass, invasion of privacy, unlawful search and seizure, and conversion. (Id. ¶¶ 5.7.1-5.7.9.) Count 8 alleges violations under Virgin Islands privacy and nuisance laws. (Id. ¶¶ 5.8.1-5.8.9.) Count 9 alleges negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 5.9.1-5.9.7.) Count 10 alleges a civil and criminal conspiracy to violate the FHA. (Id. ¶¶ 5.10.1-5.10.4.) Count 11 alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. ¶¶ 5.11.1-5.11.6.)

Plaintiff filed four other civil cases alleging nearly identical claims against the Association and other owners and tenants at Sapphire Village. (See Civ. Nos. 16-50, 18-15, 18-29, and 18-32.) In Civ. No. 18-29, the Court dismissed Counts 5 and 6, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, respectively, and allowed the remaining claims to proceed. (Civ. No. 18-29, ECF No. 534.) On May 10, 2019, Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement and to Strike. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff opposed. (ECF No. 14.) On December 4, 2019, the Court consolidated this case with the four related cases. (ECF No. 44.) Defendants' Motion is now before the Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court should conduct a three-part analysis. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). "First, the court must 'take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must "review[] the complaint to strike conclusory allegations." Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Finally, the court must assume the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations and "determine whether the facts are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563. If the complaint does not demonstrate more than a "mere possibility of misconduct," it must be dismissed. See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Defs.' Br. at 1, ECF No. 13.) Defendants also argue that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.) In the alternative, Defendants move for a more definite statement of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and move to strike the "many outrageous allegations" in the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.)

I. Rule 8 Pleading Requirements

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes "minimal burdens on the plaintiff at the pleading stage." Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Frazier v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1986). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The allegations in the complaint must not be "so undeveloped that [they do] not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8." Tucker v. (HP) Hewlett Packard, Inc., 689 F. App'x 133, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008)). "[E]ven if it is vague, repetitious, or contains extraneous information, a pro se complaint's language will ordinarily be 'plain' if it presents cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits." Garrett, 938 F.2d at 94 (citations omitted).

Defendants argue that the lengthy Complaint contains claims unrelated to Defendants and fails to provide Defendants notice of the allegations against them. (Defs.' Br. At 3-4.) While the Complaint is long and contains numerous allegations against individuals other than Defendants, the Complaint is not so vague and undeveloped as to warrant dismissal under Rule 8, especially considering Plaintiff's pro se status. The Complaint specifically outlines the allegations against the Defendants in a section titled "Defendants Jack Tinsley jr. and Melissa Tinsley Jr.'s." (See Compl. ¶¶ 4.4.29-4.4.42.) Although many sections relate to the actions of other individuals, the Complaint alleges that Defendants were involved in a conspiracy with those individuals, such that their actions are relevant. (Id. ¶¶ 5.10.1-5.10.2.) Furthermore, the Complaint lays out thelegal basis for Plaintiff's claims in Counts 1 through 11 against Defendants and/or their alleged co-conspirators. (See id. ¶¶ 5.1.1-5.11.6.) These elements provide Defendants with sufficient notice as to the allegations against them. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 8 is denied.

II. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants challenge each of the eleven counts in the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants first argue that Count 1 is vague because it references the FHA in its entirety, rather than pinpointing the specific provision at issue. (Defs.' Br. at 5.) Although the Complaint does not specify the specific provision, Count 1 provides enough detail on the alleged violations to adequately state a claim at the...