Douglas v. State

378 So.3d 361

Willie DOUGLAS a/k/a Willie Ludall Douglas a/k/a Willie L. Douglas

v.STATE of Mississippi

NO. 2022-KA-00859-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

01/18/2024

PANOLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. JAMES McCLURE, III, JUDGE

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: WILLIE DOUGLAS (PRO SE) OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES, Jackson, HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAUREN GABRIELLE CANTRELL

BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.

GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Willie Douglas appeals his conviction and life sentence as a habitual offender. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On two separate occasions, December 4, 2018, and January 3, 2019, confidential informant Ronald Keen met with law enforcement officers from the Batesville Police Department to make a controlled purchase of drugs from a man Keen knew as "Buddy Row." On each occasion, Keen’s person and vehicle were searched, recording equipment was placed in Keen’s vehicle, and Keen was provided $20 in cash. Officers followed Keen to the Bradford Trailer Park and positioned themselves near the trailer park as Keen entered. The audio and video recordings from each occasion showed Keen purchase a substance believed to be cocaine from Buddy Row for $20. Keen then left the trailer park and met officers at an agreed upon location. Officers collected each substance from Keen and put it in an evidence bag.

¶3. The two collected substances were sent to and analyzed by the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory. Erik Frazure, the section chief over the drug analysis section at the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory and an expert in forensic science specializing in drug analysis, opined that the two substances were determined to be cocaine in the amount of, 0.169 grams and 0.194 grams.

¶4. Douglas was indicted and charged with two counts of the sale of less than two grams of cocaine. The indictment further charged Douglas as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2015).

¶5. At trial,¹ Keen recounted the events of December 4 and January 3. Keen testified that on each occasion he met with police who searched his person and vehicle, placed recording equipment in his vehicle, and provided him $20 in cash. He then drove to Bradford Trailer Park where he purchased a substance believed to be cocaine from Buddy Row in exchange for $20. Keen identified Douglas as the man he knew as Buddy Row, and he confirmed that Douglas was the man from whom he purchased the drugs.

¶6. Douglas did not testify or present any evidence or testimony at trial. The jury found Douglas guilty on both counts.

¶7. At the sentencing hearing, two witnesses testified regarding Douglas’s habitual offender status. Trina Burris, the records department supervisor for the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), testified that Douglas was previously convicted in Quitman County of grand larceny and served one year and 251 days on that conviction. Lori Priest, director of records management for the Tennessee, Department of Corrections (TDOC), testified that Douglas had been previously convicted of aggravated robbery in Shelby County and served approximately seven years on that charge.

¶8. Douglas did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his habitual offender status. Both MDOC’s and TDOC’s pen packs² were admitted into evidence without objection from Douglas, Douglas was sentenced, as a habitual offender under Section 99-19-83, to life without parole in the custody of the MDOC.

¶9. Douglas filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial, which the trial court denied. Douglas timely appealed.

¶10. On appeal, Douglas’s appellate counsel raised one issue—whether Douglas’s sentence is illegal. Douglas filed a pro se supplemental brief and asserted, additional issues.³

DISCUSSION

I. Illegal Sentence

[1] ¶11. Douglas was indicted and charged as a habitual offender under Section 99-19-83. "[Section] 99-19-83 requires that a defendant have been twice convicted, sentenced, and served separate terms of one year or more in prison, and one of the felonies must have been a crime of violence." Akins v. State, 493 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (Miss. 1986).

¶12. Under Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.1(b)(1), if a defendant is eligible for an enhanced punishment because of one or more prior convictions, the State shall specify such prior conviction(s) in the indictment, identifying each such prior conviction by the name of the crime, the name of the court in which each such conviction occurred and the cause number(s), the date(s) of conviction, and, if relevant, the length of time the accused was incarcerated for each such conviction[.].

MRCrP 14.1(b)(1) (emphasis added).

¶13. The habitual-offender portion of Douglas’s indictment stated as follows:

the said WILLIE LUDALL DOUGLAS having been previously convicted of Grand Larceny in Cause No 5387 in the Circuit Court of Quitman County, Mississippi and sentenced on 3/5/96 to serve a term of one (l) year or more in the Department of Corrections;

and the said WILLIE LUDALL DOUGLAS having been previously convicted of Aggravated Robbery in Cause No 96-08235 in the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee and sentenced on 5/6/99 to serve a term of one (1) year or more in the Department of Corrections;

and the said WILLIE LUDALL DOUGLAS thereby coming under Section 99-19-83, Mississippi Code 1972 Annotated, as amended, a Mississippi habitual offender statute; contrary to the form of the statute in such cases provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

¶14. It is undisputed that Douglas’s indictment does not include the length of time he actually served on each prior felony conviction. Douglas argues that because his indictment does not include the length of time he was incarcerated for each prior conviction, it is defective under Rule 14.1(b)(1). He claims that as a result of the defective indictment, his enhanced sen- tence under Section 99-19-83 is illegal and should be vacated.

[2] ¶15. "The question of whether an indictment is defective is an issue of law and therefore deserves a relatively broad standard of review, or de novo review, by this Court." Tapper v. State, 47 So. 3d 95, 100 (Miss. 2010) (citing Montgomery v. State, 891 So. 2d 179, 185 (Miss. 2004)).

¶16. Douglas challenges the sufficiency of his indictment for the first time on appeal. As the record reflects, Douglas failed to raise the issue in the trial court. Under Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.4(b), "[d]efects respecting the indictment shall be raised by written motion." MRCrP 14.4(b) (emphasis added). In Wells v. State, the indictment "failed to specify whether the [prior] convictions occurred in the First or Second Judicial District of Harrison County." Wells v. State, 160 So. 3d 1136, 1144 (Miss. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Rowsey v. State, 188 So. 3d 486, 494 (Miss. 2015). Wells argued that because the indictment "did not state with particularity the precise state jurisdiction of his previous conviction," the indictment was invalid and insufficiently charged him as a habitual and subsequent offender; Id. The Court agreed "that the failure to specify the judicial district in the [indictment] was erroneous" but found that Wells’s failure to object to the error at trial barred the issue from consideration on appeal. Id.

¶17. Recently, in Young v. State, the Court considered whether the indictment was sufficient to charge Young as a habitual offender. Young v. State, 368 So. 3d 299, 301 (Miss. 2023). Young’s indictment "fail[ed] in every respect" to comply with Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. Id. at 303. The indictment did "not identify or describe the nature of the previous convictions, their dates, their cause numbers, their sentences or the court from which they were rendered." Id. Nevertheless, the Court found "Young’s failure to object to the defective indictment in the trial court resulted in the waiver of this issue on appeal." Id. at 302. The Court explained:

The State made no attempt to amend Young’s indictment in this case. "Mississippi caselaw clearly holds that a trial court may allow amendment of an indictment to charge a defendant as a habitual offender because the amendment does not affect the substance of the charged crime but only the subsequent sentencing." Therefore, had the State sought to amend Young’s indictment in the trial court, it would have been permissible as an amendment to its form. Because the indictment was defective as to its form and could have been amended in the trial court, Young’s failure to object in the trial court waived the issue, and Young is barred from raising it for the first time on appeal.

Id. at 303-04 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

¶18. Here, as in Wells and Young, Douglas failed to object to the alleged defective indictment in the trial court, and he raises the issue for the first time on appeal. Wells, 160 So. 3d at 1144; Young, 368 So. 3d at 303. Contrary to Rule 14.4(b), Douglas did not "raise[] by written motion" the indictment’s failure to include the length of time he actually served on each prior felony conviction. Consequently, the issue is barred from consideration on appeal. Wells, 160 So. 3d at 1144; Young, 368 So. 3d at 303-04.

II. Improper Indictment

[3] ¶19. Douglas argues "the State filed an improper indictment in violation of the 5th Amendment, Article 3, Sec. 27" because his name was incorrect. Douglas attacks the State’s use of his middle name "Ludall" and asserts that his "legal given name is Willie Douglas." But Douglas failed to object to or challenge the indictment, on this ground in the, trial court. Consequently, this issue is barred from consideration on appeal. Wells, 160 So. 3d at 1144; Young, 368 So. 3d at 303-04. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, this issue is meritless because certified documents...