Dove v. Childs

920 A.2d 511

173 Md. App. 602

Loy DOVE, et al. v. Walter CHILDS, et al.

No. 233, Sept. Term, 2006.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 4, 2007.

Paul N. De Santis, Towson (Nevett Steele, Jr., on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Lawrence J. Gebhardt, Baltimore, for appellee.

Panel EYLER, JAMES R., SHARER, WOODWARD, JJ.

JAMES R. EYLER, J.

This case requires interpretation of the Maryland Mobile Home Parks Act of 1980, Maryland Code (2003 Repl.Vol.), §§ 8A101 to 8A-1803 of the Real Property Article ("the Act"), and Howard County ordinances regulating mobile home developments, specifically, § 16.516 of the Howard County Code.

The owners of a mobile home park, after giving notice to the tenants of their intention to close the park as of a certain date, sought and obtained a judgment of restitution of possession, requiring the tenants to vacate the park. The tenants appeal from that decision and contend the court erred because the owners were not in compliance with the above laws.

Perceiving no error, we shall affirm the judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Henry Meyn and Marie Meyn, spouses, and John and Evelyn Meyn, spouses, owned two adjoining parcels of land, consisting of 6.47 acres, located on Gorman Road in Howard County ("the property"). In 1955, the Meyns established Ev-Mar Mobile Home Village ("the Park") on the property. The property is zoned R-MH (residential — mobile home). Sometime after 1955, John Meyn and Marie Meyn died, leaving their spouses, Henry and Evelyn, as the owners. Henry and Evelyn continued to operate the Park.

In June, 1997, Henry and Evelyn died. Walter S.B. Childs, an appellee, is personal representative of the estate of Henry Meyn, and J. Timothy Matlock, the other appellee, is personal representative of the estate of Evelyn Meyn. The estates were involved in litigation with each other, which resulted in a settlement agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, the two parcels of land were to be sold and the proceeds divided according to agreed upon percentages.

In January, 2003, appellees filed an application to change the zoning classification on the property. Appellees stated that their intention was to eventually close the Park and sell the property. The residents of the Park protested, and in February 2004, the County authorities denied the application.

In April, 2004, appellees entered into a contract to sell the property and to deliver it to the purchaser vacant and unoccupied. Also in April, 2004, the tenants in the Park formed Ev-Mar Village Residents' Association, Inc. to advance their interests.

On May 5, 2004, appellees sent notices to the tenants advising them that they were going to close the Park as of June 1 2005. Appellees sent subsequent notices on May 10, May 21, June 23, August 6 in 2004, and on April 13, 2005. They also held meetings with the tenants. The notices provided that if the tenants did not vacate by June 1, 2005, appellees would proceed against them as holdover tenants. Appellees offered the tenants relocation assistance if they did not contest the closing of the Park.

In May, 2005, appellees surrendered their license to operate the Park.

On May 5, 2005, Ev-Mar Village Residents' Association, Inc. and individual tenants filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Howard County against appellees, asserting fraud and violation of State and County statutes, including the Act and Howard County Code § 16.516. That action is pending.

On June 6, 2005, appellees initiated tenant holding over proceedings in the District Court of Maryland, in Howard County, against appellants,¹ the tenants who had not vacated the Park. Appellants filed a demand for jury trial, and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Howard County.

On July 5, 2005, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment of restitution of possession. The motion was supported by an affidavit from Walter S.B. Childs dated June 30, 2005, appellants' leases, the notices to appellants, and affidavits from some of the appellants.²

Appellants filed an opposition to the motion. They argued that the leases had not been properly terminated under the Act and the County Code because it could only be done in conjunction with a zoning change, and the attempted closure of the Park was unlawful. Appellants attached documents, demonstrating that appellees had mismanaged the Park, creating safety and health concerns. According to appellants, the attempted closure was motivated by a desire to retaliate because of appellants' opposition to appellees' requested zoning change and the fact that appellants formed a tenants' association. Thus, they alleged that appellees' action constituted a retaliatory eviction under the Act and the County Code.

On September 2, 2005, the circuit court held a hearing, and by order dated January 5, 2006 and docketed on January 9, it granted appellees' motion. In its accompanying opinion, the court explained that the rental agreements had terminated, appellants had received proper notice, and appellees' actions did not constitute a retaliatory eviction.

Appellants requested a stay of the order, which was denied. Appellants did not post a bond.

On January 19, 2005, appellants filed a motion to alter or amend. Appellants attached (1) their first amended complaint, filed in the action seeking damages and injunctive relief, (2) materials relating to the legislative history of the Act, and (3) an Attorney General's opinion and a law review article, relating to the interpretation of the Act.

In late January to early February, 2006, appellants were removed under warrants of restitution. All appellants were removed by February 8, 2006.

Contentions

Appellants contend that the court erred (1) in interpreting § 8A-202(c)(3) of the Act as permitting a change in use without a change in zoning, and (2) in failing to consider Howard County Code § 16.516, which provides protection over and above that provided in the Act.

Appellees contend (1) the issues presented are moot, (2) the proceedings initiated by them were tenant holding over proceedings, not evictions, (3) the leases had all been terminated by June 1, 2005, and (4) they complied with the holdover tenant provisions in § 8A-1702(b)(2) of the Act.

In a "corrected appendix" to their brief, filed in this Court, appellees included an affidavit from Walter S.B. Childs dated January 4, 2007. According to appellees, the affidavit is substantively the same as an affidavit they filed previously in this Court, in support of their motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of mootness. We denied that motion.

Appellants, in their reply brief, assert that we should not consider the affidavit because it was filed too late.

The affidavit relates to the issue of mootness. We shall consider the affidavit, but as explained below, we shall not dismiss the appeal.

Mootness

Appellees point out that the Park has been closed, the license to operate it has been surrendered, and the judgment of restitution of possession has been enforced. Thus, appellees conclude that, even if this Court found merit in appellants' claims, it could not provide a remedy.

Appellants argue that the questions raised are relevant to their claims for damages and attorney's fees in the action in which they are plaintiffs. In addition, appellants urge us to exercise our discretion and decide the issues because they raise important matters of public interest that are likely to recur. Pursuant to § 8A-1702(b)(2) of the Act, a bond must be posted in order to stay a judgment of restitution of possession, and according to appellants, it is likely that a mobile home park tenant will not be able to post a bond in sufficient amount.³

The Court of Appeals has explained:

"`Generally, appellate courts do not decide academic or moot questions. A question is moot if, at the time it is before the Court, there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide.'" Attorney Gen. v. Anne Arundel Co. School Bus Contractors Assn., Inc., 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749 (1979). The Court of Appeals has recently made clear that, when moot questions are raised on appeal, this Court should dismiss the appeal on the ground of mootness. Cottman v. State, 395 Md. 729, 912 A.2d 620 (2006), slip. op. at 14.

There are, however, exceptions to the general rule that appellate courts will not decide moot questions. In Cottman, the Court of Appeals recognized that "`[t]here is a public benefit derived from published opinions, which is the reason appellate courts are sometimes willing to decide moot questions where it appears that there are important issues of public interest raised which merit an expression of our views for the guidance of courts and litigants in the future.'" Id. at 15, 912 A.2d 620 (Internal quotes and citations omitted.). This Court may reach the merits of a moot question "`where the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest. . . .'" Albert S. v. Dept. of Health, 166 Md.App. 726, 744, 891 A.2d 402 (2006) (quoting Lloyd v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379 (1954)).

In Lloyd, the Court of Appeals listed the circumstances under which Maryland appellate courts may decide moot issues:

[I]f the public interest clearly will be hurt if the question is not immediately decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between the government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision, then the Court may find justification for deciding the issues raised by a question which has become moot, particularly if all of these factors concur with sufficient weight. 206 Md. at 43, 111 A.2d 379.

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