Dougherty v. Drew Univ.

534 F.Supp.3d 363

Crista and Angel DOUGHERTY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.DREW UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

Civ. No. 21-00249 (KM) (ESK)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed April 14, 2021

Philip Lawrence Fraietta, Bursor & Fisher PA, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Mia Rosati, Michael Edward Baughman, Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Angelo A. Stio, III, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Princeton, NJ, for Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Drew University transitioned to virtual instruction and suspended campus operations. Angel Dougherty, an undergraduate during the Spring 2020 semester, and her mother, Crista Dougherty, have sued the University, asserting contract and tort claims on the theory that the University did not provide the education and college experience she had a right to expect. The University moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (DE 6.)¹ For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART .

I. BACKGROUND

Angel Dougherty studied art as an undergraduate student at Drew University, a private institution in New Jersey. (Compl. ¶¶ 13–14.) She entered her final semester in Spring 2020. (Id. ¶ 13.) Her course of study naturally would entail in-person instruction and events; for example, her degree program usually culminates in a live gallery show. (Id. )

Angel's mother, Crista,² financed her spring semester. (Id. ¶ 14.) Tuition for that semester cost the average undergraduate $19,914. (Id. ¶ 21.) Crista paid approximately $8,000 in tuition, as well as an "Art Fee" of $75, a "Parking Fee" of $200, and a "Technology Fee" of $125. (Id. ¶ 14.)³

For Crista and Angel, as for all of us, the spring of 2020 did not unfold as expected. The COVID-19 pandemic swept through the world in the early months of 2020. In March 2020, the University suspended in-person classes, closed the campus, and transitioned courses to a virtual-instruction format. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.) This mode of instruction, according to the Complaint, was "subpar" and "in no way" was "equivalent" to in-person instruction. (Id. ¶¶ 37–38.) The Academic Catalog, which contains course descriptions and education policies, stated that many courses would encompass in-person activities, like field trips, but as it turned out, virtual instruction has not provided anything comparable. (Id. ¶¶ 25–32, 34.) The Catalog contains a "reservation of rights" that allows the University to make changes to academic programs. (RR.) Nonetheless, virtual instruction deprived students of the on-campus experience, which the University markets as an advantage of being a student at Drew. (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 38.) Despite the discrepancy between what she expected and what she received, Crista did not receive a refund of any tuition or fees. (Id. ¶ 14.)

The Doughertys sued the University in New Jersey Superior Court, seeking to represent a class of students enrolled for the Spring 2020 semester. (Id. ¶ 40.) They asserted claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) conversion, and (4) money had and received. (Id. ¶¶ 53–88.) They allege that the Academic Catalog's course descriptions, which refer to in-person activities, were "promises" which the University broke when it transitioned to virtual learning. (E.g. , id. ¶¶ 24–32.) They allege that they reasonably expected an in-person education and on-campus experience, based on normal expectations and more specifically on the University's marketing statements. (Id. ¶¶ 33–38.) They seek damages consisting of a "pro-rata share of the tuition and fees" because in-person education was not provided for 49% of the semester. (Id. ¶ 64.)

The University removed the case to this Court. Although the parties are not diverse (the Doughertys are New Jersey residents) and the Complaint alleges no federal claims, the University invoked federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441, 1446. (Notice ¶ 16.) See Section III.C.1, infra. A threshold issue in any putative class action, however, is whether the plaintiffs themselves possess a viable claim. See Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Grp. , 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim."). The University has moved to dismiss the Doughertys’ complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Mot.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require that a pleading contain detailed factual allegations but "more than labels and conclusions." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The allegations must raise a claimant's right to relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is "plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. That standard is met when "factual content [ ] allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim. The defendant bears the burden to show that no claim has been stated. Davis v. Wells Fargo , 824 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2016). I accept facts in the complaint as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Morrow v. Balaski , 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).

III. DISCUSSION

At the threshold, I consider sua sponte whether plaintiffs possess Article III standing, a jurisdictional prerequisite. (Section III.A.) I then consider the substance of the Doughertys’ claims regarding tuition (Section III.B) and fees (Section III.C). See Burt v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of R.I. , 523 F. Supp. 3d 214, 220, 223 No. 20-465 (D.R.I. Mar. 4, 2021) (analyzing the tuition and fees issues separately).

A. Standing

Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives federal courts the power to hear "cases" and "controversies," U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, which the Supreme Court interprets to mean that a plaintiff must have "standing," Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 102–04, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). To have standing, a plaintiff must have an injury that is traceable to the defendant and redressable by the suit. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 792, 797, 209 L.Ed.2d 94 (2021). Because standing is a component of jurisdiction, a federal court has an independent obligation to assure itself that standing exists. Wayne Land & Min. Grp., LLC v. Del. River Basin Comm'n , 959 F.3d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 2020).

The issue of standing, though not raised by the parties, suggests itself because courts in similar cases have held that such parent plaintiffs lack standing. Metzner v. Quinnipiac Univ. , 528 F. Supp. 3d 15, 24, No. 20-cv-784 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2021) (collecting cases). Those courts have reasoned that the parent, although the payor of tuition, was not injured, because the parent was not the person who received the allegedly inferior education. Id. While these courts acknowledge that generally parents can sue on behalf of minor children to challenge school conditions, that standing evaporates once the child reaches the age of majority. Id. While I do not find that reasoning implausible, I do not follow it here, for two reasons.

First, it is not really necessary to address Crista's standing. "[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement." Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc. , 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) ; see also N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Pres. of U.S. , 653 F.3d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Only one of the three named plaintiffs must establish standing in order for a court to consider the merits ...."). Angel has standing because she suffered an injury by receiving a different, allegedly lesser education than expected. This injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy, so I can proceed to the merits. In short, this case is going forward; Crista's presence in the caption is, at worst, superfluous.

Second, and regardless, I believe Crista's presence in the caption is appropriate. I remain unconvinced that a parent's ability to bring suit in these cases presents a jurisdictional issue of Article III standing. The Supreme Court and Third Circuit have explained that whether a contract "inures to the benefit of" a litigant, such that she can sue to enforce it, is a merits question, not a standing question. Perry v. Thomas , 482 U.S. 483, 492, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) ; see Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC , 369 F.3d 263, 272 (3d Cir. 2004). Standing, to simplify a bit, focuses only on whether there is any injury. In analyzing that question, the court must "assume[ ] that the plaintiff's legal theory is correct because, were that not the case, the court would effectively be deciding the merits under the guise of determining the plaintiff's standing." Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States , 948 F.3d 363, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up); see Whitmore v. Arkansas , 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) ("Our threshold inquiry into standing in no way depends on the merits of the [plaintiff's] contention that particular conduct is illegal ...." (citation omitted)).

So I assume, for standing purposes, the correctness of Crista's legal position that her relationship with the University was a contractual one. The standing question, then, is only whether the alleged breach would cause her a traceable and redressable injury. It would, because she paid tuition to the University and seeks what amounts to a refund. See Mission Prods. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1660, 203 L.Ed.2d 876 (201...