Douglas v. Univ. of Haw.

1

JAMES T. DOUGLAS, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I; ALOYSIUS HELMINCK; HEINZ GERT DE COUET; DOE DEFENDANTS

1-25, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-00217-DKW-WRP

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

August 7, 2023

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DERRICK K. WATSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff James T. Douglas, a Professor of Microbiology at the Manoa Campus of the University of Hawai‘i (“UH-Manoa” or the “University”) filed a Complaint alleging claims stemming from the University's decision to decommission his laboratory in November 2019. Dkt. No. 1. Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) filed by the three named Defendants-the University, the Dean of the College of Natural Sciences Aloysius Helminck, in his official and individual capacity and the Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Biology, Heinz Gert de Couet, also in his official and individual capacity. Dkt. No. 42.

As discussed below, sovereign immunity precludes Douglas' claims for damages under Counts 1-7, along with his claims for injunctive relief under Counts 2-7, as against the University and Helminck and de Couet in their official capacities. Additionally, as against Helminck and de Couet in their individual capacities, qualified immunity precludes Douglas' damages claims for violations of federal law under Counts 1-2, and state law precludes his damages claims for violations of state law under Counts 3-7. The MSJ is therefore GRANTED in these respects. With regard to Count 1 alone, insofar as it requests injunctive relief for ongoing First Amendment violations, summary judgment is not warranted, as Defendants did not address that claim in their MSJ.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes a Court to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'”-in other words, the facts pleaded must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566, 570 (2007)). Factual allegations that only permit the court to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct” are insufficient. Id. at 678.

Additionally, summary judgment is warranted on a claim if “the evidence in the record” and “all reasonable inferences from that evidence,” when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005). The movant “bears the initial burden of . . . demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the movant carries that burden, then “[t]o survive summary judgment, [the nonmovant] must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts” showing there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636; Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005).

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND^[1]

Douglas is a tenured Professor of Microbiology at UH-Manoa. Complaint ¶¶ 7, 13-16. He has been employed by the University since 1980 and has enjoyed a career as an esteemed researcher and professor. See id. ¶¶ 14-16; Declaration of James T. Douglas (“Douglas Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-7, 21.

In October 2017, Douglas learned that he needed knee replacement surgery and scheduled it for January 2018. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. He informed his supervisor, de Couet, about the planned surgery. Id. ¶ 17. Because he had a full class load in the semester beginning in January 2018, Douglas arranged for another professor to cover his lectures while on leave. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. He returned to work in March 2018. Id. ¶ 23. In August 2018, Douglas went out on sick leave again, in part due to a heart condition. Id. ¶ 24. As a result, he was on sick leave from August 2018 until April 2020. See id. ¶¶ 24-31.

Prior to these absences, Douglas had been assigned to teach numerous undergraduate, graduate, research, and mentoring courses at UH-Manoa. See Id. ¶¶ 19, 23, 32-34. He and his students performed research in a dedicated laboratory space in Room 101 of a campus building called Snyder Hall (“Snyder 101”). See id. ¶¶ 27-30.

On November 1, 2018, a few months after Douglas left on his second sick leave term described above, the University's Institutional Biosafety Committee (“IBC”) issued a report citing health and safety issues with Douglas' laboratory in Snyder 101, including:

- Lack of adequate supervision over the lab and the graduate students working in it;

- Unapproved manipulation of laboratory biological materials and their storage in unapproved spaces; and

- Unauthorized entries to the lab by unauthorized persons.

Dkt. No. 48-8. Douglas responded to the IBC report on November 10, 2018. See Dkt. No. 48-30.

Throughout the following year, additional communications regarding the safety issues ensued between Douglas and University leadership. Therein, Douglas maintained that the lab neither posed safety risks nor violated safety protocols, while University leadership maintained that it did. According to the University, the safety concerns were not resolved in a timely manner, and, around June 2019, leadership decided to decommission Snyder 101 and dispose of the lab's biological and research contents for the safety reasons cited by the IBC.^[2] The closure took place between November 14, 2019 and January 27, 2020. See Dkt. Nos. 43-7, 48-26, 48-28 (letter stating destruction would begin on November 14, 2019); Dkt. No. 48-33 (January 27, 2020 email from contractor stating that “decontamination and clean-out of Snyder 101 and adjoining labs” was complete).

On December 2, 2019, Douglas filed a formal complaint against Helminck, de Couet, and others, pursuant to the University's Executive Policy 12.211, alleging “Research Misconduct,” including the “malicious destruction of data or other products of research or scholarship.” Dkt. No. 48-31 at 1.

In April 2020, Douglas returned from sick leave. Complaint ¶ 31. Shortly thereafter, in July 2020, he learned he would not be assigned any research courses for the fall semester, due to his lack of access to laboratory space following the decommissioning of Snyder 101. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. He alleges that he has since been unable to conduct research, independently or with students. Id.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Douglas initiated this action by filing a Complaint on May 3, 2021, asserting seven claims against the University and Helminck and de Couet in their individual and official capacities. Dkt. No. 1. The Complaint asserts that the University's past destruction of his laboratory and ongoing failure to provide current laboratory access constituted: (1) an infringement of his First Amendment freedoms of association and speech, and interference with academic freedom, by preventing him from continuing prior research and pursuing future research; (2) a violation of his right to procedural due process because it was done without proper process; (3) a breach of his employment contract with the University; (4) a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) conversion; (6) tortious interference with prospective business advantage; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress.^[3] Douglas seeks damages for past violations and declaratory and injunctive relief for prospective violations. A jury trial in this matter is scheduled for November 12, 2024. See Dkt. No. 55 at 1.

On May 19, 2023, Defendants filed the instant MSJ, Dkt. No. 42, along with a concise statement of facts, Dkt. No. 43. On June 30, 2023, Douglas opposed the MSJ, Dkt. No. 49, and filed a responsive concise statement of facts, Dkt. No. 48 at 2-4, and an additional concise statement of facts, Dkt. No. 48 at 4-5. On July 7, 2023, Defendants replied. Dkt. No. 51. The Court heard oral argument on these matters on July 21, 2023, see Dkt. No. 52, and this Order follows.

DISCUSSION

I. Sovereign Immunity: Claims Brought against the University and the Individual Defendants in their Official Capacities

In general, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages against “a state, an ‘arm of the state,' its instrumentalities, [] its agencies,” and state officials in their official capacities. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 67-69 (1985); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995).^[4] The only exceptions are where the state has unequivocally consented to waive its immunity, and/or where Congress overrides the state's immunity. Will, 491 U.S. at 67-68.

Here Douglas concedes that the University of Hawai‘i, along with Helminck and de Couet in their official capacities, are “arm[s] of the state” that are protected against damages suits by sovereign immunity. See Dkt. No. 49 at 10-12; see also Mukaida v....