Downey v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-143

ROBERT DOWNEY, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al, Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-143

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 17, 2019

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Robert Downey ("Downey"), commenced this action on January 25, 2017, while incarcerated at State Correctional Institute Waymart (SCI Waymart). The events giving rise to his complaint occurred during the time of his incarceration at SCI Waymart. (Doc. 1 at 2-3, ¶¶ 5-6). Downey filed an amended complaint on January 26, 2017 (Doc. 3), and a second amended complaint on June 3, 2017. (Doc. 37). Downey seeks monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for Eighth Amendment violations, multiple causes of action pursuant to Pennsylvania state law, and injunctive relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626, to cease violations of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 37, ¶¶ 1-3). Defendants Jessica Ashby, Correct Care Solutions, Janan Loomis, Tom Lyons, David Tomazic and Jennifer Villano (collectively, the "Medical Defendants") moved for summary judgment on December 27, 2018. (Doc. 71). Defendants Paul DelRosso, Pennsylvania Department of Correction, and Jack Sommers (collectively, the "DOC Defendants") moved for summary judgment on January 28, 2019. (Doc. 76). Both sets of defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Downey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The motions were fully briefed, and oral argument was held on March 28, 2019. The motions are now ripe for review.

This case presents the unfortunate circumstance in which by virtue of filing a lawsuit one day before being released from prison, the Plaintiff is barred from recovery under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Because he received the injunctive relief he sought, albeit after some time, there was no injunctive relief to grieve. But Plaintiff sought monetary damages, and those must also be grieved. When an inmate files a claim that is not grieved, and that grievance process has not been rendered unavailable, then this Court simply does not have jurisdiction to hear that claim. As such, judgment must be entered in Defendants' favor, and this case dismissed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The factual background is taken from Defendants' Statements of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. 73; Doc. 77); Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statements of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. 79; Doc. 92); and Plaintiff's Counterstatements of Facts (Doc. 80; Doc. 93), to the extent the facts are admitted or otherwise undisputed. Where the parties dispute certain facts, those disputes are noted. In addition, the facts have been taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor. At argument, the parties agreed that the only fact in dispute is whether Downey's condition was one of an urgent or emergent nature such that the PLRA's requirement that he exhaust the grievance process would apply at all.

Downey was incarcerated within the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections on September 24, 2013 and transferred to SCI Waymart on January 22, 2014. (Doc. 73 at 1, ¶ 2; (Doc. 37 at 7, ¶ 33). At the time of his transfer to SCI Waymart, Downey had glaucomaaffecting both eyes. On January 26, 2015, Downey had an appointment with Dr. Roth, an ophthalmologist at Eye Care Specialists. (Doc. 73 at 2, ¶ 3). Dr. Roth referred Downey to Dr. Szulborski for a surgical consultation. Dr. Szulborski is an opthamologist that specialized in glaucoma procedures. (Doc. 79 at 2, ¶ 3 Doc. 81-1 at 44-49). Dr. Tozmic of SCI Waymart approved that order for the consult on January 27, 2015. (Doc. 79 at 3, ¶ 4; Doc. 81-3 at 86). On March 18, 2015, Downey saw Dr. Szulborski for a surgical consultation, at which point Dr. Szulborski ordered Downey to have glaucoma surgery on both of his eyes within two weeks. (Id.; Doc. 81-1 at 37-43; Doc. 81-5 at 4). Downey did not return to Eye Care Specialists until December 2, 2015. He ultimately underwent surgery to his left eye on December 16, 2015, and surgery to his right eye on February 2, 2016, but not before significant vision loss occurred in both eyes. (Doc. 73 at 2, ¶¶ 4-5; Doc. 79 at 3-4, ¶¶ 4-5).

Downey does not dispute that he did not grieve the prison conditions that serve as the basis for his complaint. (Doc. 73 at ¶ 6; Doc. 79 at ¶ 6). Rather, Downey contends his need for glaucoma surgery was urgent or emergent in nature, and therefore the prison grievance procedure is inapplicable to his claim. (Doc. 79 at ¶ 6). Indeed, Downey readily admitted in his deposition that he was aware of the grievance process, and that he purposefully chose not to file a grievance. (Doc. 72-2 at 60). Instead of filing a grievance at any point, Downey continued to visit sick call and inquire into the status of the surgery. (Doc. 79 at ¶ 6; Doc. 80). While Downey did not file complaints in accordance with the prison grievance procedure, he did file DC 135A Requests to Staff Members regarding the scheduling of his surgery in May, July, October, and November of 2015. (Doc. 79 at ¶ 7-8; Doc. 72-7). These requests did not include any request for relief other than the scheduling of the surgery.

Downey was released from prison on January 26, 2017, nearly a year after his surgeries were complete, and just one day after filing his initial complaint in this Court. (Doc. 73 at ¶ 11; Doc. 79 at ¶ 11).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine if "a reasonable jury ... could find for the nonmoving party." Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).

A federal court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). In making this determination, "a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to thenonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor." Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the court must simply "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. However, "unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions" are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F.Supp.2d 490, 493 (E.D.Pa. 2010) (citing Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (noting that the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts").

Pursuant to the Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court accepts as true all factual statements which plaintiff does not dispute. See Hodge v. United States, No. 3: 06-CV-1622, 2009 WL 2843332, *13 (M.D. Pa. August 31, 2009). As to the facts which are disputed regarding PLRA exhaustion, the court weighs the testimony and evidence presented at the oral hearing, and makes judgments as needed. Hill v. Smith, 186 Fed. Appx. 271, 273-74 (3d Cir. 2006). An evidentiary hearing before the bench is the appropriate venue to decide an exhaustion dispute. Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. PLRA EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT

In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"). 42 U.S.C. § 1997. The PLRA mandates that prisoners exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to initiation of a suit under § 1983 for a deprivation of Constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(a). Two of the principal purposes of the PLRA are: "(1) affording corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before the initiation of a federal lawsuit; and (2) reducing the quantity, and improving the quality, of prison litigation." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 114 (2006); see also Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F. 3d 1347, 1354 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737 (2001) (requiring inmates to grieve for monetary relief when prison procedures do not provide for any and discussing a practical consideration which may satisfy an inmate, the satisfaction of having one's complaint...